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Abstract
Is defense policy more collegial than other policy issues addressed by Congress? More
specifically, what are the institutional and political motives which drive a majority of the
members of Congress to consistently transcend partisanship in order to pass defense
focused legislation into law?
The purpose of this study was to test whether or not the consideration of defense policy in
the House of Representatives is unique in its ability to transcend partisanship. And if so,
why?
Hypothesis: The formulation of defense policy in the U.S. House of Representatives is
approached with more collegiality than other policy issue areas, mainly due to
institutional, domestic, and international political pressures on members that transcend
competing partisan motivations.
Defense policy was operationalized by the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).
“Other types of policy” was operationalized by the Farm Bill and the Highway Bill.
“Collegiality,” the primary dependent variable, was defined as exceptional and consistent
cooperative interaction among colleagues over time that rendered legislation which
garnered support of at least a bipartisan supermajority (two-thirds) of the House of
Representatives upon its final passage.
A mixed methods approach was employed using the annual NDAA process as a study
vehicle. Qualitative and quantitative analysis included case studies of U.S. legislative
history that compared the NDAA process with that of the Farm Bill and Highway Bill.
Deliberations over the bills were explored during three five-year periods of notable
partisanship in U.S. politics that coupled with notable U.S. security concerns abroad:
1961-66, 1993-98, and 2007-12. Case studies were complemented by interviews with 25
members of the policy community
The study concluded that the NDAA is essentially a de facto annual omnibus
authorization bill with unparalleled political and institutional momentum that serves
individual policymaker interests as well as the public interest. As such, the NDAA is an
institution unto itself and its annual process consistently demands House members
approach it in a uniquely collegial manner, providing strong evidence defense policy
formulation is more collegial than other policy areas.

3

Prologue - 9/11
On September 11, 2001 (9/11), airplanes hijacked by terrorists at some of the
nation’s busiest airports were used as missiles to attack the United States from within.
They killed over 3,000 people, mostly Americans, at the Pentagon in Washington, D.C.,
the World Trade Center in New York City, and a field in rural Pennsylvania.
Congress acted swiftly in response and introduced the U.S.A. Providing
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (PATRIOT) Act, which
provided the government with sweeping authorities deemed necessary by policymakers at
the time to deal with the terrorist threat (Library of Congress 2015a). The bill was
referred to eight committees for consideration in the House (Library of Congress 2015a).
A bill’s referral to more than one committee is often seen as a death knell given
the process hurdles and partisan snarls it must overcome to get through the legislative
process. However, the PATRIOT Act met with little resistance in the committees to
which it was referred and subsequently on the House floor. Surrounding debates were
largely substantive, concerned with provisions which proposed to enact liberal security
powers allowed to be exercised by the federal government versus what was viewed by
some as an insufficient balance in the protection of liberties (Library of Congress 2015a).
Accordingly, partisanship fell to the wayside during the legislative process, the product of
a nation back on its heels. The PATRIOT Act passed the Senate 98-1, and the House
357-66. It was signed by the president on October 26, 2001 just six short weeks after the
9/11 attacks (Library of Congress 2015a).
Soon after, the bill creating the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS) bill
passed through the entire legislative process despite its referral to twelve committees for
consideration in the House alone (Library of Congress 2015b). As previously explained,
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its referral was significant with regard to institutional and organizational politics, as bills
referred to multiple committees for consideration, due to overlapping and complex
jurisdictional issues, are more likely doomed to fail. At least one, but usually more
committees along the process will not place the bill on the agenda nor surrender
jurisdiction to another committee. Or, a bill never rises high enough on the agendas of
the committees of jurisdiction and therefore dies. While the DHS bill did not have quite
the political momentum of the PATRIOT Act, it still held its own, garnering a spectrum
of supporters despite its vast scope and the sweeping policy changes it enabled.
The process which shepherded the passage of the DHS legislation was dubbed
“the largest reorganization of government in more than half a century,” by Senator Tom
Coburn (2015). Nonetheless, the bill passed the House 295-132, and the Senate 90-9,
with relatively strong bipartisan support in both chambers (Library of Congress 2015b).
Public Law 107-296, created the new DHS bureaucracy on November 25, 2002 (Library
of Congress 2015b), which now spends over $61 billion a year and employs over 240,000
people (Painter 2013).
DHS likely would never have come into existences had it not been for the 9/11
terrorist attacks. Why else would a Republican administration betray their party’s
fundamental conservative principle of small government by creating a new cabinet-level
department that banded together a random collection of twenty-two somewhat marginally
related federal entities (including FEMA, the Secret Service, and the U.S. Customs
Service), with disparate missions and cultures under one new behemoth bureaucracy
(Coburn 2015)?
Even in the shadow of the 9/11 attacks, the White House was not convinced that
creating an entirely new department was a viable solution to remedy the policy problem
5

of how to battle terrorism domestically (Baker 2013). Accordingly, political author and
reporter Peter Baker (2013) noted the creation of DHS was looked to by the White House
“as a bureaucratic nightmare in the making…an idea that Bush opposed for nine months.”
However politically prickly the debates over solving nation’s security problems,
defense policy formulation has arguably been characterized over time as less vitriolic
than that of other policy issue areas, frequently ending in policy solutions both parties see
eye-to-eye on—especially when compared with other policy realms. Be it the response to
the attacks on Pearl Harbor or those of 9/11, resourcing means to keep North Korean
missile technology or the Viet Cong at bay, or preserving the legitimacy of the U.S.
electoral process against a Russian misinformation campaign, when it comes to rallying
around the flag on defense related issues, policymakers have been routinely observed in
the media, by scholars, anecdotally, and in official records as acting with greater unity,
even when faced with especially challenging domestic political climates. It is a
relentlessly enduring trend of American policymaking history—elected officials have
repeatedly bypassed partisan loyalties, in unique fashion, to assure the nation’s defense.
This study is focused on providing a comprehensive understanding of why. That is, how
legislation like the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act, the bill that authorized the creation of the DHS
immediately after 9/11, and the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for the past
fifty-plus years—essentially the formulation of defense policy in Congress—has been
able to historically transcend partisan detractors and environments of all stripe and enjoy
more collegial deference in Congress than other policy issues.
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Chapter 1 – Introduction overview
As of this writing, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) has been
passed by Congress and signed into law every year since 1961 (Shogan 2011, 3). It
passed in times of war and peace, prosperity and recession, and despite varying
institutional political pressures from within Congress, as well as those emanating from
the domestic and international political environments. What does the NDAA’s resolute
success over the years say about the political nature of defense policy formulation in
Congress? This chapter provides an introduction to that topic and outlines a roadmap for
how this study attempted to answer the following research question: Is defense policy
more collegial than other policy issue areas addressed by Congress? If so, how and
why? After a short contextual prelude that discusses the genesis of the research question,
a brief description of each of the remaining chapters follows, to include: the background
and literature review (Chapter 2); research design and methodology (Chapter 3); analyses
of institutional (Chapter 4), domestic (Chapters 5 & 6), and international (Chapters 7 &
8) political influences weighing on the political nature of defense policy in Congress;
concluding thoughts and assessment of the hypotheses (Chapter 9).
Background & research question
Despite what has been characterized as an historic level of political partisanship in
Washington, there are policy issues which arguably enjoy more collegiality in Congress
than others. There are myriad anecdotes, for example, of defense policy transcending the
fray of partisanship with more ease than others, even in times of great domestic political
dissension. Such an atmosphere was especially evident during the Cold War, when
difficult sociopolitical and economic challenges at home (especially during the 1960s and
1970s) saw policymakers from opposite sides of the aisle come together to counter a
7

common Soviet threat.
While there may have been agreement on the threat itself, views on how best to
counter that threat were disparate at times and often politically charged, especially if
there were domestic political consequences attached. Former Secretary of State and
National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice identified such an instance during the
Reagan-Carter presidential campaign of 1980. Reagan ran and won using a “peace
through strength” slogan. The message was a means to assure the majority of Americans
– polled as favoring the pursuit of peace—that the military buildup he proposed was to
bolster deterrence and thereby prevent war with the Soviet Union, a remedy to Carter’s
approach of disarmament which, Reagan claimed, made the U.S. vulnerable to war and
isolated U.S. allies (Skinner, Kudelia, Mesquita and Rice 2007).
The same principle could be applied to the threat of transnational terror in the
modern era. While there is definitive bipartisan agreement that transnational terror is a
threat to the United States, cooperation on how to deal with it effectively has been
politically contentious at times. However contentious the related debates, those
specifically focused on defense policy are often characterized as less vitriolic than
debates over other types of policy. The question at hand is whether or not those
observations represent a consistent, demonstrable trend, or just anecdotes about a process
that is not necessarily unique. Are they truly the result of hopeful optimism—in a bitterly
polarized period—representing the willingness of national leaders to lay aside differences
and cooperate for the greater good when faced with serious threats to U.S. interests?
The purpose of this study was to help explain the nature of defense policy
formulation in Congress. More specifically, it was to reveal reasons why consideration
of defense policy in the U.S. House of Representatives (the House) has been long
8

observed as uniquely capable of transcending partisan vitriol and gridlock, noted in
scholarship and elsewhere, in comparison to other policy issues. A such, the underlying
research question at hand was: Is defense policy more collegial than other policy issue
areas addressed by Congress? If so, how and why?
The notion that deliberations on defense policy are unique when compared with
other issues has been a consistent theme in the rhetoric of policymakers in Congress over
time. For example, at the height of the Korean War in 1951, members of the Senate
Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees concluded in a joint committee report
that, “The issues which might divide our people are far transcended by the things which
unite them. If threatened danger becomes war, the aggressor would find at one stroke
arrayed against him the united energies, the united resources, and the united devotion of
all the American people” (Brands 2016, 371). This assertion by policymakers was the
thematic underscore of hearings which followed the firing of General Douglass
MacArthur by President Truman and indicated that the investigation did not just linger on
the politically charged removal of the highly regarded military leader. Rather, their
conclusion seemed to be the product of unique deliberation, a unifying dialogue for the
sake of national security, a notion that trumped normal political grandstanding (which
still, nonetheless, took place). More recently, Senator John McCain, chairman of the
Senate Armed Services Committee and former presidential candidate observed, “Defense
reform is not a partisan issue, and we will keep it that way. We must seek to build a
consensus about how to improve the organization and operation of the Department of
Defense in ways that can, and will, be advanced by whomever wins next year’s [2016]
elections. That is in keeping with the best traditions of this Committee” (U.S. Senate
Armed Services Committee 2015; hereafter SASC). McCain’s observation not only
9

alluded to the influences of partisanship on defense policy deliberations but also to
institutional pressures internal to Congress driving the approach policymakers take in
dealing with such issues. Such collegiality is uncommonly rare in Congress these days,
especially to the casual observer. Therefore, the institutional pressures, as well as the
domestic and international influences, which inspire such rhetoric should pique the
interest of social scientists as to why, and whether or not the language is genuine or just
mere platitudes (and if so, what their practical ramifications are). Such was the
inspiration behind this study.
Chapter descriptions & organization
Chapter 2 explores the literature to discover what we know and do not know
about collegiality in such Congressional deliberations. The chapter establishes the
practical, empirical, and methodological significance of this study. From a practical
standpoint, members of Congress, along with the President, do not live in an ideological
vacuum and must find ways to govern effectively or threaten putting the country at risk
of dire consequences. In that regard, examining how an outlier like the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) has been able to navigate through the congressional
committee process and repeatedly pass into law, year after year, provides a practical
platform for understanding how defense policy is dealt with in Congress. The NDAA as
a platform allots insight to processes, culture, and roots of motivation that feed the
politically driven machinations of the institution.
The body of literature addressing whether or not defense policy in Congress is
approached differently than other policy areas is relatively limited from an empirical
standpoint. It is narrowed even further when the NDAA is referenced as the
representative example of defense policy, as in this study. That said, the overall pool of
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research on defense policy formulation renders a guide adequate enough to understand
where scholars currently fall on the matter, employing a mix of qualitative and
quantitative methodologies to reveal political drivers within that environment.
Reoccurring themes in the literature used to explain why policymakers might approach
defense policy differently are rooted in (1) institutional processes and structures; (2)
crises, or especially pressing matters associated with threats to national interests; or (3)
through processes swayed by distributive politics.
Above and beyond those themes, there is relative consensus that defense policy is
more collegial or inviting to bipartisan collaboration than other policy areas. Such
allusions are also prolific in the media and found in other accounts of the legislative
process, shaped by domestic, international, and institutional political circumstances.
Interestingly, the notion is often just accepted in the literature, or only briefly analyzed,
and rarely compared with other policy types, thus spurring the main question addressed in
this study. A primary aim of this research was therefore to help determine the validity of
the assertion that defense policy is unique in its ability to transcend polarization in
Congress.
This study also sought to answer the call in the literature for more comprehensive
methodological approaches in the social sciences. More specifically, it was an effort to
counterbalance the more contemporarily favored trend of employing relatively narrowfocused quantitatively-based analyses in political science. Instead, it sought a
comprehensive, practical explanation of human behavior in the policy formulation
environment via a qualitatively-based, contextual approach.
Chapter 3 further explains the methodological approach used in this study, to
include how the data was gathered, assessed, and interpreted. It also introduces the
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study’s primary hypothesis: The formulation of defense policy in the U.S. House of
Representatives is approached with more collegiality than other policy issue areas,
mainly due to domestic, institutional, and international political pressures that
transcend competing partisan motivations.
“Collegiality,” the primary dependent variable, is qualitatively defined as
exceptional and consistent cooperative interaction among colleagues over time that
rendered legislation which garnered support of at least a bipartisan supermajority
(two-thirds) of the House of Representatives upon final passage. For the purposes of
this study, a quantitative representation of collegiality generally equates to legislation
garnering at least two-thirds bipartisan support of the final roll call floor vote in its
respective chamber (House or Senate). “Defense policy” was operationalized by the
NDAA and its deliberation in Congress, mainly during three time periods, the details of
which are described below. “Other policy issue areas” were primarily operationalized
by the Farm Bill and the Highway Bill, also deliberated during the three case study
periods. The impact of the principal independent (IV) variables, “domestic, institutional
and international, political pressures,” on collegiality were assessed primarily from
historical accounting of the legislative process. And, given the organic nature of the
institution of Congress—subject to the dynamics of human behavior—both qualitative
and quantitative methods were employed. Finally, several secondary hypotheses are
introduced in Chapter 3, focused on institutional, international, and domestic political
pressures that affect policy formulation in Congress.
The NDAA’s propensity for long-term bipartisan support (it has passed for over
fifty years straight and vetoed only a handful of times) provides an opportune basis for
comparison with the “Farm Bill,” as considered by the House Agriculture Committee,
12

and the “Highway Bill,” as considered by the Committee on Transportation and
Infrastructure. Additionally, the House, as opposed to the Senate, is debatably the more
polarized body of the two when it comes to policy formulation. Instances of bipartisan
cooperation are arguably more difficult to come by in the House and therefore easier to
identify when they do occur. As a result, the House was determined a more appropriate
primary subject for this study as explained further in Chapter 3.
The NDAA is an exhaustively comprehensive bill that provides annual defense
budget authorizations and policy guidance for the Department of Defense (DOD). As the
largest department in the U.S. government, DOD commands the lion’s share of federal
discretionary spending and operates as the nation’s largest employer (CBO 2016). As
such, the annual NDAA is viewed as “must pass” legislation for fear of otherwise putting
the nation’s security and economy in peril by impeding the military’s ability to organize,
train, equip, and operate. Accordingly, consideration of the NDAA has steep political
consequences for the president and Congress to contemplate, both domestically and
abroad. It also helps explain the NDAA’s continued passage with bipartisan support
since its inception as an amendment to the FY1960 defense appropriations bill (Ahmadi
2013,70).
Much like the NDAA, even in times of great political divide the “Farm Bill” has
passed with relative certainty about every five years by Congress since the 1930s
(Johnson and Monke 2017, 1). It is an “omnibus, multi-year law that governs an array of
agricultural and food programs,” characterized as being able to “create broad coalitions
of support among sometimes conflicting interests for policies that individually might not
survive the legislative process” (Johnson and Monke 2017, 1). Because of that broad
appeal and support, Johnson and Monke’s description could arguably be transferred to
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the NDAA with relative ease. While there are certainly discernible differences in how
(and what) policy issues are addressed in the two bills, there are equally, if not more,
underlying similarities in how they are approached politically by policymakers and in
how their respective committees of jurisdiction deal with them.
Since the nation’s birth, agriculture has been an important part of American
culture, history, and economics. As a result, agriculture policy is ingrained in the
American political environment. Much like the NDAA, the Farm Bill, a direct
manifestation of that history, has enjoyed steady bipartisan support over time, evident by
its consistent passage under the leadership of both Democratic and Republican
Congresses and White Houses controlled by both parties. The House Agriculture (Ag)
Committee, which oversees the Farm Bill, is a larger committee within the House of
Representatives, much like the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) which has
jurisdiction over the NDAA. Additionally, similar to the HASC, the Ag Committee
usually includes members from all over the country representing a diverse array of
political and policy interests and constituencies whose interests converges in the bill’s
substance. The array of similarities between the two provides a meaningful platform for
comparison, one that can also be logically extended to the Highway Bill and the House
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee.
Virtually everyone in the United States benefits from the nation’s vast roadway
and transportation infrastructure in some manner. It is the crucial backbone of the
American economy, enabling interstate commerce and provides a vital connection to the
rest of the world. America’s reliance on roads, the ability to move freely from one place
to another across the entire continent, from the most rural towns to the busiest cities, is
therefore of universal interest to policymakers at all levels of government, regardless of
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ideology or party affiliation.
Enhancing that interest is the notion that American culture identifies closely with
the freedom of the open roads and anything that impedes or enhances that freedom (from
a pothole to a new highway offramp) is liable to gain the public’s attention. Automobiles
have long played (and will for the foreseeable future, continue to play) a prominent role
in the life of most Americans. Constituents therefore expect their representatives in
government be attentive to related policy issues and helps explain the reason why
members of Congress have debated the role of the federal government with regard to the
nation’s road system since its earliest days. It is an endeavor that has progressed from
bequeathing federal land grants to states to build roads in the 1800s, to the over $43
billion in direct federal spending provided for roads in FY 2016, much of which overseen
by the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee (Dilger 2015, 1-4).
Much like the Ag Committee and the HASC, the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure is quite large by institutional standards. Its membership
is also diverse yet nonetheless unified by the common interest to preserve a modern,
well-kept roadway system to benefit the nation. Accordingly, transportation policy,
specifically legislation that authorizes federal roadway funding as found in the Highway
Bill, is arguably on par with agriculture and defense policy in its ability to garner
consistent bipartisan support throughout the nation’s history.
Ultimately, the Farm Bill and the Highway Bill share many characteristics with
the NDAA. They are similar in how they are considered by their respective committees
and by virtue of the nature and makeup of those committees as compared with the HASC
in addition to the relatively apolitical nature of the policy substance the bills historically
contemplate. As a result, their comparison provided a substantive platform from which
15

to analyze whether or not defense policy is truly different in its political nature than other
policy types.
The overall aim of the following five chapters (Chapters 4 through 8) was to
provide a cumulative exploration of the NDAA process and the institutional, domestic,
and international political factors influencing it to establish a foundation from which to
assess why defense policy formulation in Congress is perceived as uniquely collegial.
Chapter 4 examines institutional influences on collegiality within and proximal to
legislative branch machinations—namely from its people and processes. The approach
was built on three primary assumptions: First, the development and consideration of the
NDAA is unique compared to other major authorizing bills routinely deliberated in
Congress; Second, the constitutional mandate to raise, regulate, and oversee the military
services is viewed as an obligation by members of Congress that often outweighs partisan
loyalties, especially those who serve on the HASC; Third, the leaders, organization,
management, and staff, of the defense committees in Congress lend to a more collegial
atmosphere between minority and majority members and staff unique among authorizing
committees. Along those lines, while other committee staffs shared some of the cultural
attributes evident with the HASC, they did not seem to be collectively present, nor as
consistent. Summarily, in testing those assumptions, this chapter sought to illuminate
how the collective institutional influences from people and processes involved with
House NDAA deliberations might induce a more collegial environment than in other
policy areas.
Chapter 5 and 6 explore how certain domestic political factors have historically
weighed on defense policy formulation in the House and thereby shaped its perceived
political character. The NDAA process in the House was compared with similar
16

processes within the House Ag Committee and Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee using a series of case studies examining deliberations over the Farm Bill, the
Highway Bill, and NDAA from 1961 to 1966, 1993 to 1998, and 2007 to 2012. The aim
of the case studies was to identify “certain domestic political pressures” that
distinguished NDAA deliberations and therefore may plausibly indicate causes of
collegiality uniquely attributed to defense policy formulation in Congress.
Chapter 7 and 8 are focused on identifying how elements of the international
political environment weigh on the collegiality of defense policy formulation in
Congress. First, interviews with members of the policy community were leveraged to
identify elements from the international political realm most likely to trigger
policymakers in Congress to collaborate on defense, agriculture, and transportation
policy. Second, three historical case studies are presented using the elements identified
in the first section to illustrate why interviewees might have come to their conclusions
regarding reasons for collegial discourse on defense policy as a product of international
political pressures.
Chapter 9, the concluding chapter, provides an overall assessment of the
hypotheses, discusses divergent findings, and gives possible explanations for those
findings. It also highlights shortfalls in the study’s methodologies that became evident
along the way and attempts to reconcile expected empirical, practical, and theoretical
implications of the study with the actual findings. Finally, it suggests opportunities for
future research and provides final, overall conclusions.
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Chapter 2 – Background & Literature Review
Is defense policy more collegial than other policy issue areas addressed by
Congress? If so, how and why? The purpose of this chapter is to provide clarity
regarding what that research question means, to explain why answering it is important,
and to explore research important to answering the question. The chapter is organized
into three main sections. The first section discusses the state of affairs that led to the
research question being posed. It recounts the resolute character of defense policy
formulation process in Congress—namely the annual deliberation and passage of the
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)—and how it has been facilitated over time
with unique political unity despite a variety of obstacles along the way. The second
section examines explanations provided in existing scholarship for why defense policy
formulation in Congress has been so stable and viewed as politically collegial over time.
That is, it traces reasons why scholars think the NDAA has avoided derailment despite its
immersion in some of the most difficult political environments over the last half-century.
The third section explores what we still need to know—what past research has not
revealed—and why it is important. What has yet to be explained by scholars? Why is it
important to understand why policymakers seem to get along better on formulating
defense policy? What is the value of that knowledge and how can it be applied?
Summarily, this chapter aims to (1) highlight the unusual political unity and stability
historically associated with the NDAA process, (2) explore reasons previously provided
for why it is that way and (3) highlight gaps in that reasoning, and to explain why it
matters.
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The resolute nature of the NDAA process
The NDAA came about as an amendment introduced by Senator Richard Russell
to the fiscal year (FY) 1960 Military Construction Authorization Act which pressed for
more diligent congressional oversight of the defense budget (and accompanied policies)
which was rapidly growing amidst a Cold War backdrop (Shogan 2011). Russell’s
amendment essentially required defense appropriations, normally handled by the
respective appropriations subcommittees in the House and Senate, to be reviewed and
authorized by the defense policy committees of both chambers before being passed into
law (Shogan 2011). The result was the NDAA, what eventually became an exhaustively
comprehensive bill that provides annual defense budget authorizations and policy
guidance for the largest department in government, one that also commands the largest
share of federal discretionary spending to operate as the nation’s largest employer (CBO
2016).
Since its inception, the NDAA has transformed into “must pass” legislation and
its enormity and political momentum is virtually without peer. Fear of placing national
security in peril by impeding the military’s ability to organize, train, equip, and operate is
a significant political contemplation which helps explain the NDAA’s routine passage,
but does not provide the whole picture regarding its success no matter who holds the
White House or Congress or the combination thereof (Ahmadi 2013,70). Accordingly,
Williams and Heitshusen (2016b) noted the NDAA’s “enactment has come to be
expected and the bill is seen by many as a reliable legislative vehicle for a range of policy
matters,” not just those relegated to the Department of Defense (DOD). The pair also
submitted, “This regular enactment of complex legislation for over five decades
illustrates, engenders, and is dependent on close adherence to process and consistency in
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procedures, schedules, and protocols,” as another partial explanation for the bill’s
persistent success (Williams and Heitshusen 2016a). As such, there are a variety of
factors influencing how annual deliberations over the NDAA are shaped—of
institutional, domestic, and international origin. Nonetheless, those deliberations have
historically provided a consistent, predictable venue wherein policymakers collaborate
and make substantive progress on policy despite other partisan detractors, severe as they
may have been.
The contemporary partisan divide among Americans is at a high (Doherty 2017).
The divide is reflected in the individuals the citizenry sends to serve in Congress and in
the White House and further complicated by ideologically-motivated subgroups on the
fringes of both major political parties. Despite wielding a majority in the House,
Republicans have had difficulty passing or even negotiating on legislation due to the
power of the ultra-conservative Freedom Caucus and Democrats have not fared much
better with the majority in recent years either. Political gain is valued over substantive
policy progress, with gridlock the norm even in the most routine of governing processes.
As one senior policy staffer, the legislative director for a Republican chairman of a major
House committee, put it, “Politics and policy is one in the same” (Interview, May 1,
2018). He continued by explaining the “entire system,” meaning the legislative process,
“is built on trust,” however, “deception is prevalent” and has deteriorated the trust
necessary to keep things moving in a productive manner (Interview, May 1, 2018).
The partisan gridlock is not a new matter: “In the four decades since the current
system for budgeting and spending tax dollars has been in effect, Congress has managed
to pass all its required appropriations measures on time only four times” (Desilver 2018).
Yet, the NDAA has soldiered on with support from both parties in some fashion each
20

year since its inception. The NDAA has enjoyed legislative success virtually without
match and weathered some of the most tumultuous political climates of the nation’s last
fifty-plus years. Even amidst the most historically prevalent defense policy debates over
the past half century, like those surrounding the war in Vietnam, the reform of a “hollow
force” into an all-volunteer force in years following, the Reagan-era defense build-up and
the Clinton-era draw down, rendition flights and detainees at Guantanamo Bay, the repeal
of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell,” and the funding of the 2007 Iraq surge, among other notable
examples, the NDAA’s passage into law was not derailed.
Political unity supporting the NDAA over time has also demonstrated unique
strength when faced with what is among the most definitive threats to a bill in the
legislative process—a presidential veto. As of this writing, the NDAA has been vetoed
only five times since 1961, yet still found its way into the law books each time no matter
which political party controlled the Congress or the White House (Towell 2015).
Democrats led in both chambers of Congress when President Jimmy Carter, also a
Democrat, first vetoed the bill in 1978; an objection to its authorization of a nuclearpowered, versus conventionally-powered, aircraft carrier (Towell 2015). In 1988, a
Republican president, Ronald Reagan, vetoed the NDAA passed by a Democraticallycontrolled Congress, claiming the legislation undermined U.S. leverage in arms
reductions negotiations with the Soviet Union (Towell 2015). Another Democrat,
President Bill Clinton, vetoed the bill in December 1995, his veto sustained by the GOPcontrolled House (Towell 2015). A new bill, with essentially the same language minus
the offending provision argued as “inconsistent with the 1972 U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty,” was subsequently passed by Republican majorities in both chambers
before Clinton signed it into law in February of 1996 (Towell 2015). On December 28,
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2007, George W. Bush vetoed the NDAA sent to him by a split Congress, (Democrats
controlled the House and Republicans, the Senate) yet the bill was reconciled and passed
into law one month later; a case over funding for the war in Iraq explored in further detail
in Chapter 8 (Towell 2015). Most recently, President Barack Obama vetoed the FY 2016
NDAA, sent to him by a Republican-controlled Congress, yet once again the bill was
eventually signed into law by the president. In each instance, a version of the NDAA was
reconciled and passed with support of policymakers of varied political stripe, prioritized
over other political challenges of the time—in times of relative peace (post-Cold War)
and in war (Vietnam, Iraq, Afghanistan), in times of economic boom (1990s) and severe
financial downturn (amidst the “Great Recession”).
Given its resolute nature, the NDAA arguably represents the last bastion of
“regular order” and bipartisan cooperation in the legislative process, one virtually
unmatched by other major legislation regularly passed. Not even the relatively routine
passage of the historically bipartisan Farm Bill (which has a much longer history than the
NDAA), nor the relatively bipartisan Highway Bill, have enjoyed support equal to the
NDAA’s over the years. Yet, scholars have not solidly placed a finger on why. Answers
are somewhat disparate and focused elsewhere, essentially leaving a disconnected
collection of anecdotes and studies to lean on for explanation as to why defense policy,
namely the NDAA, is approached with exceptional collegiality in Congress.
Scholarly explanations for the NDAA’s success
With exception, much of the research that explores the political nature of defense
policy formulation in Congress is too tightly focused to answer the research question at
hand in this study. The available scholarship is thinner yet in instances where the NDAA
process is specifically employed as a primary study vehicle representing defense policy
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formulation in Congress. Furthermore, current research tends to only employ a narrow
approach to how a singular (or just a few factors) might influence behavior toward a
defense policy decision. This is quite amazing considering the dynamically fluid nature
of the institution, comprised of 535 human beings each with unique backgrounds,
motivations, and agendas. Along those lines, existing studies favor either qualitative or
quantitative methodologies for analysis, often with minimal regard for context of the
broader political environment—an approach that borders on irresponsible given the heavy
human element involved. To be fair, there are instances where all three areas
(qualitative, quantitative, and contextual political circumstances), or at least two of the
three, are leveraged to provide a more comprehensive assessment. However, there is
room for further research, as the current body of scholarship regarding the political nature
of defense policy formulation in Congress is hardly exhaustive.
There are reoccurring themes underlying current scholarly explanations as to why
policymakers might approach defense policy differently, which include: (1) institutional
processes and structures; (2) crisis or matters that demand immediate attention by
policymakers (usually correlated with international pressures due to a threat to national
interests); and (3) distributive processes and related politics (often associated closely with
domestic political influences). Yet, in the many studies deriving those themes, the
congenial character of defense policy formulation is still usually just accepted, inferred,
or only briefly analyzed. Ripley and Lindsay (1993, 223) for example, concluded former
Speaker Tom Foley was “clearly correct” in his contention that bipartisan agreement in
defense policy is more present than not…and left it at that. Rarely have researchers taken
one step further to seek differences in the formative process of defense policy compared
with that of other policy types. That is, researchers have acknowledged and explored
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why policymakers get along when it comes to making defense policy but usually do not
ask whether or not that process is comparatively unique, specifically with regard to its
ability to transcend partisanship. That circumstance was inspiration for the underlying
research question of this study.
Institutional processes & structure
Research by Colleen Shogan (2011) provided somewhat of an exception to the
norm by way of her examination of the NDAA process in the United States Senate.
Shogan (2011, 2) referred to national defense as “surely a bipartisan, perhaps even
nonpartisan, issue,” and translated that observation into a reason why the NDAA was
passed by the Senate so many years in a row (49 straight years at the time of the study).
In doing so, she placed particular emphasis on the fact the NDAA was able to succeed
with bipartisan support despite controversial provisions which threatened to derail it, such
as the repeal of the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy (Shogan 2011, 1). Weighing heavily on
institutional processes to make her case, Shogan concluded the “building block” method
of constructing the NDAA each year complemented a “complex mixture” of trusted
relationships, leadership, bipartisanship, and “widely shared belief in the overall
mission,” all of which contributed to the bill’s historically consistent success (Shogan
2011, 2). The predictability and reliability of that “building block” approach was
especially credited for inducing collegiality in the process, examined deeper in Chapter 4.
The method starts with a base bill built only from provisions known to have bipartisan
consensus, then moves to negotiated additions, and finally to amendments that required
roll call votes (Shogan 2011). Unique among the literature, Shogan’s piece provides
valuable elucidation regarding the institutional influences on defense policy formulation
in Congress, and specifically those surrounding the Senate’s annual consideration of the
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NDAA. However, its brevity and relatively narrow focus provide opportunity for deeper
examination of the issue, especially with regard to the comparative political nature of
defense policy formulation.
Other works delve into the political nature of defense policy formulation from a
broader or different institutional stance, often emanating from the character of the
defense committees in Congress. Sapolsky, Talmadge, and Gholz (2013, 148), noted
“sessions [of defense committees] are more bipartisan than not,” and referred to their
deliberations as a “friendly process,” yet failed to expand why such was the case, aside
from members perhaps merely expressing platitudes. Richard Fenno’s (1973) landmark
study, Congressmen in Committees, provides a contextual basis and theoretical
framework (examined further in Chapter 4) to answer the question at hand, but stops
short of providing a specific comparative analysis of the politics of defense policy
formulation. Campbell and Auerswald (2012, 10) observed, “Congress and other elected
officials are apt to set aside their partisan differences in the interest of common defense,”
then focused on the growing negative impact of partisanship on national security instead
of digging into definitive reasons why policymakers actually come together on defense
issues. Christopher Deering observed, “internal [defense] committee operations have
long been regarded as consensual” (Ripley and Lindsay 1993, 160) and conjected that
political environments within the various defense committees tend to be comparatively
neutral due to the apolitical nature of the institution of the military (also a common
deduction). Yet, as with much of the literature focused on defense policy formulation,
his initial supposition was not conclusively supported, nor rigorously pursued. Deering’s
is a representative case of bipartisan cooperation on the defense committees being
routinely acknowledged by scholars, yet minimally pondered, if at all. Ultimately, the
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collegial nature of defense policy is rarely compared with deliberations on other policy
types and how partisan influences may or may not override the path of one process versus
another from an institutional sense, thereby leaving room for pursuit of more questioning
and understanding.
Crises or threat as explanation for collegiality
Many researchers looked to crises, circumstances wherein existential stakes are
involved or immediate policy attention is demanded to deal with a threat to national
interests (often stemming from international pressures or domestic issues with global
implications), to explain political unity on defense policy. Much attention along those
lines is rooted in the long-accepted (though challenged in more contemporary works)
premise that domestic politics are abandoned once a policy debate heads offshore.
Aaron Wildavsky (1966, 23), argued there is one president and two
presidencies—one focused on domestic policy, the other on matters of foreign and
defense policy. He characterized the latter as different because the consequences of the
decisions of the presidency focused abroad are, “potentially more grave [sic], faster to
manifest themselves and less easily reversible than in domestic affairs” (Wildavsky 1966,
25). Though, the president is never really alone in such matters, which explains why
political and substantive discourse between the White House and Congress is a staple of
foreign and defense policy studies. As such, Peter Gourevitch (Katznelson and Shefter
2002) observed the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy as always
intermeshed, while Trubowitz (2011) emphasized that national leaders have masters to
answer to in both realms and therefore must together reconcile “conflicting institutional
incentives” between the dynamics of “realpolitik,” abroad and “innenpolitik” at home.
The need to manage and balance political pressures from both realms is an experience
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shared by policymakers in Congress and the White House and therefore conceivably a
basis to help explain common ground found in the defense policy formulation process.
Accordingly, it is also understandable how Nelson (2013), Ripley and Lindsay (1993,
238) and Wildavsky (1966, 27), among others, came to conclude that members of
Congress usually prefer to unify behind the president on security matters, especially
when the use or threat of force is involved.
From another angle, James M. Lindsay (1994, 91), was not alone in attributing
congressional decision deferrals to the president on security matters as a means to avoid
individual and party punishment at the polls. As such, Americans in general, regardless
of party, also usually look to the commander-in-chief as the inherent leader on defense
related issues. Accordingly, members of Congress rarely benefit from falling on the
wrong side of that popular consensus. Nelson (2013) made an exemplary point in that
regard when he noted, “Historically, Congress has been assertive only on the foreign
policy issues that concern voters the most: unpopular wars and policies that have a clear
domestic politics coloration.” Conversely, Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999,
288) were not alone in their observation that “Congress has become a more active
participant in foreign policy-making,” but also pointed out that, “trust and comity have
been more exception than rule,” even when different political parties control the
executive and the legislature. Along those lines, Lindsay (1994, 70) alluded to the
“golden era of bipartisanship,” in the twenty-five years following World War II, during
which Democrats often maneuvered procedurally to ensure amendments would not undo
foreign policy decisions of Republican presidents working to counter Cold War threats.
H.R. McMaster (1997) and Ripley and Franklin (1987, 194), among others, took a similar
but slightly different stance, offering that collective fear of destabilizing the strategic U.S.
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position abroad (usually already established by the president) was enough to drive unity
in Congress, especially pertinent to a dynamic crisis scenario and, at times, resulted in
supportive legislation.
Another often-referenced means for explaining unity among congressional
policymakers, especially in crisis-type environments, is the process of dealing with
associated legislation that may render politically satisfying responses for both sides of the
aisle. The policy responses to the attacks of September 11, 2001, are frequently referred
to as a prime example along those lines (Lott and Daschle 2016, 167). The attacks
triggered wide support for the PATRIOT Act and authorization to create the Department
of Homeland Security, in short order. Virtually all other items on the policy agenda at
the time were bypassed with relative cooperation across the ideological spectrum:
“Congress responded on both sides of the aisles with unanimous support for further
increases in defense spending to counter the terrorist threat” (Jones, DeVore and
Candreva, 2012, 172). Comparatively, on the domestic policy front, the 2007-2008
financial meltdown which led to the “Great Recession,” moved Congress to act with
immediacy to put policy remedies in place, based (arguably) on feelings the crisis was an
existential threat to the domestic and global economy. As noted by Blinder and Zandi
(2010, 1), the crisis was met with bipartisan support in the form of legislation that
included the Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-185), which passed the House
380 – 34, and the Senate 81 – 16.1 Ultimately, in the immediate response to both crises,
one economic, the other a matter of national security (both largely perceived as

1

The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act passed later on party lines, partially attributable to
feelings the immediate dangers of the crisis had passed and the legislation was therefore not as crucial to
recovery. It also marked a politically charged presidential transition from the George H.W. Bush to Barack
Obama.

28

existential), scholars observed the immediate gravity of the respective situations as
helping outweigh partisan calculus in realizing a sincere policy response, a situation not
otherwise likely.
Aside the categorical “crisis” explanation for bringing policymakers together,
Lindsay and Ripley (1993, 19) further delineated foreign and defense policy into matters
of “strategic” and “structural” concern, a notion also echoed by Huntington (1961, 3-6)
and Lowi (1967, 324-250)—instructive frameworks for understanding the nature of such
policy formulation in the House. In that vein, Ripley and Franklin (1987, 27) concluded
that consultation over structural policy matters (procurement, deployment, and
organization of military personnel and material) are essentially treated like domestic
policy, to include elements of agriculture and transportation policy. Allison and Zelikow
(1999, 289) echoed the comparison, in that those policy areas tend to garner collective
support by virtue of their base character in delving out resources—a characteristic also
reflective of the substance and nature of the NDAA process in Congress.
Distributive politics & processes
As with Ripley and Franklin (1987), politically unifying discourse on legislation
of such character in Congress is often more broadly categorized and explained in terms of
distributive political theory—who gets what and reaps political capital from steering
government resources. Shogan (2011, 6) noted the study of distributive politics as one of
the only areas in which there is “an exhaustive literature examining how Congress
produces defense policy.” Rundquist and Carsey (2002, 37-38) theorized that a
combination of committee, party, and ideological based “distributive processes” interact
to influence defense policy. Craig and Logevall (2009), took a starker (though relatively
common) view of the employment of the principles of distributive politics to help explain
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motivations for unity among a state’s congressional delegation:
Its tentacles reached into almost every congressional district in the country and
distorted electoral politics to a tremendous degree. The preservation of the militaryindustrial establishment became a kind of national addiction, from which American
society could recover only after going through the most severe withdrawal. No
one—least of all the powerful committee chairmen whose home districts received
hefty defense contracts, and the labor unions and communities who also
benefited—was willing to endure such pain.
In context, “logrolling” is also widely referred to by scholars as a symptom of distributive
politics, a plausible reason for cooperation on defense authorizations and beyond since all
conceivably stand to gain (Ripley and Franklin 1987, 21; Rundquist and Carsey 2002;
Weingast 1979; Marshall and Weingast 1988). “Universalism,” as described by Mayhew
(1974, 88), scenarios wherein all congressional members get a piece of the pie, regardless
of rank or party, is a more nuanced version of distributive politics leveraged in the
literature to help explain collective action on defense policy. According to Rundquist and
Carsey (2002, 39), universalism empirically “predicts two different but theoretically
linked phenomena:” allocation of distributive benefits to virtually every congressional
district via an omnibus bill (like the NDAA), and that such bills will pass by lopsided
majorities out of committee and on the floor (much like the NDAA often does).
Rundquist and Carsey (2002, 40) furthered the concept in relation to defense procurement
as “interpolicy universalism,” a “grand multipolicy logroll” that transcended policy issue
areas and committees. While universalism was originally developed for study of
committee dynamics (as in the HASC) the theoretical concept has been transferred to
study cooperation on issues in entire legislatures (Fiorina 1981, 198; Weingast and
Marshall 1988).
A more application-focused approach to explaining cooperation transcendent of
party loyalties, Wildvasky (1966, 26) argued the only time Congress really dictates on
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defense issues (aside from intervention in parochial spats between the armed services) is
when it comes to “some sort of real estate…dealing with the regional economic
consequences of the location [and status] of military facilities.” Such is theoretical basis
for geographically linked congressional delegations to cooperate, regardless of party. In
that vein, and to build on Craig and Logevall’s (2009) point above, Shogan (2011, 15)
observed motives for cooperation across party lines on Senate NDAA provisions
included “continued production of a weapons system or the closing of a military base.”
She concluded that coalitions advocating for such issues, especially those which
“converge geographically or along shared industries,” are rarely partisan (Shogan 2011,
15). Rather, the issues tend to be parochial, and the majority party therefore historically
takes care (in the case of the NDAA) to address such issues with more inclusiveness and
comity (Shogan 2011, 15). BRAC, the Base Realignment and Closure process, is a
quintessential example in that regard, foundational to political cooperation in defense
policy circles.
In the BRAC process, the oversight responsibility of Congress to assess and make
recommendations regarding the efficiency of the defense infrastructure is largely
abdicated to an independent commission. However, as Andrew Glassberg (1995, 97)
observed, policymakers retained political clout nonetheless, noting it “does not deter
communities from believing that their congressional member might still be able to protect
them, nor has it deterred members from continuing to reinforce such attitudes.” Periods
leading up to, during, and after a round of BRAC thereby provide politicians at all levels
of government, regardless of party, a means to pursue common benefit together in
sidestepping closures or capitalizing on opportunities that come from communities
reclaiming lands from the military. Along those lines, Glassberg (1995, 97) also noted
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the general “favorable publicity” of the BRAC process, politics aside. Interestingly, in
that light, Congress has rejected requests by the administration to initiate another BRAC
round every year from 2012 to the present (Else 2016, 4). Such a trend leads to empirical
questions as to the changing nature of domestic political pressures on defense policy
(“structural” policy, in particular). This is especially the case in light of the current
partisan environment, not only with regard to BRAC, but also to the defense industrial
base—another prime example of defense policy’s subjugation to distributive politics.
Other explanations
There is a variety of other explanations throughout the literature as to why
defense policy formulation seems to enjoy more collegial support than other policy areas.
However, much of it is disjointed or focused on answering other questions rather than
whether or not defense policy formulations is really more collegial than other policy
areas and working to reveal the reasons why. Those other explanations are rooted in: the
decision making of committee and staff leadership in how institutional processes are
approached and conducted; a sense among policymakers that they are working toward a
“higher mission” when focused on defense policy; the loyalty of members to policies and
legislation by virtue of their committee assignments; and, dedication to a sense of duty
that producing the best possible policy for the nation’s defense was an imperative.
Expanding on the role of leadership, Shogan (2011) noted an insistence by
defense committee leadership over time to stick with a predictable and methodical
legislative routine, much as the NDAA enjoys, and one which encourages input from
minority party members, helps to solidify the bill’s overall support from both sides of the
aisle. Christopher Deering (Ripley and Lindsay 1993, 165) in his study of the Armed
Services Committee, also emphasized the importance of continuous and consistently
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strong committee leadership (staff and members) and their commitment to maintaining a
bipartisan tenor as vital to the NDAA’s success and the collegial nature of its
deliberations.
Reminiscent of the political demeanor of the defense committees, Lindsay (1994,
65) noted the intelligence committee’s traditional designation of the ranking minority
member as the committee’s vice-chairman, a message of unity from leadership regarding
the importance of the nation’s security issue above party loyalties. In comparing defense
policy with education, transportation, and aviation policy, Shogan (2011, 14) emphasized
its distinctiveness due to a sense of “shared mission” felt among policymakers in
supporting the military. James Lindsay (1994, 43) echoed a similar sentiment among
policymakers working on foreign policy, as did Pat Towell: “In the middle of a war, the
two [defense] committees, led by the president’s own party, initiated – over the strong
objections of a particularly sharp-elbowed secretary of defense – a significant policy
change that had no tangible electoral payoff” (Campbell and Auerswald, 2012, 73). In
that vein, regarding loyalty to policy, Maltzman (1998, 158) as well as Poole and
Rosenthal (2007, 266), among others, concluded members of Congress generally foster a
proclivity to cross the aisle to support legislation from the committees upon which they
sit (with some exception). Such gives rise to the question of committee makeup (with
regard to ideology in particular) and its influence on collegiality.
Rundquist and Carsey (2002) noted, “several scholars have argued that ideology
is significant for explaining legislative behavior regarding defense policy (e.g. Moyer
1973; Lindsay 1991).” Such conclusions are largely drawn from what started in the
1930’s as cooperation between the Republican Conservative Coalition and Southern
Democrats, who banded together as “hawks” to support and sustain foreign and defense
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policy that benefitted the entire group and their constituencies (Rundquist and Carsey
2002, 16). The coalition provided an enduring, stable and predictable means (Arrow
1951; Black 1958) for members of Congress to pursue policy goals regardless of benefit
to their constituencies, an example reminiscent of distributive politics (Rundquist and
Carsey 2002, 35). Ripley and Lindsay (1993 243, 251) found much of the same—that
foreign and defense policy is somewhat irrelevant to the concerns of the electorate and
therefore ideological universalism takes over to a degree. Thus, with the assumption few
constituent interests are at stake, reelection calculations become somewhat irrelevant in
defense policy decision making, thereby opening logrolling and ideology to guide
choices, transcendent of party loyalties (Ripley and Lindsay 1993, 243, 251). Of equal
import, (Rundquist and Carsey 2002, 53, 59) found when it comes to defense policy,
policymakers tend to vote according to their own ideological beliefs and are less
concerned with those of their constituents, and that the HASC is an “ideological outlier”
in that regard, attracting more hawkish members, regardless of party. Considering such
findings, the ideological makeup of defense committees should clearly be weighed in
deriving explanations as to why policymakers cooperate more on defense policy than on
other issues.
Ultimately, current research explaining the relative consensus of why
policymakers tend to approach defense policy formulation with more collegiality than
other issue areas can be roughly split into three categories. The first looks to institutional
processes and structures and leans on the ideological makeup of the defense committees,
the collective feelings that the committee’s work is driven by a “higher mission,” and the
structure and nature of the NDAA legislation and the associated deliberative process, to
help explain cooperation. The second category is seeded in matters of crisis or pressing
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issues that demand immediate policy action due to a threat to national interests. Such
crises or threats are usually correlated with international pressures, their remedies reason
for bipartisan cooperation not just within Congress, but also between Congress and the
White House. In those cases, the president tends to lead and unify, usually garnering
support from the Congress and the public, often without regard for partisan loyalty.
Third—theories of distributive process and politics (which often parallel domestic policy
deliberations)—are widely offered to explain collective action and cooperation among
policymakers on defense matters.
The three categorical themes are the result of an attempt to delineate the political
nature of defense policy formulation from the existing body of literature focused on the
defense policy process. Evidence was pieced together and interpreted to derive
conclusions from existing works because researchers have yet to really set out and
systemically explore whether or not defense policy formulation is more collegial than
other policy areas, thereby leaving only inferences to be made from existing scholarship.
Aside from Shogan’s (2011) research and the disparate collection of uninvestigated
conjecture found in literature over time (attempted to be organized in preceding
paragraphs), a methodical examination of why defense policy is so often construed (and
demonstrated in the NDAA process) to be more politically collegial has yet to be
undertaken. The purpose of this study is to help rectify that shortfall, to specifically
examine whether or not defense policy is more collegial than other policy issue areas
addressed by Congress. And, if so, how and why. But first, it is important to understand
why answering that question is important.
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Why it is important
Why does the substance of this study matter? As mentioned earlier, it is generally
accepted by political scientists that the United States is more politically divided than it
ever has been in recent history. Though, some argue it is only the exceptionally vocal,
active fringes of the political spectrum that drive those conclusions and are therefore not
truly reflective of the sentiments of most Americans (Stern 2017). No matter the case,
the government still must function practically to provide society with security and
stability and to carry out inherently governmental functions (like defense) with expected
effect. While some would say the federal government’s current ability to execute that
charge is debatable due to the toxicity of the contemporary political environment, there
are plenty examples of government still working well. And, in some cases, working
extraordinarily well (consistently, over time, for that matter). The NDAA process is one
of those cases. And therefore, research revealing why and how it has worked so well
over the years in varying political environments has practical and academic value.
Furthermore, members of the policy community, those who run the government
and in particular those who provide for the common defense, do not operate in an
ideological vacuum. As such, they must find practical ways to govern effectively despite
the political environment or threaten putting the country at risk of dire consequences—
especially the case with defense policy. Insight into what motivates policymakers to look
beyond politics or pushes them to compromise on complex legislation is especially
valuable in the development of effective strategies to realize policy goals, especially
when petitioning a Congress embroiled in a temperamental political environment.
Methods of this study aimed to provide that insight, lending to its practical value and
importance.
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Perhaps most important from a practical sense, understanding why the NDAA
process has been so successful in transcending partisanship in even the toughest of
political environments over time, is essential to U.S. national security interests. Along
those lines, the effective preservation of national security has been adversely impacted by
the growing influence of partisanship in recent years. Specifically, the budget process in
Congress has been plagued by political gridlock resulting in government shutdowns, a
long string continuing resolutions (CR), and stifling provisions of the Budget Control Act
(BCA)—all culminating in the corrosion of U.S. military capabilities and readiness to the
point it must be addressed as a serious strategic challenge for the nation.
A growing chorus has warned of deteriorating military readiness and its risks due
to the partisanship in Congress. Upon the passage of a CR in late December, 2017,
Senator John McCain (R-AZ) (2017) warned:
Readiness will continue to decline. Service members will not receive scheduled
training. Ship maintenance backlogs will grow. All of this in the face of a world
that only gets more dangerous and where threats continue to rise. As competitors
like China, Russia, and North Korea continue to rapidly advance their military and
modernize their weapons, the U.S. military will wait.
McCain’s warning manifested itself in a rash of serious military aviation incidents
coupled with multiple deadly U.S. Navy ship accidents in following months.
Investigation into the latter incited blame on cuts to training budgets and protocols (both
of which fall under the auspices of the NDAA) while the former spurred an investigation
by House Armed Services Committee Ranking Member, Adam Smith (D-WA) (Kheel
2018). Senior military officials from all the services and the combatant commands
repeatedly testified before Congress in recent years regarding their concerns for risks
stemming from readiness shortfalls, especially as the U.S. faces threats from abroad that
are growing in complexity and number (Wenstrup 2017). Others in the policy
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community, outside of Congress and the administration, echoed their concerns, calling
for policymakers to transcend partisan bickering and act to reverse the state of reduced
military readiness (Adams 2018). With that in mind, garnering a practical understanding
for what has made the NDAA process successful, what makes defense policy formulation
“easier” for policymakers to reach across the aisle and collaborate on, is useful to
preserving the veracity of that process and therefore to preserving U.S. national security
interests.
Finally, from a practical standpoint, understanding what motivates collegial
political behavior among policymakers in Congress—as in the NDAA process—makes
for lessons presumably transferable to other policy areas. Such knowledge has practical
utility in shaping the legislative process itself, or in choosing a nuanced approach or
specific political mechanism to facilitate the enactment of a certain policy. As such,
lessons from studies like this one are practically important in helping leaders better
prioritize precious time and resources toward institutional processes and policies that
have demonstrated success. In other words, lessons from understanding why the NDAA
process has worked so well over time can potentially be applied elsewhere to overcome
partisanship and thereby lend to consistently realized policy success in those other areas.
From an academic perspective, knowledge gained from researching why defense
policy is different than other policy areas, particularly with regard to the NDAA, is
important to progressing the practice and study of public policy and politics. In
particular, studying how a bill with a history like the NDAA is able to forage through the
committee process and repeatedly pass into law, year after year, provides invaluable
insight about the institution of Congress, its processes, culture, and the roots of the
motivations that feed its machinations. Learning what drives otherwise disparate groups
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to coalesce on policy also has tremendous empirical value to understanding the political
environment. Are motives for collaboration in the face of extraordinarily partisan
circumstances rooted in deeply held values, in preserving vital national interests, in the
product of a Constitutional mandate, or in institutional process or culture? Those
questions, among others, are explored in ensuing chapters.
The NDAA process is also compared with the processes other similarly
reoccurring comprehensive authorizing legislation, like the Farm Bill and Highway Bill,
have traversed over time. The case studies used in those comparisons are important to
broadening the somewhat sparse scholarship on defense policymaking in Congress, as is
the complementary evidence gathered from interviews with those from the policy
community who have decades of firsthand knowledge and experience with those
processes. Both the cases and interviews are also important to providing a widened
understanding as to the influences of and interaction between domestic and international
political pressures on defense policy formulation, not to mention the institutional
pressures within Congress that influence associated decision making. Scholars are
presumed to find value in such research, especially if it supports or counters prevailing
theories in the social sciences or inspires new avenues of study.
Understanding the political nature of defense policy process in Congress—why it
is more collegial than other policy areas—is important for three primary reasons. First,
from a practical standpoint, understanding why the NDAA process works so well—why
the bill can bypass partisan traps each year as it makes its way into law—presumably
allows those in the policy community to better foresee and overcome obstacles that might
otherwise derail that process. This is especially important in offsetting the debilitating
effects of partisanship on military readiness, an issue vital to the preservation of national
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security. Second, understanding what makes the NDAA process more collegial allots
policymakers and others in the policy community a basis for understanding how to
potentially bypass partisan gridlock in other policy areas, via substance, process, politics,
or otherwise. Finally, studying the resolute endurance of the NDAA process and its
political nature provides academics an opportunity to broaden the theoretical
understanding of the people, political discourse, history, and institutions involved in that
process (and of defense policy formulation in Congress, in general).
In conclusion, the deliberation of defense policy in Congress, namely the annual
consideration and passage of the NDAA, has enjoyed resolute and unique political unity
over time and it is important to understand why. Scholars have provided some reasons
why the NDAA has avoided partisan derailment despite enduring some of the most
difficult political environments over the last half-century. Yet, those reasons are
disparate and largely inferred by interpreting scholarship that is really focused elsewhere.
Essentially, the question whether or not defense policy formulation in Congress is more
collegial than other policy areas has not really been addressed directly, with minor
exception. As such, the chapters which follow attempt to remedy that shortfall, as there
is practical and empirical value to exploring what past research has not yet revealed
regarding the political nature of defense policy in Congress.
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Chapter 3 – Methodology
The untested conventional wisdom of defense policy
To fully address the question of whether or not the formulation of defense policy
is approached with more collegiality than other policy issues, it was necessary to reveal
and then examine factors that drive members of Congress from every corner of the
country, from all political persuasions and backgrounds, to repeatedly transcend their
partisan leanings and pass the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) into law with
uniquely stubborn consistency (for over fifty years straight, and counting). To do so, a
mix of quantitative and qualitative approaches, as outlined in this chapter, were employed
to test a series of hypotheses aimed at answering the research question: Is defense policy
more collegial than other policy issue areas addressed by Congress? If so, how and
why?
Qualitative analysis was primarily based on data from official records and
transcripts of institutional processes to include floor and committee vote statements,
testimony presented during committee hearings, speeches given by policymakers and
press and media accounts. That information was complemented by interviews with
members of Congress, professional staff members (congressional staffers employed by
committees), personal office staff (staffers employed in district or state offices), and
subject matter experts from think tanks and other relevant, public policy focused
organizations such as the Congressional Research Service and the Library of Congress.
Quantitative analysis was largely derived from existing historical data, to include
comparisons of committee and roll call votes, bill amendment counts, and committee and
member ideological indexes, as detailed further below.
Methods used to answer the research question aimed to provide a comprehensive
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picture of the political nature of defense policy in Congress, primarily accounting for
political pressures internal to (institutional) and external to (domestic and international
politics) the policy formulation process during three primary time periods: 1961 to 1966;
1993 to 1998; and 2007 to 2012. Qualitative and quantitative evidence from the NDAA
process was compared with that of other policy types which also use major periodic
authorizing bills to employ policy—namely agriculture policy in the form of the Farm
Bill and transportation policy as the Highway Bill. Ultimately, in doing so, the goal was
to provide a comprehensive comparative understanding for why defense policy
formulation in Congress has been routinely characterized over time as more collegial than
its policy counterparts.
The Main Hypothesis
The primary hypothesis for this study was:
The formulation of defense policy in the U.S. House of Representatives is
approached with more collegiality than other policy issue areas, mainly due
to institutional, domestic, and international political pressures on members
that transcend competing partisan motivations.
This hypothesis stemmed from a wealth of historical, anecdotal, and scholarly references
as to the uniquely collegial nature of defense policy formulation in Congress. It was
fashioned from an initial collective assessment of those references and the resultant
primary assertion guiding this study: Motivations driving exceptional policymaker
collaboration during legislative deliberations on defense policy emanate from distinct but
parallel institutional politics and processes, domestic political influences, and
international political pressures. The collegial nature of defense policy formulation has
been consistently evident in annual NDAA deliberations over the past fifty-plus years,
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especially when compared with how other periodic authorizing legislation was
considered by Congress over the same time period. Understanding why the NDAA has
met with such success has practical importance – mainly in understanding the risks
severe partisanship has on effectively preserving U.S. national security. It also has
scholarly value – in providing a better understanding for how institutional, domestic, and
international political influences weigh on the defense policy process, and the legislation
process in general, in Congress.
Qualitative approach & interviews
The methodology of this study answers the call of social scientists like Theriault
and Shafran (2013), who argued for a more comprehensive approach to understanding
decision making in the legislative branch. More specifically, they advocated for more
qualitative analytical approaches to complement the prevalence of quantitative studies to
provide a better account of the true machinations of the policy process. Frances Lee
(2009) did so in accounting for the political context of Senate roll call votes in Beyond
Ideology, explaining that reasons behind apparent partisanship cannot only be gleaned
from spatial models but also require an examination of the politics that sways such votes.
While useful from a purely academic standpoint, finding practical applications for studies
based solely on quantitative analysis can be difficult as they are rendered with critical
contextual voids. For example, such studies rarely provide discussion of agenda
influence, be it from the president, other involved parties, congressional leadership, or as
a response to public demands for action. Also, often absent are nuances of the policies
contemplated, political pressures encountered, and the impact of institutional procedures,
all vital to revealing a full understanding for the event under scrutiny.
Such amounts to quantitative analysis without qualitative context, a serious
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shortfall when truly attempting to fully understand or explain the behavior of an
institution as complex as Congress. In other words, numbers—counting actions and
votes, etc. in the legislative process—help tell the story, but not the whole story,
especially when isolated from associated social discourse. Using predictive or other
quantitative analytical methods or tools are useful, but alone fail to capture the wholly
organic nature of the institution of Congress. Accordingly, Raymond La Raja (2013)
observed, “scholars have become too reliant on ideological scores of individual members
to predict how Congress will make laws.” Along those lines, it can be argued the
distillation of complex congressional activities into mere metrics betrays the academic
ethos, as it ignores historic context, political influences, and institutional processes
associated with policy change.
Summarily, much of the character, content, and conclusions of the current
scholarship regarding the comparative nature of defense policy in Congress is based on
relatively narrow focused analyses. While that analyses provides useful insight, its
conclusions are often presented in slivers with varying consideration for the broader
political context from which the data was gathered. Therefore, new research that renders
conclusions drawn from a combination of qualitative and quantitative analyses and
orchestrated with historical context of the political environment from which associated
data was pulled, will help provide the most comprehensive (and therefore theoretically
sound and practically useful) explanations possible for the question at hand. This study
aimed to follow that trend to move the discipline forward productively by providing
analysis that employs quantitative measures with appropriate and substantive context to
fully reveal the nature of defense policy in Congress.
A key part of the comprehensive approach used for this study leveraged
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approximately twenty-five individual interviews conducted in person, over the telephone,
via online survey, and email using the questionnaire at the end of this section to guide
questions posed. The interviews took place over a twelve-month period, most of which
took place in Washington D.C. Interviews were conducted with former and sitting
members of Congress as well as with former and current congressional staffers who
served as professional staff members (PSM) with various committees and/or as senior
staffers with the personal offices of the members they worked for in both the House and
Senate. Several of those interviewed continued to build their practical policy expertise as
lobbyists, mainly focused on the policy issues under scrutiny in this study (defense,
agriculture, transportation). Also interviewed were representatives of the Congressional
Research Service, scholars of influential public policy think tanks, former senior
administration officials to include a Principal Assistant and Deputy Undersecretary of
Defense, a former Deputy Assistant Secretary with the Department of Agriculture, and
former senior military officials to include a retired three-star general who has also served
as a House committee staff director.
The practical personal experiences of interviewees mainly came from service
during the latter two case study periods (1993 – 1998 and 2007 – 2012). And while the
earliest case period (1961 – 1966) was somewhat underrepresented by interviewees with
direct personal experience due to the time elapsed, many of those interviewed were
nonetheless well-versed in that period’s political history and character by virtue of their
own research and subject-matter familiarity.
The questionnaire at the end of this chapter provided a guide for conducting the
interviews. However, the vast majority of the surveys conducted, especially those
conducted in person, included extensive discussions and questioning that went well
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beyond the depth of the questions listed in the questionnaire.
Discussions with interviewees provided valuable insight used to compare the way
the policy issues are approached politically, as well as in the legislative processes of the
bills examined, to include the impact of institutional, domestic, and international
influences. The value of this kind of methodology is recognized by the discipline, in that
“interviews are an important and distinct means of understanding contemporary political
actions and outcomes. Interviews can serve to identify causal mechanisms that are not
evident in other forms of data” (Mosley 2013, 5). As such, the open-ended nature of
questions and responses during in-person interviews allowed for gathering of insight not
captured via other methods. It also allowed for follow-up queries to clarify or gain greater
detail as to the influences on the respective policy making processes under scrutiny.
Variables & Primary Assertions Tested
“Collegiality,” the primary dependent variable, was defined as exceptional and
consistent cooperative interaction among colleagues over time that rendered legislation
which garnered support of at least a bipartisan supermajority (two-thirds) of the House
of Representatives upon its final passage. “Defense policy” was primarily
operationalized by examples of the NDAA during case study examination periods.
“Other types of policy” were primarily operationalized by the Farm Bill and the
Highway Bill during the three respective case assessment periods, explained further
below. The impact of the principal independent (IV) variables, “institutional, domestic
and international political pressures,” on collegiality was assessed primarily from
historical accounting of the legislative process.
Primary assertions tested in Chapter 4, as to the impact of institutional pressures
on collegiality, included: (1) the specific constitutional mandate for Congress to raise,
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regulate, and oversee the military services is an obligation that outweighs partisanship; 2
(2) the NDAA is uniquely consensus-building in its development and consideration
among major authorizing legislation routinely considered within Congress; and (3)
strong, focused defense committee leadership, including the organization, management,
and interaction of committee staff, that is unique among authorizing committees.
The NDAA “establishes or continues DOD programs, policies, projects, or
activities and provides guidance on how the appropriated funds are to be used in carrying
out those authorized activities” (Williams and Heitshusen 2016b). That collection might
include funding authorization for major weapon system procurement such as the F-35
Joint Strike Fighter or a new aircraft carrier, or to maintain a satellite constellation or to
build a new aircraft hangar, or even to develop a new artillery shell. Policy and project
provisions could outline new personnel recruiting requirements for the services or may
authorize funds for DOD schools abroad or the department’s commissary system along
with guidance on how those monies should be spent. The bills are typically organized
into four divisions: Division A: Department of Defense Authorizations; Division B:
Military Construction Authorizations; Division C: Department of Energy National
Security Authorizations and Other Authorizations, and; Division D: Funding Tables; the
totality of which directs budget and policy for the entire defense enterprise (Williams and
Heitshusen 2016b).
Underlying assertions about pressures from the domestic political environment on
defense policy formulation in the House are tested in Chapter 5 and 6. Specifically, the

2

Other responsibilities emerged over time in statute as authorities of the federal government were gradually
interpreted from constitutional language. Those responsibilities developed as needs arose, but at times met
with challenge regarding their constitutionality. Federal authority to regulate waters (rivers and harbors)
has been interpreted from the Commerce Clause, for example, but is not specifically spelled out in the
Constitution (Mulligan 2016).
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notion that distributive politics (universalism, logrolling, etc.) and member ideology are
primary drivers of collegial behavior in defense policy formulation is examined.
Measures of collegiality were ultimately assessed using a combination of qualitative and
quantitative measures.
Assertions tested in Chapter 7 and 8 focus on how international political pressures
weigh on defense policy in Congress. They include the notion that politicians tend to
band together when it comes to dealing with crisis or threats to national interests (which
usually originate on the world stage or have global implications). Such is an extension of
the “politics stops at the water’s edge” view of foreign policy. Furthermore, it was
presumed Congress tends to follow the lead of the president in such circumstances and
that its members are reluctant to make vote decisions that could be construed as not
supporting U.S. servicemembers (or other Americans) in harm’s way.
The House as a testing venue
The U.S. House of Representatives (House) was chosen as a subject for this study
primarily for its unique institutional characteristics, presumed to distinctly highlight the
interaction between the dependent and independent variables under scrutiny. That is, the
majority party definitively rules House processes and as a result, instances of bipartisan
cooperation are presumed to be more visible in the legislative process in the House,
thereby making it easier to compare the NDAA process with that of the Farm Bill and
Highway Bill.
The House is run by majority rule with little opportunity for members of the
minority party to substantively influence legislation without bipartisan support, especially
if they do not have support from the majority leadership. As a result, the agenda and
legislation considered in the House can be quite politically charged and ideologically
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sweeping in the nature of the policies addressed. So, if polarization breaks down
bipartisanship, it should be more evident in the House than the Senate.
Conversely, in the Senate, most business is conducted by unanimous consent,
meaning virtually any member of the majority or minority party has the power to stop or
slow legislation single-handedly notionally tempering the partisan nature of the agenda
and legislation considered. That is, the unanimous consent process presumably forces
Senators to consider how the politics of their legislation might be received by colleagues
before its introduced because it will likely not move otherwise. Thus, with the exception
of bills considered under the suspension of the House Rules which usually pass via voice
vote, instances of cooperation are relatively easy to spot and compare in House
deliberations. Collaboration is especially evident during floor proceedings focused on
major bills like the NDAA, the Farm Bill, and Highway Bill, thereby making the House
an appropriate subject for the study from a methodological and institutional standpoint.
Additionally, certain aspects of this study were modeled to complement research
previously conducted by Colleen Shogan (2011). Shogan focused on the institutional and
political character of the NDAA process in the U.S. Senate from her first-hand
experience with the bill as a congressional research fellow and staffer. This study aims to
provide balance to and build upon Shogan’s work; to provide a deeper understanding for
the political nature of defense policy formulation across the institution – from both
chambers of Congress.
Why the House NDAA process provides a good test
The case studies employed are focused on three five-year periods during which
partisanship played a notable role in domestic politics. They were also times during
which the U.S. was involved with unique security concerns abroad which impacted the
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policy making process of the time. While the NDAA has been addressed each year by
Congress since its inception, the Farm Bill and Highway Bill are addressed more
sporadically, in approximate intervals of three to five years. As such, the time periods
chosen for the case studies each had overlapping instances of all three bills deliberated on
and passed by Congress, allowing for a roughly even contextual foundation for
comparison.
Within each of the three periods the nation also experienced significant historical
events exclusive to the policy making environment. Nonetheless, those events were
presumed to impact domestic, international, and institutional pressures weighing on the
political calculus of decision-making by policymakers at the time. Each of the chapters
which incorporate case study examples (Chapters 4, 5, and 6) therefore present a
discussion of the historical context of the period, the highlights of which are summarized
below.
The first case study period, 1961 – 1966, deep in the Cold War, arguably
represents an era of stable and myopically focused defense policy, primarily concerned
with countering the Soviet Union and spread of communism. During the second period,
1993 – 1998, the United States struggled with defense policy priorities parcel to its new
global role following the fall of the Soviet Union. During the third period, 2007 – 2012,
defense policy was largely monopolized by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and the
broader war on terrorism amidst a vitriol political environment stoked further by global
financial turmoil.
1961 - 1966: This period was an especially tumultuous time for the United States
under Republican and Democratic presidents, a period during which Democrats
controlled both chambers of Congress. Landmark legislation was nonetheless passed,
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realizing foreign and domestic policy goals to include the Food Stamp Act, the Civil
Rights Act, and that which established the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID). Agriculture in America was changing quickly during this time,
with over 573,000 smaller farms (those with gross sales of less than $5,000 per year)
closing over the five-year period, while the number which made over $10,000 grew
rapidly (U.S. Council of Economic Advisors 1966, 133). On the open road, the Federal
Aid Highway Act of 1962 directed states and urban areas to develop coordinated and
comprehensive long-range plans and programs that integrated highways with other means
of transportation (Williamson 2012, 8). Aside from the initial stages of America’s
involvement in Vietnam during this time, foreign political influences emanated from the
failed CIA choreographed Bay of Pigs invasion in Cuba and the threat of communism
spreading across the globe. Defense policy was relatively predictable as a result of the
latter, policymakers’ attention primarily invested with bipartisan unity in providing
means to counter the Soviet Union in a bipolar world (Allison 2017, 204). One of the
most significant of events of the period on the domestic front was the assassination of
John F. Kennedy, which shook the America political landscape from the optimistic
foundation the young president inspired during his tenure. Deliberations over the
Highway Bill of 1962, and Farm Bill of 1965, were compared with NDAA provisions
considered during this timeframe.
1993 - 1998: Defense policy in this period was swayed by the U.S. search for its
new global role in the post-Cold War era as the world’s sole superpower. It was also
characterized by a “peace dividend,” major decreases in the defense budget pushed by the
Clinton administration. Democrats controlled the Congress in 1994, with the remaining
four years led by Republicans. International political influences in Congress emanated
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from the Dayton Accords and NATO’s intervention in Kosovo and Bosnia during this
period. Saddam Hussein continued to defy United Nations resolutions to reopen Iraq
nuclear facilities to IAEA inspectors which resulted in coalition airstrikes. On the home
front, the Clinton impeachment influenced the tone of domestic political debates as the
dot-com boom fueled the economy and a rare federal budget surplus. Highway
transportation policy debates were influenced by the evolution of computerized logistics
to meet on-demand supply models and the challenge of states and cities to keep up with
associated needs, largely with federal funding (Eberts 1997, 14-15). Agriculture policy
was characterized by an increasingly integrated globalized market which embraced
technologies that increased supply thereby fueling competitive pressures at home and
abroad (Dimitri 2005, 8). Deliberations over the Highway Bill of 1998, and Farm Bill of
1996, will be compared with the NDAA provisions considered during this timeframe.
2007 - 2012: During the years bridging the Republican Bush and Democratic
Obama administrations, Congress started under Democratic control and later split
chamber control between the parties. The attention of defense policy in Congress was
influenced on the international stage by the ongoing war in Afghanistan and the surge of
American troops in Iraq during this period, as temporal and fiscal realities of the broader
war against violent extremism settled in. Major domestic political factors impacting
policy debates at the time included the election of the first African American president,
Barack Obama, the Great Recession, the rise of the Tea Party, and blinding paralysis in
Congress that resulted in the Budget Control Act and sequestration. The Farm Bill of
2008 was vetoed twice by President George W. Bush, overridden by Congress both
times, with much of the policy debate focused on concerns of spending levels and
priorities in the wake of the aforementioned global financial crisis (Austin 2008).
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Deliberations over that legislation and the 2012 Highway Bill, an arguably bipartisan
affair which was also caught up in congressional spending fights, is compared with the
NDAA provisions considered during this timeframe (Laing 2012).
Throughout all three periods the NDAA continuously passed into law each year.
This success occurred despite of the unique character of the defense policy landscape at
the time and the influences it endured institutionally in Congress and from domestic and
international politics. Additionally, both Democrats and Republicans controlled the
White House and the Congress at various times throughout the periods examined.
Finally, over the entire fifty-plus year history of the NDAA there were only five instances
(1978, 1988, 1995, 2007, and 2015) in which the bill was vetoed by the president, two of
which fall in the parameters of the case study periods (DeBruyne 2016). Thus, the
periods examined represent a healthy cross-section of American political history in the
House and provide for an earnestly balanced series of comparisons among policy areas.
Authorizing legislation
Comprehensive authorizing legislation, exemplified by the bills compared in this
study, set federal spending targets and may include policy guidance or statutory direction
specifically expressing the intent of Congress. Authorizations are different than
appropriations legislation which usually does not incorporate policy guidance, but rather
approves specific dollar amounts to be spent by the federal government on certain
programs or projects. The three authorizing bills primarily used for comparison here—
the NDAA, the Farm Bill, and transportation authorization legislation (commonly known
as the Highway Bill)—were viewed as roughly equal representations of major
authorizing legislation in their respective policy areas and therefore presumed to provide
reasonably appropriate platforms for effective comparative analysis (tested in Chapter 4).
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Comparative case studies were focused on revealing how the three primary policy
areas were approached by policymakers during their respective timeframes and to
highlight unique or exceptional differences in collegiality as the bills were considered
throughout the legislative process. With that in mind, it is appropriate to briefly explain
why the Farm and Highway Bills were chosen as means of comparison to the NDAA.
The Farm Bill
Much like the NDAA, even in times of great political divide the “Farm Bill” has
passed with relative certainty about every five years by Congress since the 1930s
(Johnson and Monke 2017, 1). The legislation “is an omnibus, multi-year law that
governs an array of agricultural and food programs,” characterized as being able to
“create broad coalitions of support among sometimes conflicting interests for policies
that individually might not survive the legislative process” (Johnson and Monke 2017, 1).
While each version of the Farm Bill differs slightly in its authorizations, “Titles in the
most recent farm bill [2014] encompassed farm commodity price and income supports,
agricultural conservation, farm credit, trade, research, rural development, bioenergy,
foreign food aid, and domestic nutrition assistance” (Johnson and Monke 2017). In that
regard, Johnson and Monke’s description of the Farm Bill could arguably be compared to
the NDAA with relative ease due to its similar broad appeal and support. While there are
certainly discernible differences in how (and what) policy issues are addressed in the two
bills, there were presumed to be equally, if not more, underlying similarities in the
manner by which they are approached politically by policymakers and in the nature by
which their respective committees of jurisdiction deal with them.
Since its first days, long before being established as an independent nation,
agriculture has played an important role in America’s culture, history, and economics.
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As a result, agriculture policy is ingrained in the American political environment. And
much like the NDAA, the Farm Bill, a direct manifestation of that history, has enjoyed
steady bipartisan support over time, evident in its consistent passage under the leadership
of both Democrats and Republicans in Congress and the White House. The House
Agriculture (Ag) Committee, which oversees the Farm Bill, is also a larger committee of
the House of Representatives, much like the HASC. Also, similar to the HASC, the Ag
Committee includes members from all over the country representing a diverse array of
political and policy interests and constituencies, much of which converges in the bill’s
substance. These similarities provided a meaningful platform for comparison when it
came to analyzing if one policy realm had more collegial tendencies than another, much
like the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee and the Highway Bill.
The Highway Bill
Virtually everyone in the United States benefits from the nation’s vast roadway
and transportation infrastructure. It is the crucial backbone of the American economy,
enabling interstate commerce and a vital connection to the rest of the world. America’s
reliance on roads, the ability to move freely from one place to another across the entire
continent, from the most rural towns to the busiest cities, is therefore of universal interest
to policymakers at all levels of government regardless of ideology or party affiliation.
Enhancing that interest is the notion that American culture identifies closely with the
freedom of the open roads and anything that impedes or enhances that freedom (from a
pothole to a new highway offramp) is liable to gain the public’s attention.
Accordingly, members of Congress have strong incentives to set aside partisan
divisions to authorize transportation infrastructure with geographically widespread and
visible benefits. The Highway Bill authorizes and supports major critical infrastructure
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across the country, to include the interstate highway system, major roads, mass transit
projects, and bridges and freight movement as well as funding for research, development
and education, in addition to providing state block grants for related projects. Members
of Congress have debated the role of the federal government with regard to the nation’s
road system since its earliest days, an endeavor that has progressed from bequeathing
federal land grants to states to build roads in the 1800s, to the over $43 billion in direct
federal spending provided for roads in FY 2016 (Dilger 2015, 1-4).
Much like the Ag Committee and the HASC, the House Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure is quite large, by House standards. Its membership is
also diverse, yet still often unified by common interests associated with the nation
preserving the benefits of modern, well-kept roadways. Accordingly, transportation
policy, specifically legislation that authorizes federal roadway funding as found in the
Highway Bill is comparable to agriculture and defense policy in its ability to garner
consistent bipartisan support through the nation’s history.
Testing the Hypothesis
Given the assertion that voting decisions and decisions to cooperate across party
lines by members of Congress are influenced by current events and the corresponding
political climate, (among other factors), analyses incorporated independent variables (IV)
derived from three main areas designed to adequately capture those factors. Those IV’s
included: (1) institutional influences within Congress, (2) domestic political pressures,
and (3) international influences, each scrutinized for their impact on the collegial nature
of defense policy formulation in the House (DV).
Chapter 4 includes analyses of four subordinate hypotheses to test the impact of
those IVs on the DV from the standpoint of Congress as an institution. Two of the four
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explore the comparative ideological disposition of rank-and-file defense committee
members and that of the committee leadership (chairmen and ranking members). The
third is focused on congressional responsibilities derived directly from the Constitution,
and the fourth attempts to illuminate how the organization, interaction, and management
of congressional staff influence collegiality in the defense policy formulation process in
Congress. Analyses in Chapter 4—institutional influences—was guided by the following
secondary hypotheses:
4a. The process by which the House Armed Services Committee (HASC)
constructs and considers the NDAA is more conducive to collegiality than
methods by which the Highway Bill and Farm Bill are framed and
deliberated on by their respective committees.
The test for this hypothesis was qualitative in nature and consisted of comparing the
methods by which the three committees built their recurring authorizing bill. Presumed
to promote bipartisan cooperation, the HASC uses a “building-block” approach that starts
with minority and majority staff compiling provisions all agree upon, then they negotiate
more controversial provisions, bringing in members for resolution only if necessary and
ultimately to vote if no resolution is found (Shogan 2011). Also compared was the
predictability and consistency of deliberations on the three bills in question. For
example, guarded almost ritualistically by committee leadership and staff, the NDAA
consideration process has been characterized as uniquely predictable and consistent—a
testament as to its institutional nature (Shogan 2011). Along those lines, a familiar prebudget resolution briefing regimen by DOD, followed by posture and budget hearings
and markup processes, are repeated annually with active participation by members and
staff from both sides of the aisle (Shogan 2011). The almost religious institutional
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loyalty to that process, to include the assimilation of House members and staff from both
sides of the aisle newly introduced to it, provides difficult momentum to counter
regardless of ideological bent or prowess.
4b. Members of Congress express a greater obligation to collaborate on
defense policy as an explicit constitutionally charged responsibility than on
other policy issues lacking a specific Constitutional mandate.
The test for this hypothesis was qualitative in nature. Current and former members of
Congress, Congressional staff, and other policy community actors with significant
experience dealing with defense policy formulation were asked the following interview
question: Do members of Congress feel more of an obligation to cooperate on policy
issues specifically charged to the legislature by the Constitution (to raise and support
Armies; to provide and maintain a Navy) than those not specifically directed (agriculture
and transportation infrastructure policy)? The congressional record and media accounts
from the designated case study periods will also be reviewed for rhetoric by policymakers
alluding to such ends.
4c. The HASC staff is organized, “housed,” and operate in a manner more
conducive to bipartisan collaboration than other committees in the House,
such as the Agriculture or Transportation Committees staffs.
The test for this was qualitative in nature and consisted of comparing committee staffs by
answering the follow questions: Does the minority and majority staff schedule and take
meetings together with representatives of the department they provide authorizations and
oversight for (e.g. HASC and DOD)? Does the minority and majority staff share office
space, or is it separate? Does the committee staff draft provisions of the main recurring
authorizing legislation (like the NDAA) as a collaborative effort between majority and
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minority staffs? Answers were derived from interviews of current and former staff and
members as well as accounts from existing scholarship.
4d. The ideological dispositions of HASC members are expected to be closer
aligned than that of other House Committees like the Agriculture Committee
and the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee during the case study
periods in question.
Past research demonstrated ideology was a factor in attracting members of Congress to
serve on defense committees—perhaps the most frequently referenced group being the
collectively hawkish Conservative Coalition Republicans and Southern Democrats
(Rundquist and Carsey 2002, 16). As a result, this hypothesis was tested to provide a
comparative baseline regarding the collegiality of the respective committees under
scrutiny for the time periods in question. It was quantitatively derived, using existing
historical indices which categorized members of Congress over time by ideology via their
voting behavior. Membership of each committee of jurisdiction (Armed Services,
Agriculture, and Transportation) was scrutinized.
Keith T. Poole’s and Howard Rosenthal’s (2007) Dynamic Weighted NOMINAl
Three-step Estimation (DW-NOMINATE) research was employed to establish
ideological reference points for the committees. The baselines were then used for a
comparative analysis of the three committees under review. Those comparisons helped
reveal whether the committees in question were more ideologically predisposed toward
collegiality than their counterparts based on the sway of their membership and aside from
the nature of the legislation they oversaw.
Analysis included an evaluation of standard deviations and distribution shapes,
looking specifically at whether or not defense was less dispersed and less bimodal than
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the other committees. Establishment and scrutiny of the baseline ultimately allowed for a
more effective qualitative evaluation regarding the political nature of the policy at hand.
Finally, vote differentials for the final passage of each bill in their respective committees
were examined for each case study time period, which provided additional quantitative
means to assess and compare levels of collegiality between committees.
4e. HASC Chairmen and Ranking Members are expected to be more
ideologically aligned with their fellow committee members as compared with
the leadership of other House Committees, like the Agriculture Committee or
Transportation Committee.
This subordinate hypothesis was derived to answer whether or not defense committee
leaders are more predisposed toward collegial behavior in formulating defense policy due
to certain shared ideological characteristics. It was tested quantitatively and qualitatively.
Quantitatively, DW-NOMINATE scores of committee chairmen and ranking members
were analyzed and compared across committees. Qualitative comparisons were made
regarding the impact of leadership on collegiality by leveraging interviews, existing
research, historical media accounts, and congressional records.
Analysis in Chapter 5 and 6, focused on domestic political influences, was guided
by the following secondary hypothesis:
5a. Certain domestic political pressures are unique to defense policy
formulation in Congress and render it more collegial than other policy issue
areas.
The hypothesis was tested qualitatively via a series of case studies which compared
deliberations over the Farm Bill, the Highway Bill, and NDAA from 1961 to 1966, 1993
to 1998, and 2007 to 2012. The aim of each case study time period was to identify the
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“certain domestic political pressures” that distinguished NDAA deliberations. To do
so, the primary issue that fueled debate in each of the three bills for the three time periods
was isolated and analyzed to highlight possible causes of collegiality uniquely
attributable to defense policy formulation in Congress.
This hypothesis was rooted in the theory of distributive politics, to include the
concept of universalism and the role of logrolling in policymaking. Along those lines,
virtually every state and territory in the nation (and arguably most congressional districts)
has benefitted from funds authorized by the NDAA, the Farm Bill, and the Highway Bill
in some manner. As such, this hypothesis also tested if collegiality in defense policy
formulation was different than other policy areas as a product of domestic political
pressures on policymakers to steer federal dollars to their electorate.
Analysis in Chapter 7 and 8, focused on international political pressures, was
purely qualitative and guided by the following methodology: Approximately twenty-five
interviewees from the policy community spanning over four decades of experience
revealed what they surmised to be primary factors from the international political arena
weighing on how policymakers approached the defense policy process. Their answers
were encapsulated into five major themes presumed to underly why the formulation of
defense policy in Congress is often construed as more collegial than other policy areas.
The first section provides a presentation of those themes: Security; America’s role in the
world; Presidential leadership; Defense vs. other policy areas; and, The “information
gap”. In an attempt to qualify the observations of the interviewees, a second section
applies the themes to three cases. The cases were derived from periods overlapping time
periods used in the previous chapters: 1961-1966, 1993-1998, and 2007-2012.
The methodological approach to Chapter 7 and 8 presumed national interests are
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arguably non-partisan matters most Americans can relate to and support: pursuit of
security and prosperity, the preservation of fundamental societal values, and the ability to
project those values abroad (Deibel 2007). Another underlying premise was that
international political pressures influence the collegiality of defense policy more than
other policy issues, especially when Americans are in harm’s way abroad. Wildavsky’s
(1966) proposition that the president tends to lead and the Congress follow on urgent
national security matters was also presumed to hold fast. Finally, research indicating that
members may shy away from political decisions that make their party look bad by not
supporting the president in challenging times for fear of future punishment at election
time, or because they did not want to compromise the country’s position abroad by being
outwardly contrary toward a position staked out by the administration was considered.
Conclusion
This study aims to better understand the political nature of defense policy
formulation in Congress for practical and scholarly purposes. Its ultimate aim is to
provide substantive qualification for the assertion that defense policy is more politically
palatable for policymakers in Congress to collaborate on than other policy areas. This
chapter outlined a plan to do so by employing qualitative and quantitative tools that
reveal and examine institutional, domestic, and international political factors presumed to
drive members of Congress toward exceptionally collegial behavior on defense policy.
The methodological approach leverages a series of historical case studies, interviews, and
quantitative data associated with the House NDAA process and compares them with that
of the Farm Bill and Highway Bill. Sought was a comprehensive comparative picture for
why the defense policy formulation in Congress has been routinely characterized over
time as more collegial than its counterparts. The journey begins in earnest with the next
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chapter, which provides the foundation for the remainder of the study in its analysis of
institutional factors which weigh on the NDAA each year in Congress – most notably the
influences of the people and processes of that institution.
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Interview questionnaire
(UMSL IRB approved, September 29, 2017)
CONSENT FORM
I understand questions regarding partisanship and defense policy in Congress will be asked of me
and the interview is expected to last less than an hour. I also understand confidentiality will be
maintained by the researcher if requested and the associated risks and benefits. Finally, I
understand I have the right to refuse to answer any questions during the interview. YES / NO
(circle preference)
Signature: ___________________________________________
Date:_______________________
Printed full name:________________________________________________________________
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Interview questions:
1. Are there committees in which members from opposing parties have an easier time
cooperating on legislation and policy issues than others? If so, which ones and why do you
think that is the case?
2. Are there policy issues which members from opposing parties have an easier time cooperating
on than others? If so, which ones and why do you think that is the case?
3. What is the primary source of the intense partisanship observed in American politics in recent
years?
4. What are instances of institutional processes or cultural norms in Congress that exacerbate or
reduce partisanship?
5. What events on the international stage are most likely to influence the decision making of
policymakers in Congress? Why?
6. In your experience working with Congress, do matters of agriculture policy, surface
transportation, policy, or national security policy seem to be approached with more or less
partisanship than the consideration of other policy issues? Why?
7. Do you recall any specific examples of national security policy, agriculture policy, or surface
transportation policy under consideration in Congress being treated differently during the
legislative process than other policy issues? If so, how was it treated differently and what
was your perception as to why it was treated differently?
8. In your estimation, are policymakers and staff in Congress more or less willing to work across
party lines to cooperate on national security policy? How about agriculture policy or surface
transportation policy? Why?
9. Do members of Congress feel more of an obligation to cooperate on policy specifically charged
to the legislature by the Constitution (to raise and support Armies; to provide and maintain a
Navy) than those not directly specified (agriculture and transportation infrastructure policy)?
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Chapter 4 - Institutional Influences
This chapter explores activities involved with the National Defense Authorization
Act (NDAA) process in Congress and how associated institutional factors influence
perceived collegial nature of defense policy formulation as compared with other policy
areas. The institutional influences within and proximal to legislative branch activities—
primarily from people and processes—are scrutinized in this chapter while influences
associated with events from the domestic political environment and from abroad are
examined in Chapters 5 and 6, respectively. The collective aim of the three chapters is to
provide a comprehensive exploration of the NDAA process, one that elucidates
institutional, domestic, and international political influences weighing on it, and thereby
establish a foundation from which to assess why defense policy formulation in Congress
is perceived as uniquely collegial among its policy issue peers.
Three primary assertions were made regarding how institutional pressures impact
collegiality (the exceptional and consistent cooperative interaction among colleagues
over time) in the policymaking process and were the basis for the hypotheses that drove
the discussion in this chapter. The first assertion is that the development and
consideration of the NDAA in the legislative process is unique when compared with
other major authorizing bills routinely deliberated in Congress. Second, the specific
constitutional provision for Congress to raise, regulate, and oversee the military services
is viewed as an obligation by many members of Congress, especially those serving on the
House Armed Services Committee (HASC); reverence of that duty then outweighs
partisan loyalties in order to fulfill a greater good for the nation. Third, defense
committee leadership, organization, management, and staff, are unique among
authorizing committees and lend to a more collegial atmosphere between minority and
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majority members and staff (both personal and professional committee staff).
Ultimately, all three assertions were grounded in the premise that people and
processes are vital to understanding Congress as an organic institution. That is, Congress
is constantly changing based on personalities, the political environment, and current
events. Douglass C. North’s (1990, 4) conception of institutions provided a theoretical
framework in that regard: “Institutions include any form of constraint that human beings
devise to shape human interaction.” He clarified his thesis in a manner relatable to the
machinations of the legislative process in Congress: “Institutional constraints include
both what individuals are prohibited from doing and, sometimes, under what conditions
some individuals are permitted to undertake certain activities” (North 1990, 4).
Therefore, understanding the characteristics and motives of the people—namely members
of Congress and staff—and the processes (and associated activities) with formulating the
NDAA in the House each year was assumed to provide an appropriate institutional
framework to illuminate why defense policy is approached with unique collegiality
compared with other policy areas.
The aim of this chapter therefore, is to illuminate the collective institutional
influences emanating from people and processes involved with House NDAA
deliberations and why, as a result, they may induce a more collegial environment than
other policy deliberations. Comparisons with the Agriculture (Ag) Committee and its
consideration of the Farm Bill and the Transportation Committee with the Highway Bill
(among others) were used to delineate differences from an institutional standpoint with
the understanding that revelation of those differences could help explain why defense
policy formulation in Congress consistently appears to be more collaborative—
rhetorically and substantively—than counterpart policy issues.
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When the focus was narrowed specifically on people, it became clear personalities
and social interaction play a vitally important role in the collegial discourse that defines
the institutional nature of Congress. The interaction of members, staff, media, and
myriad constituencies, are brought together with constraints of tradition, rules,
parliamentary mechanisms and procedures, to a culmination defines the institution.
Accordingly, this chapter explores four hypotheses derived from the three previously
outlined assumptions. Two of the four hypotheses focused on the comparative
ideological disposition of rank-and-file defense committee members and that of the
committee leadership (chairmen and ranking members). Of the remaining two, the first
was focused on congressional responsibilities derived directly from constitutional
language and whether that compelled members of Congress to transcend partisan
loyalties to collaborate on policy formulation. The second was focused on illuminating
how the organization, interaction, and management of congressional staff influence
collegiality in the defense policy formulation process in Congress.
Process also weighs heavy in defining the institutional character of the Congress.
From the very initial stages of a complex bill like the NDAA, the Farm Bill, or Highway
Bill, legislation passing through Congress is subject to myriad formal and informal
processes that shape the political constraints and opportunities reflected in the final policy
outcome. For example, policy proposals from the Department of Defense (DOD) are
introduced in a draft bill the HASC works from to develop a version eventually reported
to the full House for deliberation (Heitshusen and Williams 2016b, 1). Collectively,
processes like the one the NDAA endures each year (an institution unto itself by North’s
definition (1990, 4)) helps define the institutional nature of Congress in conjunction with
the character and actions of the people facilitating them. That is, the manner in which
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people approach the NDAA process help define associated cultural nuances, traditions,
and norms, adding to the broader character of the Congress. In the case of the NDAA
process, there is an institutional expectation that its substance is too important to be
leveraged as partisan punching bag. That view lends to a more collegial approach to
NDAA deliberations as fabric of the broader institutional character of Congress.
Essentially, those processes help shape the NDAA’s legislative provisions as well as the
manner in which the bill is approached politically and substantively within and between
the House and Senate (and other interested constituencies). That is why the NDAA
process—outlined in ensuing paragraphs helps explain the widely perceived exceptional
collegial nature of defense policy formulation, one seemingly different institutionally
than policy formulation in other issue areas.
Process: NDAA Construction & Consideration
Each congressional committee has a unique history and culture which drives its
institutional character (Smith and Deering 1990, 1). The institutional character is shaped
by and influences the processes the committee employs to develop public policy under its
jurisdiction, to include the creation of legislative vehicles to carry those policies to
fruition. In researching this paper, it became evident collegiality plays an integral role in
the institutional culture of the HASC and in committee processes. Accordingly, the
character of the HASC, to include its stalwart dedication to long-revered practices, has
played a significant role in assuring the passage of the NDAA each year for the past fiftyplus years. The committee has passed the bill with such agreement by maintaining an
atmosphere of collegial discourse between members and staff, one transparent especially
during NDAA deliberations, and a characteristic which has arguably deteriorated over
time in other House committees (Mann and Ornstein 2012). Therefore, exploring the
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institutional nuances of the HASC’s “sausage making” culminating in what is essentially
a failsafe annual passage of the NDAA is vital to understanding why defense policy
formulation in Congress appears more collegial than other policy issues and provided
inspiration for the following hypothesis: The processes by which the HASC constructs
and considers the NDAA is more conducive to collegiality than those by which the
Highway Bill and Farm Bill are framed and deliberated on by their respective
committees. To test the hypothesis, the methods and processes by which the HASC built
and considered the NDAA over time were examined and compared with how the House
Agriculture and Transportation Committees considered their respective recurring
authorization bills—the Farm Bill and the Highway Bill.
The HASC initiates the NDAA legislative process unlike most other House
authorizing committees—by coordinating a projected target date with House leadership
for the bill’s consideration on the floor. This step usually takes place at the beginning of
the calendar year and is the point from which all other NDAA related processes are
predicated (Interview with Congressional Research Service (CRS) defense researcher,
January 31, 2018). A former senior HASC staffer recalled, “[The NDAA] process
demands early collection of information on issues in January so bill can be completed by
May,” and “Leadership was committed to the NDAA. HASC always shared it with the
Appropriations Committee first, on a bipartisan basis, so parallel negotiations [on
appropriations] could ensue immediately” (Interview, January 31, 2018). Essentially,
from the very beginning of the process, a path for success is established and reinforced—
one that incites institutional collaboration based on the bill’s expected passage. The vast
majority of bills in Congress never make it to the floor, let alone coordinated among
committees to deconflict possible procedural, jurisdictional, or policy snags along the
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way. By leadership signing off on a projected floor date early-on, and given the majority
rules House process, the NDAA is essentially on the action agenda (again, a sincere step
in the legislative process for any bill to achieve). The expectation is the relative floor
date will be met, essentially leaving only the substance of the bill to be reconciled. As
such, members have an opportunity to get on the bandwagon with a major bill expected
to pass into law—basis for approaching the bill collegially, especially if members
perceive they will gain politically (or otherwise) from being associated with its successful
passage into law, no matter if they are in the majority party or not.
Conversely, floor action on legislation like the Farm Bill or the Highway Bill, was
usually dependent on when the committees were ready (or close to ready) with the
legislation or as directed by House leadership. Floor action is based on the political
environment; timing (with regard to elections, etc.) and pressures to demonstrate progress
toward achieving the majority’s policy agenda (or that of the White House) to
constituencies. At best, scheduling floor time for most bills, as described by Ornstein
(1981, 379) is “increasingly unpredictable and difficult” and “erratic,” the queue
crowded, especially at the end of the year. In cases examined, a set floor date did not
necessarily grant the NDAA complete immunity from partisan tides. However, it did
provide more certainty for a path with less of the politicking and competition other
similar authorizing bills, like the Farm Bill and Highway Bill, faced toward their
uncertain floor appointments. As explained earlier, there is collective interest among
members to be associated with legislative successes due to political gains they can
potentially provide, regardless of party. Therefore, there is presumably less incentive to
be an obstructionist on a bill that is headed to the floor with relative certainty, especially
one with as much institutional momentum as the NDAA, thereby providing for a more
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collegial approach to its deliberations.
Setting the NDAA floor date also triggered certain institutional influences that
appeared to help drive collegial behavior among those carrying out associated legislative
processes. First, it sent a message, reinforced by House leadership, that the bill was a
priority for action. Given the majority rule of House process, there is expectation a bill
with a floor date will pass and thereby provide an opportunity for members to be party to
a major legislative success—potentially a political win, regardless of party affiliation, due
to the substance of the bill. Second, it pressured both sides to resolve controversial
provisions before the floor date to avoid political blowback stemming from hindering the
perceived inevitability of the NDAA’s annual passage. The tremendous importance of
the latter point—the momentum of the NDAA as an institutional influence—became
vitally clear in the research and was therefore worthy of deeper examination.
The powerful momentum of the annual NDAA process was appropriately
summed up by a former senior HASC staffer who later retired as a two-star general:
“Nobody wants to be the guy that allows the NDAA to fail first in fifty-plus years, there
is an institutional legacy, it is an imperative” (Interview, December 22, 2017). Because
of the perceived inevitability of the NDAA’s annual passage, members approach its
consideration as an opportunity for building political capital (parochial or otherwise)
transcendent of the partisan rancor that slows or derails other legislation, like the Farm
Bill of 2014 (and 2018, for that matter), delayed a year for a partisan fight over Food
Stamp policy and funding (Heiligenstein 2014). Another former HASC Professional
Staff Member (PSM), expressed a frequent sentiment of interviews conducted for this
study, noting few (if any) members of Congress are willing to “get in front of the train,”
to stop the momentum associated with the NDAA process (January 31, 2018). The PSM
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emphasized that even if the “axles come off the bus,” the momentum continues and “the
bus will be picked up and carried across the line” (Interview, January 31, 2018). Along
those lines, Colleen Shogan (2011, 1) mused: “Despite all odds, the NDAA persists –
even when the specter of the repeal of ‘Don’t Ask Don’t Tell’ (DADT) almost derailed
the fiscal year (FY) 2011 bill.” The same could be said for several other NDAA
proposed provisions which, in recent years, included threats to close the U.S. military
prison at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, to alter interrogation techniques authorized for use by
U.S. military personnel post-9/11, and which guided funding authorizations for the 2007
troop surge in Iraq.
Those interviewed recalled countless fervent efforts by majority and minority
committee leadership and staff working together (sometimes against House leadership or
against factions of their own respective party’s political interests), to routinely maneuver
the NDAA over partisan roadblocks toward assured bill passage, much like those
observed by Colleen Shogan on the Senate-side (2011, 28). Those efforts were bolstered
by the generally wide support the NDAA has enjoyed from rank-and-file members,
regardless of party. Some of that support originates from the bill’s historically vast
compilation of nonpartisan provisions which engender a variety of parochial political
interests (an aspect examined deeper in the chapter on domestic political influences).
Pressure from those parochial concerns often override the gravity of other broader
partisan debates de jour because they relate directly to jobs and the economy of members’
congressional districts (Interview with former defense staffer, April 3, 2018). 3
Non-defense policy focused provisions have also added strength to the bipartisan

3

Support for the NDAA by members of Congress as influenced by district/state-driven political priorities is
explored further in the chapter on “Domestic Political Influences.”
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support behind the NDAA’s momentum over time. For example, since 1992, billions of
dollars in unrequested funding has been authorized for Congressionally Directed Medical
Research Programs within Department of Defense. The funding supports research for a
broad range of medical maladies—to include breast, ovarian, and prostate cancer, under
the auspices of national security (Jansen and Blakeley 2013, 20-21). In that vein, other
committees in the House have recognized the NDAA’s momentum and leveraged it to
move bipartisan (but otherwise stagnant) legislative provisions under their jurisdiction by
relating them (loosely, at best) to national security.
Because of frustration with partisan gridlock derailing normal institutional
processes, the House Small Business Committee enacted bipartisan legislation in
the NDAA. Starting around 2013-15, there was a growing number of Small
Business provisions in the NDAA. They basically rewrote the SBA [Small
Business Act] within the NDAA; placed [provisions] in the [HASC] Chairman’s
mark, ran it through minority and majority staffs and members as well as the
[House] parliamentarians every step of the way—from early in the process—to
remove roadblocks, to assess provisions and work them out between the
committees and the parties. Democrat and Republican general counsels from both
committees worked to get it done together with House parliamentarians. [The Small
Business Committee] waived jurisdiction and sequential referral [to the HASC].
[Members] testified on behalf of the provisions, masked as defense business
friendly, supporting the defense base. (Interview with CRS defense policy
researcher, January 31, 2018).
The Small Business Committee (SBC) essentially abdicated (sequential referral) its
jurisdictional authority to the HASC via the NDAA process to get important elements of
its bipartisan supported agenda passed into law. In doing so, the SBC maneuvered
around an overall House process stifled by partisan roadblocks and embraced an
opportunity for regular-order legislative protocols. The voluntary abdication of power
from one committee to another is a rarity in Congress (especially considering the SBC is
viewed as relatively nonpartisan) and demonstrated the institutional power of the
NDAA’s momentum as well as the respect the NDAA process enjoys from both sides of
73

the aisle throughout the institution. So, while partisan issues may have put the NDAA’s
collegial track record at risk on occasion, history has established its inertia as complex
and difficult to overcome, its momentum a significant factor in shaping how defense
policy is approached politically in Congress.
Process: Regular Order
In addition to rules for framing the NDAA, the regular process for enacting the
NDAA also promotes collegiality. Its durable, consistent character has garnered loyal
bipartisan support over time and transformed the process into an institution in its own
right. “There is process success because the process has been so successful,” quipped
one former PSM turned CRS defense policy researcher of the House NDAA process
(January 31, 2018). Valerie Heitshusen and Lynn Williams (2016a, 1) supported that
notion when they observed: “Th[e] regular enactment of complex legislation for over five
decades illustrates, engenders, and is dependent on close adherence to process and
consistency in procedures, schedules, and protocols.”
The dependability of the annual NDAA routine was also frequently noted as an
essential component of the HASC’s collegial atmosphere—the routine supported (and
relied upon) by both sides, no matter which party held the majority. The “consistent,
predictable, and methodical,” legislative steps of the Senate Armed Services Committee
(SASC) dealing with the NDAA, as identified by Colleen Shogan (2011, 7), similarly
characterized descriptions of how the HASC handled the NDAA. Reflecting on two
decades of defense policy experience on the Hill, one veteran congressional staffer
pointed to the “the predictability of the bill and its process” as “what sets apart defense
policy from others” (Interview, February 1, 2018).
In that regard, the HASC’s continuous culture of respect for regular-order
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legislative protocol and tradition has been strongly reinforced by committee leadership
over time, regardless of party. A senior professional staffer who served with the HASC
during the 1990’s recalled of Chairman Ron Dellums (D-CA): “He respected and held to
the committee process and traditions even though a lot of what was dealt with may have
been against his personal ideology…he was ferocious in defending the substance and
process” (Interview, 22 December 2017). Additively, a prominent Washington think tank
scholar and former West Point professor observed: “HASC and SASC leadership protect
the institutional processes of their committees, both Democrats and Republicans”
(Interview, January 23, 2018).
In comparison, a former Hill staffer still immersed in agriculture policy as a
lobbyist noted of the Ag Committee: “Committee leadership matters and attempts to
guard the institution to an extent, guiding newer members to respect the process and the
bipartisan spirit of the committee” (Interview, January 11, 2018). However, unlike those
who described the legislative protocol of the defense committees she added a caveat
about the Ag committee:
There is a lack of respect for legislative tradition and precedent; a gentleman’s
handshake used to go farther. Institutional knowledge is lacking among many
committee members which translates to lack of [Farm] bill history and reduced
reverence for existing policy. Ag is a historically congenial committee, staff and
members know each other well and that has paid off in the past. As Congress
changed and became more partisan, so has the Ag Committee. (Interview, January
11, 2018)
The lobbyist further explained why she thought Congress (and the committee) changed:
The Farm Bill used to not be partisan, the wedges were by region. The regions
were split between southern crops like cotton, peanuts, tobacco, etc. versus
Midwest corn, soybean and livestock. Bipartisan support came per regional focus.
Debates were over who got the “better” program for price
supports/protections/subsidies, not really partisan but local, constituency-driven
interests. This was before the crop insurance wedge over cost and principles about
what government should pay for.
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Social programs became a major wedge as conservatives became more politically
motivated by pushing for fiscal constraints [on federal spending], especially over
children nutritional programs—food stamps and the [Women, Infants and Children]
WIC program. Domestic nutrition programs are largest part of the USDA budget
and spending and deficits politics became more important than Farm Bill policies
as priority for Republicans while Democrats support the programs as a majority.
Traditional farm programs and policies changed as crops started changing via
biotechnology and genetic altering. Plants that once were once able to grow in one
region, like corn, could be grown elsewhere; like in the South, where it was not
possible in the past due to rot of plants, etc. Biotechnology made the plants heartier,
seeds were able to survive and thrive as they previously only did in the Midwest.
As a result, commodities were [more] widely planted which weakened some of the
reasons for regional bipartisanship on ag policy. (Interview, January 11, 2018)
Another former think tanker researcher and current MLA for a HASC member echoed a
sensed disparity between committees: “Decorum has slowly been stripped away in
American society at large which has bled over into Congress. HASC is a holdout
though.” He continued by noting: “Stronger norms in HASC enable it to withstand day
to day pressures. The NDAA is a vehicle of tradition that counters the ‘invading army’
of partisanship that is slowly taking over one committee after another and one group after
another.” (February 1, 2018).
When queried as to why defense committee leaders from both sides of the aisle
resolutely held to a rigid legislative process, the resounding response pointed to a culture
that reinforced fairness; being afforded an opportunity to be heard. Along those lines, a
former senior HASC staffer and later Undersecretary of Defense characterized HASC
Chairman Mac Thornberry (R-TX) as, “seen as fair by rank-and-file, which makes
compromise easier,” and further noted of his HASC experience: “Protected was a sense
of fairness and bipartisanship; deference to the process was paramount; there was a sense
from members that institutionally they felt an obligation to pay-forward accommodations
made when minority switched to majority” (Interview, January 31, 2018). The
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importance of fairness to success of the NDAA process and the collegial environment it
fostered was further echoed by a long-time HASC PSM, turned CRS defense researcher:
Success…was a product of perceived fairness. Even if they lost a provision,
members were heard and had an opportunity to present their case and to voice
their opinion; not angry or frustrated or emotional; the debate was heard instead
of shutting out the minority. When that happens, even if it is politically risky, the
environment is more productive and cordial. (Interview, January 31, 2018).
While it mattered if members “won” or “lost” on a proposed NDAA provision, equally
important among those interviewed was merely the opportunity to exercise “regular
order.” “Regular order” is the exercise of the deliberative path by which a bill becomes a
law, from its introduction through referral and passage via the committee process,
eventually to the House floor. Regular order is sometimes bypassed by the majority to
avoid politically tenuous debate incited by the minority party during the process. As
such, bipartisan respect for adherence to legislative protocol carried through to the House
floor: “Legislation open to amendment, even with a structured rule is more likely to get
bipartisan support because members from both sides have skin in the game and feel like
they can be heard, even if their provisions are not incorporated” (Interview with former
House MLA, January 29, 2018). Ultimately, the protection and practice of regular order
by the HASC was consistently reflected upon as an accelerant for collegiality by those
closest to it. As such, respect for legislative protocol provided legitimacy for the NDAA
over the years and translated into bipartisan support—support seemingly more robust
than what other committees experienced.
Even members who demonstrated notable ideological distance from their HASC
colleagues gained from the committee’s culture of adhering to regular order traditions. 4

4

HASC members’ ideologies compared with members of other committees is examined later in this
chapter.
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A former senior policy advisor with the HASC recalled, “Leaders and committee
members like Ron Dellums learned the process and procedure in order to better maneuver
on policy matters” (December 22, 2017). Dellums, a liberal African American Democrat
from California’s Bay Area, and “one of the most outspoken congressional critics of U.S.
defense policy, a leading voice against military intervention and an opponent of some
major weapons systems,” nonetheless rose to be a widely-respected member and
chairman of the HASC (Bornemeier and Eaton 1992). Another congressional staff
veteran who focused on defense and foreign policy issues during the Obama
administration observed: “Because regular order process is respected, HASC minority
members are especially likely to provide input to the NDAA that is integrated [into the
bill] as opposed to minority members of other committees. It helps bipartisan support
because the Ranking Member and rank-and-file have buy-in. They are invested”
(Interview, January 29, 2018). Ultimately, close observers of defense policy formulation
in Congress, namely in the form of the NDAA process, recognized HASC’s deliberations
to be fair in part because regular order legislative traditions religiously adhered to thus
respected by members and staff and reinforced by committee leaders from both parties.
Process: Building the Bill
Colleen Shogan (2011, 17) termed the strategy of building the actual NDAA
legislation a “building-block” approach in the Senate. The approach, as described by
those involved with the process over the years and from literature, generally mirrors that
of the House and essentially provides a series of sequential opportunities for minority and
majority staff, members, and representatives of the DOD to collaborate and compromise
on bill provisions as navigates the legislative process. The approach has also historically
safeguarded the NDAA from potentially divisive provisions, no matter the source of
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debate, political or otherwise.
The “building-blocks” start in the NDAA’s initial preparatory stages, is then
employed in subcommittee meetings and markups and carried through to full committee
deliberations, eventually pushing unresolved policy disputes to the House floor for a vote
if not reconciled during previous stages (if deemed politically palatable), in public or
private fora.
The foundational “block” of the NDAA process normally emerges from a
compilation of prioritized legislative proposals derived from the budget planning and
policy process at DOD. The DOD proposals are introduced in a base bill the HASC then
works from to shape and develop a version eventually reported to the full House for
consideration (Heitshusen and Williams 2016b, 1). Within each ensuing step of the
committee process, HASC staff and members work continuously to come to terms on
disputed issues and seek resolution at the earliest opportunity. The collaboration deepens
mutual investment in the bill’s provisions thereby padding assurance of its ultimate
success. One former senior HASC staffer during the late 1990’s recalled, “If there was
divisiveness based on an issue, it was only for a brief window during which the issue was
dealt with and ultimately did not transfer to support on the final bill” (Interview, Jan 31,
2018).
More controversial NDAA provisions are discussed and negotiated among
professional committee staff from both sides of the aisle, frequently in conjunction with
the Military Legislative Assistants (MLAs)—personal defense policy staffers—of various
committee members. MLAs are especially included in cases where provisions in question
addressed parochial matters of interest to their specific member, or if the provision fell
under the jurisdictional purview of the member’s assigned subcommittee(s). If resolution
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cannot be found among the staff, guidance is sought from respective (sub)committee
members and even (sub)committee leadership, as necessary. 5 One former HASC senior
staffer-turned think tank fellow noted, “The committee protects its turf jealously and is
able to move the process and keep out provisions that may otherwise hijack it”
(Interview, December 22, 2017). Along those lines, a think tank scholar also reflected,
“HASC and SASC leadership protect the institutional processes of their committees, both
Democrat and Republican. Because of their expertise and the substance and
consequences of the NDAA, they are able to counter [chamber] leadership’s challenges”
(Interview, January 23, 2018). An example of that protective action was shared by
another staffer. He recalled a successful cooperative effort by Senators John Warner (RVA) and Carl Levin (D-MI) (SASC Ranking Member and Chairman at the time,
respectively) to remove highly controversial hate crimes provisions from the fiscal year
FY 2008 NDAA that was tacked on as a Senate amendment and jeopardized its passage,
as its addition had spurred a veto threat by then President George W. Bush (Interview,
February 7, 2018).
If resolution still remains elusive on a provision in question, an amendment was
often prepared for presentation at the subcommittee and/or full committee bill markup,
possibly triggering a roll call vote, with the same course of action ultimately mirrored on
the House floor if the issue made it that far without resolution (Shogan 2011). One
staffer recalled, “Controversial provisions were okay to hold back if there wasn’t
resolution made among staff and members. In that case it was understood the issue

5

The way HASC-associated minority and majority staffers (PSMs and MLAs) interact with each other and
with members is uniquely collaborative and adds to the collegiality of the NDAA process as examined in
the section of this paper on “Staff Organization & Operations.”
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would be offered as an amendment for a vote; not a surprise to the opposing party versus
other committees where you never knew what was coming for amendments in markups”
(Interview, January 31, 2018).
The protocol for using amendments as a last resort, when all other opportunities
for collaboration are exhausted, is not the only difference highlighting institutional
disparities between deliberations on the NDAA and that of other major authorizing bills.
Committees like the House Agriculture (Ag) and Transportation Committees, for
example, integrate controversial provisions directly into the chairman’s mark (the final
version of the bill considered at its respective level – subcommittee or full committee)
forcing members to vote up or down on the entire bill instead of on individual divisive
issues (Shogan 2011, 16). The practice is a disincentive for collegial behavior as it does
not allow for regular order dissent, the importance of which was discussed earlier. If
controversial issues can be debated and voted on first, even if associated provisions are
added into the final bill against a member’s wishes, the process provides that member
with an opportunity for their voice to be heard, on the record, regarding the issue in
question, thereby representing a more fair and collegial process.
The Farm Bill process (like others in the House) also provides unnecessary
opportunities for partisan derailment. Both the minority and majority sides of the Ag
Committee have a long-followed practice of building and introducing their own separate
versions of the legislation then attempt to reconcile the two during markup.
The majority and the minority each tend to draft their own versions of the Farm
Bill. The titles or provisions usually do not match and they use the markup as an
opportunity to reconcile the bills, like a conference [committee]. Minority staff
tends to advise the majority staff of their wants, interests, and priorities for the
upcoming Farm Bill, but usually the first time they see the comprehensive
legislation is at the markup. (Interview with former Ag Committee staffer January
11, 2018)
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Instead of starting with a product built of “block” provisions all but agreed upon (like the
NDAA), the Farm Bill resides at the other end of the spectrum—a much more difficult
path to navigate politically and process-wise, one spring-loaded for partisan conflict. A
former Ag Committee staffer who later served as a Deputy Assistant Secretary at the
Department of Agriculture and has worked on agriculture related policy issues since the
1980s corroborated: “the [Ag Committee] majority usually initiates the primary bill for
the committee then brings in the minority along the way to work through issues and to
integrate their priorities - minority members often sit in on majority meetings [to help
resolve controversial provisions] with constituents but not always.” He added that “Farm
Bills were supposed to be worked from the subcommittee level up but that goal has yet to
be realized” (Interview, February 7, 2018). The HASC’s approach to the NDAA process
is different, focused on building and maintaining the integrity of the core bipartisan
provisions agreed to in the base bill to avoid jeopardizing collaborative progress with
controversial votes or by association with partisan issues that might upset its momentum.
Delving further into the legislative path of the NDAA, the previously mentioned
target floor date established between House and HASC leadership sets into motion a
series of time-honored activities by the committee. The HASC’s professional staff,
reputed for their subject matter expertise and process loyalty, carries out the routine of
activities each year, primarily in a nonpartisan manner and largely motivated by the
opportunity to progress substantive policy rather than political agendas. 6 Again,
consistency and replication of the NDAA processes by staff was repeatedly noted in
interviews as key to the bill’s success: “Repetition—the process is replicated each year

6

The role of the staff is examined in deeper detail later in the chapter.
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with rare exception, it is a proven process…HASC & SASC have mastered that process.
They have staff that live and breathe the process” (Interview with CRS defense policy
researcher and former HASC PSM, January 31, 2018).
“Staffer Days” are a key part of the successful repetition as well as sharpen staff
expertise and reinforce institutional norms that emphasize collegial discourse in the
NDAA process. “Staffer Days” consist of DOD representatives hosting nonpartisan
briefings for PSMs and MLAs to immerse all parties into the latest and most pertinent
policy issues together. Accordingly, the activities facilitate free-flowing discussions on
provisions of the administration’s annual defense budget proposal, those ultimately
incorporated into the “Introduced Version” of the NDAA, the version that “Typically
contains only the legislative proposals requested by the Administration” (Heitshusen and
Williams 2016b, 2). The value of “Staffer Days” is therefore in its linking of executive
and legislative branch representatives on policy and budget proposals, regardless of
partisan politics.
A former staffer who worked extensively on the NDAA as well as the Highway
Bill during his Hill tenure attested to the value of “Staffer Days”: “Congress did what
they wanted on transit and highway funding. There was occasional discussion on a few
high-level policy issues between the Transportation Department and Congress during the
bill’s deliberation but not really.” On the other hand, he noted, “The Pentagon’s lobbying
is a force to be reckoned with. They would fly you out to see anything, anywhere to help
you learn and understand” (Interview, April 3, 2018). Another CRS researcher and close
witness of congressional processes since 1968, commented, “DOD ensures the HASC
and SASC have what they need to do the authorization and keep the committees happy,
informed, and responsive” (Interview, November 3, 2017). His view contrasted with how
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policy proposals were formulated for the Farm Bill with relation to the Agriculture
Department: “committees will take some cues from the administration on where policy
should fall and what will be acceptable…[but] constituencies push agendas mainly
through trade organizations” (Interview with former House Ag Committee staffer,
January 11, 2018). “Staffer Days” then provides a bipartisan platform enabling
collaboration and communication extending throughout the NDAA process unlike most
other discourse on legislation between the Hill and executive branch departments.
“Staffer Days” are followed by a series of posture (wherein senior military
officials communicate the state of the force) and budget hearings once the
administration’s budget is officially released, the schedule of which is essentially
identical to years past, changed only by the issues of the day. Hearings unify members
and staff with rare exception, as the testimony, discussion, and discoveries within them
are transferred into the actual substance of the NDAA’s provisions. “Hearings matter –
they meant something. There was focus on a substantive issue that needed solution or
oversight; substance versus grandstanding. Protesters like Code Pink on Iraq made both
sides of aisle angry,” because they detracted from the productivity of the hearings for all
members, regardless of party or ideology (Interview with CRS researcher, January 31,
2018). The lack of tolerance for politically motivated behavior that detracted from
substantive policy debate extended to members also: “There were members that tried to
counter the process, be bomb-throwers, especially early on when they were freshmen.
The Chairman and Ranking Member would often correct such behavior and/or they
would get swallowed by the process” (Interview with CRS researcher, January 31, 2018).
A former senior HASC staffer who served with the committee during 1990’s noted even
the Clinton impeachment was not leveraged politically during committee deliberations:
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“Leadership would not tolerate such behavior…chair nor ranking member. The defense
budget was the roughest part of relations with the Clinton White House. But, it was not
apparent the Clinton scandal impacted the ability of HASC members to work together”
(Interview, January 31, 2018).
Committee and NDAA process unity also stemmed from the reality that decisions
made on hearing subject matter directly impacted national security: “Each year the
national security strategy must be reviewed to translate into readiness needs and decisions
on how best to defend” (Interview with CRS scholar, November 3, 2017). Accordingly,
the virtual same lineup of service secretaries and chiefs, other senior officers and enlisted
members, and defense policy wonks testified in a parade of hearings before the HASC
each year regardless of the party in charge, all focused on providing context to justify
NDAA provisions. In contrast, as one former Hill staffer-turned CRS scholar reported:
“Other committees spend their time on a variety of smaller bills which can bring
divisiveness, not order, the process is messier, disparate versus unifying” (Interview,
January 31, 2018).
Routinized subcommittee hearings also reinforced bipartisan institutional norms
of the HASC during the NDAA process, the substance of which fed into the jurisdictional
markups of their respective bill sections. While other House subcommittees can take
several hours or days on marking up a single bill, HASC subcommittee markups on
respective NDAA sections usually last less than thirty minutes and rarely go longer than
an hour—an unusual feat considering the complexity of some of the issues and a
testament to the collegial nature of the process (McKeon 2013). The efficiency of HASC
subcommittee markups is an additional testament to the value of the collaborative
“building block” approach discussed earlier and its ability to deflect divisive matters for
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resolution to another venue (via informal negotiation between staff and/or members, or
amendment in full committee or the floor), thereby protecting the collegiality of the
overall process and the integrity of the provisions agreed upon to that point.
The marked-up subcommittee bill sections are compiled into the draft NDAA,
subsequently marked-up by the full committee (FC). The FC markup results in the
“Reported Version” of the bill sent to the House floor for consideration by the entire
chamber (Heitshusen and Williams 2016b, 2). Bipartisan solidarity to pass the bill is
evident throughout the FC process: “members and staff frequently reach across the aisle
and between chambers to build coalitions, answer member questions, push back on
criticisms and pre-empt veto threats from the executive branch” (McKeon 2013).
Part of the cooperative atmosphere is motivated by the notorious marathon nature
of the HASC markup (atypical of other committees), essentially a show of unity to
minimize shared misery. The FC markup of the NDAA, viewed as a cultural rite of
passage, is traditionally held for as long as it takes to get the bill done, which can exceed
twelve hours (McKeon 2013). One MLA, the veteran of multiple NDAA markups over
twenty years recalled, “One big, long, drawn-out mark-up lasts until the wee morning
hours. Part of leadership’s strategy—from both sides—is to tire members out and wait
until very late in the process to address fairly controversial issues so they will just want to
get the markup completed and more apt to give in on or agree on issues” (Interview,
January 26, 2018). Another former HASC PSM highlighted attributes that differentiated
the NDAA, “The marathon markup keeps the lobbying to a minimum; it has become
more transparent over time but has also gotten longer; people do not take advantage of
the process [politically]” (Interview, January 31, 2018). The FC markups of the NDAA
thereby provide an additional layer of protection against partisan discord and foster
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collaboration which usually results in the bill being reported to the House floor with near
unanimous support from committee members.
The nature of the NDAA process also protected the legislation from other
(internal and external) institutional pressures during its consideration. For example,
“Changes to the NDAA usually required a sign-off by the Pentagon. The Chairman
might change something, but there had to be good reason, and it was usually in
consultation with the DOD” (Interview with former staffer, April 3, 2018). Additionally,
in a point reinforced by Smith and Deering (1990, 173-176) referencing influences
internal to the House, one CRS expert assessed the contemporary jurisdictional power of
committees and its actual weight on policy formulation:
Defense committees have been able to protect their policy issues and processes in
comparison [to other committees]. [HASC] leadership makes a discernible
difference and the [defense] committee process seeks compromise, which is lost on
other policy issues….The House defers to the defense committees on what is right,
substantively. (Interview with CRS expert, December 4, 2017)
Furthermore, another long-time MLA who worked for several HASC members recalled
efforts by House leadership to protect the NDAA’s integrity: “The Rules Committee
tended to limit controversial issues the bill might face, thereby ensuring it had a better
chance of passing when it hit the floor and limiting members’ ability to amend the base
bill passed by HASC” (Interview, January 26, 2018).
The NDAA rarely endured major issues passing the House, for that matter. “Even
with controversial, politically-charged national policy questions on the docket, such as
the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, detainees and TRICARE benefits, the two chambers
consistently approve the NDAA with an overwhelming, bipartisan majority” (McKeon
2013). Though, some had a more cynical view behind the support wealth of support from
both sides of the aisle:
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Any legislation that gets over 300 votes routinely can make it look like a trivial
issue, as if nobody cares about it politically. There is little to gain from countering
it, much more to lose from voting against the troops. The NDAA is pretty much
the same as supporting a resolution in favor of mothers. Who could vote in good
conscience against that?! How many other GOP leadership sponsored bills can you
say that Nancy Pelosi voted for this year…or, ever? (Interview with former HASC
senior policy staffer, December 22, 2017).
Ultimately, regardless of the source of its strong bipartisan support the NDAA, with little
exception, has moved to the next stage in the process—the conference committee—with
almost predictable precision each year.
The nature of the NDAA conference committee 7 was revealed to also share many
of the same collegial traits experienced during preceding House deliberations. One
former senior HASC policy PSM who was later appointed a service undersecretary noted:
Often House-Senate NDAA conference negotiations would take place at the staff
level in an effort to protect the product policy—an approach used across the entire
bill that was perhaps riskier, more dangerous, but still remains a course correction
opportunity not available in other policy areas. The process in the House and
elsewhere is broken. Both sides in other policy areas provide one position, not even
open to discussion or negotiation, take it or leave it. (Interview, January 31, 2018)
The importance of the conference committee in ensuring the NDAA’s success was
highlighted earlier as the stage of the legislative process during which Senators Levin and
Warner successfully pressed to remove controversial hate crimes provisions from the FY
2008 NDAA, essentially saving it from a veto by President Bush. Clearly still influential
during the NDAA conference committee, staff interactions, culture, and character weigh
on its overall political nature (discussed more thoroughly, later in this chapter). Also
evident in conference proceedings were signs of the “building block” approach,
supported by both sides of the aisle: “Measures carried in one house and not the other are
7

Conference committees are employed toward the end of the legislative process to reconcile differences
between the House and Senate version of a bill. If successful, the conference committee issues a
conference report—the final version of the bill—which is then considered for passage by both chambers as
required by the Constitution before being sent to the President for consideration.
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frequently set aside for deals on bigger issues of more importance to the committee’s top
leadership. At the end of staff-level talks, remaining issues are elevated to the chairmen
and ranking members to work through at the member level” (McKeon 2013).
Concluding thoughts on NDAA Construction and Consideration
Pressures from institutional processes, specifically the manner by which the
NDAA is deliberated on in the House, provides a fertile foundation for collegial behavior
among members of Congress unmatched in other policy areas. Consistent routine,
bipartisan loyalty of HASC leadership and rank-and-file members to regular order and a
conjoined and disciplined focus on policy substance, render an approach to the NDAA
that reinforces respect for collegial protocols and tradition as the bill traverses the
legislative process. Those established institutional norms buttress HASC’s processes and
keep the NDAA moving forward with active participation from the minority and majority
parties, their attention and loyalty to its momentum maintained by a collective investment
in its provisions. The institution expects the NDAA to succeed from its initial stages
each year. The legislative process reinforces that expectation and helps carry the NDAA
through into law each year, the bill also garnering collegial deference from the political
rewards its successful passage potentially offers. Ultimately, the institutional character of
the HASC and House (to a lesser degree) motivates a collegial approach to defense policy
formulation, one presumably complemented by influences stemming from the subject of
the next section—constitutional authority.
Institutional Influence: Constitutional Obligation to Defend the Nation
Article 1, Section 8, of the Constitution directs Congress to provide for the
nation’s common defense. In doing so, it establishes a distinct, unifying foundation for
those serving on the defense committees in Congress, transcendent of political loyalties.
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As a result of that unifying factor, a more collegial atmosphere exists during defense
policy formulation, especially evident during the annual consideration of the NDAA,
distinguishing it from deliberations on other policy issues like those surrounding the
Farm Bill or Highway Bill. Evidence is presented through the rhetoric of congressional
leaders, rank-and-file members of both parties, staff and others of the policy community,
delivered during policy debates, on the House floor, in the press, etc. The constitutional
mandate therefore, is found to be a guiding principle by which House Armed Services
Committee (HASC) approaches its work, regardless of ideology—a stalwart guide that
enables and complements the bipartisan nature of the committee and ultimately
exemplifies its collegial nature. Such drove the derivation of the sub-hypothesis tested in
this section: Members of Congress express a greater obligation to collaborate on
defense policy as an explicitly charged constitutional responsibility than on other
policy issues lacking a specific constitutional mandate.
Members of Congress are bound to support the U.S. Constitution by taking an
oath of office as directed by Article VI, clause 3, of that document. The current version
of the oath has not changed since 1966 and prescribed by U.S. law (5 U.S.C. §3331)
(U.S. House of Representatives 2018a):
I, _________, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I
will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely,
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion, and that I will well and
faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter. So help
me God.
The law also requires all other federal government employees, including congressional
staff, to affirm their allegiance to upholding the Constitution (U.S. Office of Personnel
Management 2018). The oath of office therefore, taken by all congressional members
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and staff, provides a means of unified purpose and direction for all members of the
institution (and for all federal government servants, for that matter). Former Secretary of
State, Rex Tillerson, characterized the oath in that broader sense when he remarked:
“[W]e all took the same oath of office. Whether you’re a career employee or political
appointee, we are all bound by that common commitment: to support and defend the
Constitution, to bear true faith and allegiance to the same, and to faithfully discharge the
duties of our office” (Felton 2018). The oath, therefore, is a mutual reference point that
underpins loyalty to the principles and provisions of the Constitution, regardless of party,
ideology, or religion.
An extension of the responsibilities to the oath is found in Article 1, Section 8, of
the Constitution and levies a more specific charge on members of Congress—to provide
for the defense of the nation. Accordingly, that mandate is commemorated by a plaque
facing the center of the witness table in the main House Armed Services Committee
hearing room on Capitol Hill. The plaque reads:
U.S. Constitution – Art. 1 – Sec. 8
The Congress shall have power…
to raise and support armies…
provide and maintain a navy…
make rules for the government and
regulation of the land and naval forces.
Not only is the quote a reminder of a major obligation of the legislative branch to the
nation, the premise of the constitutional clause is foundation to the Armed Services
Committee’s jurisdiction on legislative matters and thereby linked to its institutional
culture. It is mantra for virtually all committee members, reinforced by committee
leadership regardless of party—a unifying guide in carrying out their duties, their
institutional responsibilities, to oversee defense policy for the nation in the House of
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Representatives.
Reverence to the Article 1, Section 8, mandate has persevered over time, a telltale
characteristic of the House Armed Services Committee’s culture. As such, it is routinely
identified in the rhetoric of its members and leaders as a prime contributor to the
Committee’s bipartisan nature. Along those lines, organizational hearings take place at
the start of every Congress for each committee to establish and adopt the committee
rules, introduce and formalize its membership, and establish the tenor and direction for
the official record. In the case of the HASC, those official hearings also provide a means
to demonstrate consistency in the Committee’s dedication to the constitutional mandate
to provide for the common defense. They also help in distinguishing the HASC from
other committees like the Agriculture Committee or the Transportation Committee,
especially when it comes to amplification of the HASC’s bipartisan cultural bent—at
times expressed with prideful boasting. The opening remarks made by HASC Chairman,
L. Mendell Rivers, a Democrat from South Carolina, on February 1, 1965, during the
Committee’s organizational meeting at the start of the 89 th Congress provides a
prototypical example. In that hearing, Chairman Rivers (Committee on Armed Services
1965, 2) conveyed to his colleagues the importance of the charge of Article 1, Section 8,
as it pertained to their committee responsibilities:
Now there is one overriding duty imposed upon the Congress and part of it, in turn,
imposed upon this committee and that is the power vested in the Congress to
provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States and, in
particular, the power and thus the responsibility—listen to this—to raise and
support armies***to provide and maintain a Navy***to make rules for the
government and regulation of the land and naval forces***and to “make all laws”
which shall be necessary for carrying into execution the powers that I have just
mentioned.
I don’t plan to overlook that part of the Constitution.
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Now there is a duty imposed upon the Congress and no one has this responsibility
but the Congress of the United States. As far as I am concerned, this committee will
be operated on behalf of the House of Representatives in accordance with that
constitutional mandate.
Chairman Rivers continued his narrative in press release later that year. The release was
published following a hearing on H.R. 4016, the annual authorization of defense
appropriations, one of the earliest NDAAs ever considered by the Committee. In it,
Rivers (Committee on Armed Services 1965, 768) characterized adherence to the
mandate as a “moral and constitutional responsibility,” and that in considering the bill’s
provisions it was, “the intention of the Congress to fully discharge its responsibilities
under article I section 8 of the Constitution of the United States.” Following suit, during
the same hearing on H.R. 4016, Representative F. Edward Hébert (Committee on Armed
Services 1965, 473), a Democrat from Louisiana and a HASC subcommittee chairman, in
discourse with the hearing witness, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, reinforced
Chairman Rivers’ remarks:
…there is no doubt as to the authority here. The authority is crystal clear in this
issue. Under the Constitution-and you can probably quote the exact language; I
don't recall it exactly-but it says something to this effect: The Congress shall have
the authority to raise forces. Now, that is just very, very clear.
While the comment could be construed as Hébert just pandering to the Chairman, it was
nonetheless a reminder that HASC members took their constitutional responsibility
seriously enough to reinforce it. As such, other members also echoed the sentiment of
Chairman Rivers. They did so not just during the 89 th Congress, but in ensuing years and
decades, a trend followed by members from both sides of the aisle—a unifying factor and
shared obligation irrespective of ideological sway.
On January 10, 1995, during the organizational meeting of the Committee on
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National Security8 (1995, 3) for the 104th Congress, Republican Congressman Floyd
Spence, the first of his party appointed committee chair since 1953, made comments
startlingly reminiscent of those made by Chairman Rivers and Congressman Hébert thirty
years prior:
First, I want to draw everyone’s attention to the plaque in front of Mr. Torkildsen
right there. On it is engraved an excerpt from Article 1, Section 8 of the
Constitution that reads: “Congress shall have power to raise and support armies; to
provide and maintain a Navy; to make rules for the Government and regulation of
the land and naval forces.”
…We are tasked with what I believe to be one of the Federal Government’s most
fundamental responsibilities—to maintain a ready and capable military.
…we should not lose sight of the fact that as the name of our committee suggests,
we have the responsibility of providing for armed forces which can defend our
country against any threat. Regardless of how much disagreement lies ahead, I
want the debate to be positive and in the end hopefully focused only on the most
appropriate or efficient path toward that commonly held objective. To this end, I
pledge to work with every Member of this committee and with every Member of
the House to ensure that we live up to our responsibilities under Article 1, Section
8.
Two years later, on February 5, 1997, during the National Security Committee (1997, 2)
organizational meeting for the 105th Congress, Chairman Spence continued the narrative
in a similar vein, expanding his comments to include specific references to the NDAA
when it came to the Committee’s jurisdiction and duty:
While we do not always agree amongst ourselves, there is not a person in the room
who doesn’t take his or her job seriously. Legislatively, what this committee
produces probably requires more consistent coordination, teamwork, and
bipartisanship than any other bill the House considers each year. Our
disagreements are few and far between, when you consider them in the broader
context of this committee’s jurisdiction and its accomplishments.
A decade later, on January 10, 2007, Californian Republican Duncan Hunter echoed

The House Committee on Armed Services was renamed the House Committee on National Security between
1994-1999 (“Historic Committee Names” 2018).
8
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sentiments of his colleagues-past during the Armed Services Committee’s (2007, 2)
organizational meeting for the 110th Congress, as its Ranking Member:
…you have got in this wonderful committee, I think, the greatest mix of Democrats
and Republicans in this House, and a committee that is strongly bipartisan. And
what we can pledge to you is, we are going to stand on principle, but we are also
going to stand with you and with the Democratic Members of this committee on
the common ground that is represented by the interests of the men and women who
wear the uniform of the United States.
Hunter’s comments preceded those of Missouri Democrat Ike Skelton, who served as
HASC Chairman during the 110th Congress. Skelton made similar allusions to the shared
sense of duty among committee members—a product of their directed focus on defense
policy—and how that extended to a more collegial, bipartisan atmosphere: “[The HASC]
is truly bipartisan and we do our very, very best to work hard in an intelligent and
dedicated way, to be responsible for our national security. And I know we will continue
that tradition” (Armed Services Committee 2007, 3). His comment yet another reference
to the plaque depicting Article 1, Section 8, hanging in the committee room.
Evidence as to the influence of the constitutional responsibility was not limited to
hearings over those years. When queried during a conservation in October of 2017, as to
why defense policy seemed to anecdotally enjoy smoother collaboration across the aisle,
one former member of Congress who served as a HASC subcommittee chairman during
the Clinton administration immediately cited Article 1, Section 8, as a primary reason (all
interviews were confidential; the names of interviewees are withheld by mutual
agreement). The Congressman even mentioned the plaque in the committee hearing
room, unprompted. In further reflection, the he also recalled most members shared a
common view that the mandate was considered to be a serious matter, a constant
reminder of their duty to country which made it a factor in helping to facilitate
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cooperation across ideological divides.
A former HASC staffer who served on Capitol Hill during the 1990’s, now a
long-time defense policy scholar at a prominent public policy think tank in Washington,
shared a similar memory. He mused, “Defense is a sacrosanct issue still to an extent. It
is looked at by members [of Congress] as an important issue. That is why Article 1,
Section 8, of the Constitution is posted in the line of sight of the witness table in the
HASC hearing room.” In another interview, the former HASC deputy staff director of
the same era, who later served as Principal Assistant and Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Installations and Environment, noted “Members are serious about their
dedication to the Article 1 responsibility,” echoing the sentiment of his former colleague.
The impact and staying power of the constitutional charge was evident and
reinforced over time, clearly inculcated in the Committee’s institutional culture. One
former congressional staffer and son of a U.S. Senator noted, “There is rhetorical
dedication given to the constitutional responsibilities of the Congress when it comes to
defense of the nation, especially by the leadership of the committee. It is a prolific
anecdote and a product of the committee culture. The Senate Foreign Relations
Committee has demonstrated similar tendencies in their ‘advise and consent’
responsibilities directed by the Constitution.” A younger, less experienced Hill staffer
and military legislative assistant (MLA) who worked on defense policy issues in the
personal office of a HASC member during the most recent 115 th Congress, immediately
recognized the importance of the constitutional charge as it pertained to the
responsibilities of the committee and its members. Prior to his MLA position, the staffer
had been a policy advisor on the 2016 campaign staff of independent presidential
candidate Evan McMullin. Before that he worked several years at center-right leaning
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public policy think tank. Presumably, those work experiences in combination with the
brevity of his time on Capitol Hill (less than one year), could help explain his less
altruistic view of the constitutional mandate. As such, he characterized the constitutional
charge as a potentially coercive political tool, yet in manner that still drove unity among
members: “Article 1 is leverage to ‘shame’ members of the other party into action, to
remind them it is their duty to provide for armies, navies, the common defense, etc.”
While his conclusion inferred a less politically friendly path toward resolution on policy,
it did not necessarily nullify bipartisan cooperation. And, the underlying notion that the
constitutional mandate was an influential factor in the policy making process was not
challenged. Instead, it was reinforced again, internalized by those working within the
institution over time, proven to garner weight in the interactions of those formulating
defense policy.
In other interviews conducted with sitting and former members of Congress and
staff, respondents were asked the following question: “Do members of Congress feel
more of an obligation to cooperate on policy issues specifically charged to the legislature
by the Constitution (to raise and support Armies; to provide and maintain a Navy) than
those not specifically directed (agriculture and transportation infrastructure policy)?”
One long-time Senate staffer, who worked for a member of the Armed Services
Committee through several NDAA cycles, expressed the thought that cooperation across
the aisle was not necessarily linked to a shared sense of duty based on constitutional
responsibilities. A somewhat parallel view shared by a former Pentagon and
congressional defense commission staffer concluded: “The Constitution is not a
compelling reason on its own for the majority of Congress who will all [sic] give you
their personal interpretation of what their Oath of Office means (aka, one question and
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you'll get 535 different answers in return).” Another former Hill staffer from the
Midwest who worked with on the Agriculture Subcommittee of the Appropriations
Committee flat out disagreed with the premise of the question, “I do not believe Members
feel more obligated to cooperate on National Security policy more so [sic] than
transportation or agriculture.” Such views, discounting the impact of the mandate, were
by far the exception of those polled. As the majority of the twenty-five interviewees,
much like the historical evidence presented throughout this section, recognized some
form of unique duty sense was garnered from the constitutional directive of Article 1,
Section 8. Additionally, there was clear consistency in the rhetoric over time, regardless
of party affiliation. Such provided credence to the notion that members view the HASC
(and thereby the defense policy they deliberate upon) as unique by virtue of its
jurisdictional role. Furthermore, they see that role as predicated on clear constitutional
authority—an essential basis for unity that fuels a more collegial atmosphere as compared
to other policy issues on Capitol Hill.
Looking to other policy areas, agriculture policy and transportation policy, like
defense issues, both have a long history of being deliberated by Congress, back to earliest
days of the nation (Williamson 2012). However, neither command a line of
constitutional authority as definitive as national security. Retired Army Colonel Matthew
R. Kambrod (2018), who authored a book on the defense policy process in Congress in
addition to being a long-time defense lobbyist and former Deputy Assistant Secretary of
the Army for Aviation Research, Development and Acquisition, recognized this dynamic:
“…defense is unique. It’s not agriculture; not commerce; not health, education and
welfare; not state ― not like any other government appropriation. It is the result of the
Constitution’s clear first charge to the nation to ‘provide for the common defense.’”
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Of the two major legislative vehicles that employ agriculture and transportation
policy, the Farm Bill and the Highway Bill respectively, the Farm Bill arguably has the
least clear line of authority from the Constitution (though neither truly enjoy definitive
authority). Along those lines, Daren Bakst, a research fellow in agricultural policy at the
Heritage Foundation, highlighted troubles the Farm Bill struggled with regarding
constitutionality from its earliest days:
The first farm bill, the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 9, was a New Deal
response to severely depressed commodity prices. In the depths of the Great
Depression, farm products were not selling, of course, and the excess supply
undercut their value. The goal of the act was to raise prices by restricting production
of corn, wheat, cotton, rice, peanuts, tobacco, and milk. Farmers were paid to keep
fields fallow with funds generated by a tax on food processors (a levy later deemed
unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court). Taxpayers have been on the hook
ever since.
Summarily, it is difficult to match the constitutional mandate defense policy enjoys with
that of ag policy and the Farm Bill.
A more defined expectations regarding the role of the federal government in
transportation policy emerged over time, but not without controversy regarding the
authority to act, to include the constitutionality of such actions (Williamson 2012). In a
corollary debate, the authority for federal statutes regulating waters (rivers and harbors)
was interpreted over time from the Commerce Clause, but not specifically spelled out in
the Constitution (Mulligan 2016). President James Madison recognized that debate and
therefore sought a constitutional amendment in conjunction with a proposal to fund roads
and related infrastructure improvements across the states in 1816 (Williamson 2012, 2).
An appropriations bill was passed by Congress in 1817 honoring Madison’s funding
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The Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 is often considered to the first major farm bill. However, farm
policy goes back to the beginning of the republic, to include agriculture related tariffs, the Homestead Act,
and the creation of an Agriculture Department, among other farm policies.
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request but he vetoed it because the constitutional amendment was never adopted
(Williamson 2012, 2). Yet, the spirit of Madison’s effort persists.
On February 1, 2017, Chairman of the House Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee, Bill Shuster remarked: “From the beginning of the very First Congress that
authorized the first Federal lighthouses, to the Transcontinental Railroad, to the Panama
Canal, to the Interstate Highway System, to the Nation’s airports, the federal government
has played a vital, Constitutional role in ensuring the American people and our economy
are connected through infrastructure” (Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
2017). The view of policymakers on the federal government funding surface
transportation infrastructure obviously changed over time, yet a definitive link to
constitutional authority, as sought by Madison, was never realized. At best, the
constitutional authority referred to by Shuster extends from Article 1, Section 8, Clause 7,
of the Constitution: “To establish Post Offices and post Roads.” The latter, “post Roads”
was used to justify federal highway funding in 1916 and 1921, though not without
questions regarding its constitutionality (Dilger 2015, 5-7). That said, a more plausible
constitutionally-based justification for federal funding of roads, specifically the Interstate
Highway System, was borne in the requirement for the War Department to defend the
nation in the post-World War II era (Williamson 2012, 7).
The Interstate Highway System project started in 1941 under Franklin D.
Roosevelt with recommendations from the National Interregional Highway Committee
(Williamson 2012, 7). It accelerated under President Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was
recognized as, “instrumental in implementing the Interstate Highway System, adding a
specific national defense dimension to the concept, among other things” (Williamson
2012, 7). Eisenhower, seasoned from his days as a commanding four-star general, was
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savvy in the potential political momentum gained by securitizing a policy proposal in the
eyes of Congress and the American people, especially apropos as the unease of the Cold
War set in. As such, Ike’s move provided a bipartisan rally point. It also provided
justification that the Interstate Highway System provided for the common defense and
thereby garnered the full weight of clear constitutional authority. Accordingly, on June
26, 1956, legislation that “changed the name of the Interstate System to reflect its
importance to national defense [to]: "The National System of Interstate and Defense
Highways," passed 89-1 in the Senate and by voice vote in the House, (Highway History
2018). In the bill’s passage, Eisenhower cleared the path for a policy proposal initiated
over forty years prior, one which suffered political limbo until characterized to be a
matter of defense policy (Williamson 2012, 7).10 Ultimately, it was arguably its
characterization as a defense policy issue that brought policymakers together on the
legislation, their action legitimized by the Constitution; their unity, a response to the
common obligation it charged.
Concluding thoughts: constitutional authority & collegiality in defense policy
Historical records and personal accounts over time have demonstrated consistency
in the notion that members of Congress feel a greater obligation to collaborate on
defense policy as an explicit constitutionally charged responsibility than on other
policy issues lacking a specific Constitutional mandate. All members and staff take an
oath to uphold the Constitution. It is a shared institutional reference point regarding their
duty to the nation. Article 1, Section 8, levies an additional and unique shared
institutional obligation, especially felt by those who work on defense policy directly in
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An Interstate Highway System had been proposed in 1913 by the National Highway Association.
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Congress. The weight of that specific constitutional directive is demonstrably recognized
as a unifying factor across the institution, providing validity to the notion that defense
policy formulation is uniquely collegial compared with other policy issues addressed by
Congress. The quote on the plaque that hangs in the HASC hearing room not only serves
as a reminder to testifying witnesses as to the constitutional obligations of Congress to
defend of the nation, but equally to those who work within the institution itself. It is a
unique, shared reference regarding duty to country and a reminder of the origins of that
duty to HASC members and staff. That direct link from the Constitution to the
Committee is not a characteristic shared by other committees (like the Agriculture or
Transportation Committees) and that common link helps explain why defense policy is
approached with more collegiality than other policy issues.
However, it does not completely explain the perceived collegial nature of defense
policy formulation in Congress. Rather, it represents a part of a broader collection, a
piece of the puzzle, as the 535 members of Congress are each incentivized by a different
combination of individual motives. That rationale helps explain the purpose of this study
examining institutional, domestic, and international political factors weighing on defense
policy formulation. In doing so, it conceivably provides a more comprehensive picture of
plausible drivers which motivate members to collaborate on defense policy. As such, the
institutional influence represented by the constitutional charge of Article 1, Section 8, as
examined in this section, should be considered in conjunction with the institutional
influences of process examined previous section. It should also be considered in
conjunction with those in ensuing sections, the next of which considers the influences of
people on the collegial nature of discourse on defense policy in Congress.
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Institutional Influence: Staff Organization & Operations
Research conducted by social scientists regarding the role of congressional staff
has revealed they have sincere influence on the legislative process and associated policies
(Sidlow and Henschen 1985, 493). “As former Senator Dick Clark (D-Iowa), once said:
‘There is no question about our enormous dependency and their influence. In all
legislation, they’re the ones that lay out the options’” (Malbin 1980, 5). In his book,
Unelected Representatives Michael Malbin (1980, 5), concluded members of Congress
simply do not have the time, nor the expertise to stay abreast of all the issues of the day
and rely on staff heavily for both. Since that time, the movement and amount of
information available has only accelerated (especially with the advent and proliferation of
the internet), arguably increasing the complexity of policy issues and associated politics
and ultimately driving members of Congress toward further reliance on staff.
Accordingly, the means by which a committee’s professional staff members (PSMs)
conduct business plays a determinant role in the success and form of legislation and its
policy outcomes (Sidlow and Henschen 1985, 485). Furthermore, according to research
that compared several House committees by Edward I. Sidlow and Beth Henschen
(1985), including the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), the internal operations
of committees often translates to notable differences in their respective staffs. In that
vein, Patterson (1970, 31) categorized the Armed Services Committee staff as
“nonpartisan,” along with Munger and Fenno (1962, 106-136) and Green and Rosenthal
(1963 65-66). It also echoes Malbin’s (1981, 163) conclusion that it is a mistake to think
all committee staffs are the same, only bolstering the notion that the HASC staff is
unique, and thus a vital component of the virtually unprecedented success the National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) has enjoyed over the past fifty-plus years. Based on
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that premise, the following hypothesis was derived to further explain the uniquely
collegial nature of defense policy formulation in Congress: The House Armed Services
Committee (HASC) staff is organized, “housed,” and operate in a manner more
conducive to bipartisan collaboration than other committees in the House of
Representatives (House), like the Agriculture or Transportation Committees staffs.
The test for this hypothesis was qualitative in nature. It consisted of comparing
committee staffs by posing the questions similar to the following via series of over
twenty interactive interviews conducted with current and former staff and members of
Congress, along with other public policy professionals and academics: Does the minority
and majority staff schedule and take meetings together with representatives of the
department they provide authorizations and oversight for (e.g. HASC and DOD)? Does
the minority and majority staff share office space, or is it separate? Does the committee
staff draft provisions of the main recurring authorizing legislation (like the NDAA) as a
collaborative effort between majority and minority staffs? Answers were primarily
derived from interviews, as described above, in addition to accounts from existing
scholarship, congressional records, and press media.
Ultimately, the HASC staff’s organization, in conjunction with how they are
“housed” in their respective office spaces, combined with their methods of operation and
culture, are cumulatively influential in creating a uniquely collegial atmosphere when
compared with the staff of other House committees like the House Transportation and
Agriculture Committees. While other committee staffs shared some of those attributes,
they did not seem to be collectively present nor as consistent as with the HASC, nor did
they seem to garner the same robust and overt support by committee leadership from both
sides of the aisle over time. As a result, the HASC staff environment has provided a
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unique culture over the years wherein policy deliberations on the NDAA (among other
pieces of defense legislation) usually transcend politics and resulted in truly bipartisan
legislation. As one former HASC deputy staff director put it: “HASC staff is the last
bastion of committee bipartisanship on the Hill” (January 31, 2018).
Staff organization
The hierarchical structure of the HASC, the House Transportation Committee,
and the Agriculture (Ag) Committee are roughly similar and congruent to the way most
other House committee staffs are organized, tailored to the needs of the respective
committee. Each committee usually has a staff director or chief of staff, a deputy staff
director and or chief or general counsel, additional counsels, a parliamentarian, clerks,
PSMs, an office manager, staff assistants and interns (Congressional Institute 2007).
Nonpolitical staff usually include office managers and others tasked with strictly
administrative duties, to include clerks and information technology professionals.
Although, the long-time legislative director of a senior House member of the
Appropriations Committee noted that over his twenty years of service in both chambers,
even the traditionally apolitical positions are now politically tainted (February 1, 2018).
He specifically mentioned the Appropriations Committee used to share clerks between
the minority and majority staffs, which is no longer the case. At the other end of the
spectrum resides staffers focused on outreach, communications, and coalitions building—
all carrying a political slant. Subcommittee staff directors are usually designated by the
Chairman from the pool of more experienced staffers (PSMs, counsels, etc.), with the
policy portfolios of the various PSMs generally falling under the umbrella of one of those
subcommittees (though, not exclusively) (Patterson 1970, 31). Finally, “In general,
committee staffs are older, more experienced, and more highly paid than personal
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staffs…” (Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress 1993). Additional
interviews largely validated that HASC PSMs followed the trend of being older and more
experienced among the broader congressional staff population, also distinguished by their
notable longevity with the committee, among other things. A long-time Ag policy
lobbyist and former Ag Committee staffer observed of her former committee staff:
Many have worked together for decades and there is less turnover than many other
committees. The GOP-set term limits for chairmen has impacted it some, but not
to the extent of other committees. Many PSMs have worked together for decades
and are friends. Big committee staff changes are rare in the House and therefore
cooperation across aisle is easier because trust and longevity is well established
(Interview, January 11, 2018).
Another seasoned deputy staff director for a senior member of the Senate leadership
characterized the endurance of professional staff in more polarized terms: “The ‘swamp’
is the long-term staffers and their longevity,” viewing it as a primary source of partisan
gridlock on Capitol Hill (Interview, February 7, 2018). Generally, the attributes listed
above are where similarities between the committees’ staff organizations end and
differentiation lending to the unique collegial nature of the HASC begins. As such,
defense committee staff was generally regarded by interviewees and in congressional
records in a somewhat different light, their longevity often deemed as key to fostering a
collegial atmosphere that ensured success of the NDAA, every year for over five decades
straight.
One of the most visible reasons longevity of HASC staffers has been
complementary to a more collegial policymaking environment, is rooted in the clear
dedication committee leadership, from both sides of the aisle, have demonstrated to the
preservation of that longevity and to its conjoined collegiality over time. According to
one former HASC PSM-turned Congressional Research Service (CRS) researcher, only
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changes to “political staff” occurred when HASC leadership changed, to include
communications and outreach staff, while process and substance subject matter experts
stayed on (Interview, January 31, 2018). On the other hand, she observed, other
committees flushed out their staff when the chairmen turned over, and further mused:
The continuity of the PSMs on the HASC is invaluable to the process and institution
of the HASC – staff tend to stay on when the Chair and RM change out. Most other
committees have PSMs apply and interview again to keep their jobs, not HASC.
The longevity makes an invaluable difference to members. Staff is not subject to
turnover, though portfolios may shuffle—they are considered experts and
nonpartisan and therefore stay (Interview, January 31, 2018).
A former legislative director with almost twenty years of experience working on defense
policy issues for several different members of the HASC in their personal offices
corroborated: “Some PSMs transition back and forth between parties to stay with the
HASC and continue working on the same portfolio when majority changes hands”
(Interview, January 26, 2018). Such is an established practice documented over time by
social scientists (Patterson 1970, 31). Along those lines, another former HASC staffer,
who went on to be an Army Department political appointee, attributed his good fortune
of being the very last of the staffers hired the year he started, to the leadership’s
expectation for longevity and nonpartisan decorum from the staff (Interview, January 31,
2018). That staffer was hired as an act of comity to incoming Chairman Floyd Spence
(R-SC), by HASC Ranking Member (transitioning from his tenure as Chairman) Ron
Dellums (D-CA), when Dellums offered a minority staff billet for the staffer to fill even
though he was a Republican. That staffer also recalled one of the first directives the
whole HASC staff received from the newly appointed Chairman was to continue carrying
out the guidance Dellums had provided the staff when he was chairman: It was their role
to “serve all members” regardless of party or majority/minority; the staff worked for the
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entire committee and all members should expect access to all of the staff and all staff
were expected to provide counsel of all members, regardless of party affiliation
(Interview, January 31, 2018). Dellums’ direction was in contravention to the trend
toward deeper partisanship as noted by interviewees, a trend that has only continued,
though guidance like his was previously more the norm as recognized by social scientists
(Patterson 1970, 33-34). Such loyalty to assuring staff longevity coupled with blatant
direction by leadership against partisan bias, continued the HASC’s tradition of fostering
of a collegial, bipartisan environment. It also solidified its unique nature among House
committees and helps explain the success of the NDAA (and defense policy formulation,
more broadly) in Congress.
The loyalty of HASC leadership to the preservation of a collegial committee
environment enhanced by a seasoned staff also became evident in the rhetoric they used
in public hearings, not just limited to actions associated with the hiring and direction of
staff (the behind-the-scenes details of which would likely otherwise go unnoticed by
casual observers). In other words, not only did HASC leadership act behind semi-closed
doors to facilitate staff longevity and collegiality, they reinforced their actions vocally in
public fora (which could have an element of political risk). A strong testament to that
end was made by Congressman Spence in his first committee organizational meeting as
HASC Chairman on January 10, 1995:
[L]et me also make a personal comment about this committee and its tradition.
Very few people realize that we are the only major committee of Congress that does
not have a formally split partisan staff. As a Member who has spent more than 20
years serving on the Minority Side of this committee, I can attest to the desirability
and effectiveness of maintaining a core, nonpartisan staff to help all of us meet our
responsibilities.
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This unique staffing arrangement has allowed us to maintain one of the smallest
committee staffs relative to the size of the committee and to our vast budget
oversight and jurisdictional responsibilities of any House committee.
I have assured Mr. Dellums that this is one tradition I am committed to maintaining.
There will be times when partisanship is unavoidable…. Nonetheless, despite the
ebb and flow of partisanship in this committee’s deliberations over the years, I
never believed it in our best interests to succumb to the temptation to split the staff.
We now have a smaller staff with even more responsibility…. Access to the staff
and its expertise is one tradition that I am committed to maintaining in the years
ahead.
Such overt loyalty to the HASC staff organization as vocalized by Chairman Spence was
particularly noteworthy at the time. Control of the Congress had just been won for the
first time in over 40 years by Republicans in a sweeping election led by Newt Gingrich,
guided by the ideology of his “Contract with America” (Dionne, Ornstein and Mann
2017). Gingrich, used the “Contract” to help demonize the Washington political
establishment, later cited by political scientists like Norm Ornstein and Thomas Mann,
along with E.J. Dionne, Jr. (2017) as the origin of the ultra-partisan gridlock Congress
characterized by today. Thus, efforts to preserve the HASC staff organization, its
differentiated committee character, and nonpartisan ethos was no small feat, as inferred
by the additional remarks by the Chairman that day:
…I, with a number of my colleagues, were able to ultimately convince our
leadership that we should not be compelled to move to a pure partisan staff simply
because we were different. Assuming Majority status has not changed my belief
that a core bipartisan staff is still the most effective way for this committee to
operate.
…over all the years I have been here in the Minority and as a Minority, we…have
always arrived at the conclusion that the kind of staff we have on this committee is
the best way to serve as a Minority and Majority.
Collectively taken with other accounts, the presentation by Congressman Spence helps
further delineate the unique nature of the HASC staff organization and character
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compared to that of other committees. And, those factors help explain why defense
policy formulation in Congress is recognized for its uniquely collegial nature.
Office Space, Cyberspace and Travel Space
Staff longevity, organizational structure, and consistent loyalty by committee
leadership to maintenance of a core of nonpartisan staff are additive to an enduring
foundation of collegiality in defense policy formulation. However, the very practical
matter of the office spaces within which the staff is “housed,” and how they interact
within those spaces is also a contributor to the collaborative atmosphere of the HASC.
One CRS scholar who worked on or around Capitol Hill since 1968, a former PSM,
counselor to multiple congressional reorganization efforts, and prolific author on
legislative process as corollary to adjunct professorial duties, observed in an interview
that, “[HASC] offices are not separated like on other committees,” which was a
“tremendous factor” in the staff working together (November 3, 2017). Another CRS
researcher with extensive academic and practical experience focused congressional
budget process and reform, reinforced that view. While he noted easy accessibility
between colleagues in their workspaces cultivated bipartisan cooperation, he also shared
concern that, “HASC staff separated [minority and majority] from shared office space
only recently,” and “it used to be closer to a SASC (Senate Armed Services Committee)
set-up,” which is integrated (December 4, 2017). The deputy chief of staff to a senior
Senator echoed: “Appropriators are even under siege these days. There is divisiveness
where there was not previously, just over ten years later. Staff was not previously
separated but now is with Foreign Relations and the Intelligence Committee too”
(Interview, February 7, 2018). Ultimately, there was consensus that shared, open office
space had made a noticeable difference in HASC (and the SASC) facilitating collegiality
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in the NDAA policy formulation process over time.
While concern was expressed about the ramifications of the move by the HASC
to separate the minority and majority staff office spaces, its impact has been limited if
measured by the committee’s ability to since pass the NDAA with robust bipartisan
support. Over time, collaboration has been the steady byproduct of proximity and open
access. One former HASC staffer, who served as the deputy staff director during the
mid-1990’s, recalled:
Staff to staff conversations, substantive discussions over concerns were brought to
each other as the issues were mulled over; majority would go to their minority
counterparts in their ‘space’ [office, etc.] and discuss issues openly. It brought a
humanness to the institution that was critically important. There is no ‘policy
fermentation’ when the majority and minority staff are separated. HASC writes
the [NDAA] bill together, majority and minority and is therefore seen as a fair
process; disagreement is dealt with immediately and without prejudice (Interview,
January 31, 2018).
Another former HASC PSM-turned CRS employee recalled that the collaborative
environment enjoyed in the physical HASC committee office spaces also extended into
cyberspace:
The [NDAA] bill was built with total transparency. Minority and majority staff
had access to the same database. We could see each other’s work on the bill as it
was built and would negotiate and discuss throughout the process. It was cordial
and collaborative; trust and transparency were vital (Interview, January 31, 2018).
The commonality of that practice—sharing bill data and draft provisions freely among
committee staff—was polled in subsequent interview and informal conversations with
former staffers. Responses were relatively clear: such liberally shared access by minority
and majority staff was unique to the HASC’s NDAA process. Anecdotally, it was
completely foreign to the manner in which other committees operated, or would even
consider operating, in light of overshadowing partisan biases. Ultimately, the shared
cyber-space between minority and majority staff, on HASC’s signature annual
111

authorization bill—the NDAA—was another committee discriminator, one that promoted
collegiality in the process of policy formulation.
One last “space” frequently referenced as instrumental in the cultivation of
collegiality among staff dealing with defense issues was the “travel space” shared by
MLAs and PSMs on CODEL (congressional delegation) and STAFDEL (staff
delegation) factfinding trips. While personal and professional staffers of other
committees also traveled on factfinding forays, Armed Services Committee related travel
took members and staff on extended trips around the globe. The trips were often to
austere locations which included warzones with ample transit time to get to know each
other in the “travel spaces,” an opportunity rarely possible on Capitol Hill. One former
staffer who had worked with Senator Joe Lieberman on defense issues recalled of her
STAFDEL/CODEL experiences: “Having dinner and spending a lot of time with people
from across the aisle made them harder to demonize” (Interview, December 14, 2017).
Another long-serving legislative director for a senior House member mused that
CODELs/STAFDELs helped him meet others from across the aisle who he likely would
have not otherwise met and to “humanize” them because, “you just don’t talk politics and
learn to get along,” on the trips (Interview, February 1, 2018).
Even if warzones were avoided on a stateside trip, staffers were often exposed to
unifying issues based on life and death consequences which included interactions with
service members who were about to deploy or just returned from warzone deployments.
One former HASC staffer recalled seeking out junior enlisted military members with his
colleagues from across the aisle to gain “real frontline feedback” not otherwise exposed
to congressional oversight (Interview, January 31, 2018). Staff (along with members)
then had opportunities to contemplate such information together (as well as on other very
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serious defense policy issues) in the physical and time “travel spaces” between
destinations. Interviewees recalled the shared transit time as a factor in driving bipartisan
collaboration where it may have not otherwise blossomed, either on an issue immediately
at hand or one down the road. Along those lines, a former defense staffer for Senator Joe
Lieberman reflected:
Unity came from urgency to help solve real problems that servicemembers were
facing in wartime. Deployed sexual trauma and assault problems in DoD were
revealed to staffers on STAFDEL/CODELs – PTSD proper treatment was
provided in a bipartisan fashion, as a result.
Joint expertise and interests on certain topics brought people together, mental health
issues for example. Staff discovered soldiers were not being screened properly
before being redeployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. The issue drove Democrats and
Republicans together in investigating/oversight and finding a solution that worked
(Interview, December 14, 2017).
In another case, despite his relative inexperience, one MLA serving with a member in his
first term assigned to the HASC, provided an insightful view as to the comprehensive
value CODELs and STAFDELs brought to “a bipartisan experience,” working on defense
policy. “Interactions between members and staff on CODELs help build trusting
relationships,” he recalled from a trip to Afghanistan, “the benefits of [those]
relationships are transferrable to areas other than national security and HASC”
(Interview, February 1, 2018). Put in the broader context of institutional norms and
constraints members of Congress wrestle with, he also reflected that CODELs provide
members with opportunities for exposure to different policy and ideological perspectives
than those prevalent in their home districts. “Not spending time in DC makes it easier to
be hyper-partisan because you do not have good opportunities to get to know the other
side,” he concluded, validating the value of the time and physical travel space members
spent on CODELs in breeding bipartisan collaboration.
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Ultimately, the temporal and physical travel spaces shared while traveling,
coupled with the substance of the issues exposed on the trips, leant to unified problem
solving on tough policy issues by HASC professional staff, members, and MLAs. Such
was different than staff visiting a farm bureau meeting in the Midwest, or a laboratory
that helped develop genetically modified food crops, as with the Ag Committee, or
visiting the site of a proposed highway bypass considered for federal funding by
Transportation Committee staffers. Shared travel time and space helped transcend
political biases and institutional mechanisms that usually overshadowed interaction on
the Hill. Those factors transferred to facilitating better bipartisan discourse on the NDAA
and other policy matters and again set the HASC apart in its policy work and
environment when compared with other House committees.
Additional Staff Operations
The open manner in which the HASC’s professional staff helps drive the
committee’s policy agenda is actively coordinated with the Chairman, Ranking Member,
and rank-and-file, providing for additional collaborative opportunities between the
majority and minority. One might assume such practice is commonplace in the House, as
reflected in scholarship (Patterson 1970, 29-30). However, some interviewees revealed
otherwise, as with one long-time House staffer who noted, “Parochial interests of
members are often muted or completely nixed by long-time PSMs who are often the
continuity with regard to policy [sic]” (January 26, 2018). While the HASC was not
recognized as immune to such dalliances by its professional staff, its approach instead
was generally regarded as wholly different, largely driven by robust inclusion of personal
staff throughout the entire legislative process, with the NDAA.
In particular, the interaction between the HASC staff and military legislative
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assistants (MLAs) serving in the personal offices of HASC members seemed more robust
with the HASC’s legislative process than with other committees. One former senior
HASC PSM recalled an “underlying culture surrounding the HASC,” when it came to
interaction between MLAs/personal staffers and the committee staff, one that encouraged
“inclusiveness, colleagues-all, to solve common problems” (Interview, January 31, 2018).
He continued, “In the House this is an asset because it sets precursors to helping the
members they work for, setting up member discussions on issues prior to their meetings”
(January 31, 2018). He further recalled the particular importance of MLA-PSM dialogue
in enabling members to get agenda priorities integrated into the NDAA at the
subcommittee level—a vital step in the NDAA process (as detailed in the “Bill Creation
and Consideration” section of this paper) (January 31, 2018). The inclusiveness extended
across the aisle, which further validated the uniqueness of the interaction. During the
same interview, the former HASC PSM recalled MLAs and professional staff working
together, party aside, to get members onboard with an issue:
Inclusiveness of MLAs was very important on both sides of the aisle in working
out issues with members. Often when majority staff would want to approach a
minority member on an issue they would approach the minority member’s MLA
first, and the minority staffer would ask to see the member first to set them at ease
with the majority PSM approaching the issue with the member. They worked as a
team to get issues addressed (January 31, 2018).
He also recalled (as did several others interviewed) that majority and minority staffs were
almost always in the room together for meetings with MLAs, by rare exception, to
prepare for committee hearings or to provide informational briefings on a defense-related
issue. They all discussed the issues together, to include possible snags to expect due to
political, regional, or other differences.
Conversely, interviewees generally contended that the professional staff of other
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committees, like Ag and Transportation, tended to communicate more directly with the
members, often bypassing personal policy staffers along the way. Additionally, joint
majority-minority meetings held with committee and personal staff were deemed rare,
and usually held separately. At best, both sides might meet together briefly to discuss the
basics of a markup or other hearing, but then would split up to discuss the meat of the
issues at hand, again a vast departure from the way the HASC operated. The practice of
other committees having those deeper discussions separately allotted less opportunity for
staff-level discourse on the issues that might preempt misunderstanding or politicization
of bill provisions and for those staffers to build collegial relationships and trust across the
aisle.
Culture
The cumulative product of the institutional factors outlined in this section
comprise a “culture” shared by defense policy staffers—a notion pervasive among those
interviewed and evident in congressional records and in scholastic observations over
time. Accordingly, that culture can help explain the unique collegiality of defense policy
formulation in Congress, and more specifically in the annual NDAA deliberation process.
The culture, by one MLA’s account, a six-NDAA cycle veteran, 11 is characterized
by “believers” and “optimists,” who feel a “duty to doing a good job, to ensure good
policy for the people comes to fruition” (December 16, 2018). Limited parallels to the
MLA’s observation were described in interviews by staffers experienced in policy areas
other than defense, though routinely caveated. One former House Agriculture Committee
staffer-turned lobbyist reflected:

11

The number of times a staffer served through a NDAA legislative cycle represents a cultural badge of honor
of sorts among defense committee staffers and MLAs on the Hill.

116

Ag is a historically congenial committee, staff and members know each other well
and that has paid off in the past. It is the result of the neighborly nature of the
Midwest and South, and because most members and staff are from rural areas with
shared values and views on the world despite their party. It was a fun committee
to work with. [But,] as Congress changed and became more partisan, so did the Ag
Committee (January 11, 2018).
The increased partisanship on the Ag Committee she described was evident in the veto by
President George W. Bush of the 2008 Farm Bill, sent to him by a Democrat-controlled
Congress (CQ Almanac 2008). Furthermore, the 2014 Farm Bill took two years to pass,
derailed by deep partisan arguments over federal spending on food stamps stirred up
among Ag Committee members and which spilled over into broader partisan spats in
Congress (Heiligenstein 2014). Similar decay has yet to substantively transgress HASC’s
culture enough to derail the NDAA’s annual passage. Though, the bill was not immune
to being held hostage to political divisiveness, as in 2015 when President Barack Obama
vetoed the FY2016 NDAA for domestic political purposes (Johnson 2015).
Further insights provided in interviews also supported the notion defense
committee culture plays a key role in keeping defense policy formulation above partisan
fray. One former deputy staff director of the HASC noted, “HASC staff and members
came from all over the country and all walks of life to work on a single unifying purpose
that serves the nation…[it] was a ‘better place’ to be on the Hill” (Interview, Jan 31,
2018). “Not a partisan feeling at all,” quipped another House staffer with considerable
defense policy experience, when asked of the HASC’s culture (February 1, 2018). A
CRS researcher who had worked defense issues as a staffer primarily on the Senate-side,
recalled those characteristics were pervasive to defense committee culture on both sides
of the Hill, “there was comradery, it was routine and expected” (Interview, December 14,
2018). In deeper reflection, she shared:
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The people that worked on defense issues, PSMs, MLAs, and members alike were
all concerned about the well-being of servicemembers and it was unifying. It was
about the health of the military, not just resources but about the right kind of
resources, the types needed to be ready to defend the country. The people were
motivated by it, to get it right (Interview, December 14, 2018).
What asked about contemplated origins of the uniquely collegial culture of the culture of
the defense policy community, many interviewees attributed it, in part, to a common
experience members and staff had from prior military service.
According to those interviewed, many of the staffers working for the Armed
Services Committees were military veterans or had military experience of some sort and
were therefore already socially predisposed toward working together for a common
purpose, differentiating them from the staffs of other committees. Some staffers even
served as drilling reservists during their tenure on the Hill, both recognized by
interviewees as differentiators among the makeup of committee staffs. One former
legislative fellow recalled from her experience: “Part of the passion for the mission and
dedication emanated from the fact that many of the staffers and members were veterans.
It was more than a job for many of them, it was patriotism, an imperative. It was seen as
an important way for them to contribute and give to society” (Interview, December 14,
2017). Of the staffers with military experiences, many were noted to be retirees of a full,
twenty-plus year military career as a relatively senior officer (lieutenant colonel or
colonel) or senior non-commissioned officer before working on the Hill. It was further
observed, that with that experience came intimate first-hand knowledge of policy issues
the HASC had jurisdiction over, along with the contextual knowledge of those issues at a
level exceptionally rare for staffers serving anywhere on Capitol Hill. In that light, one
former HASC PSM remarked:
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They understood the programs and knew the questions to ask after years of
experience with systems and programs being supported. That kind of expertise is
not resident elsewhere on the Hill and would take years to replicate in a manner
sufficiently transparent and which vets the issues properly with the department
that it would support (Interview, January 31, 2018).
While practitioners-turned-policymakers are not completely unheard of on Capitol Hill,
many congressional staffers, “grew up” in the law or policy realm or viewed their staff
job as a stepping stone to another opportunity (Henschen and Sidlow 1986, 706-707).
Consequently, while well-educated, their experience was often honed in a more classic
sense, via academic study with limited on-the-job training (Malbin 1981, 175-176). This
was in contrast with retired military officers who lived through an entire 20-year career
seeped in practical experience dealing with issues they were charged with making policy
for in their second career as defense staffers.
A distinct and immediate comradery was therefore recognized as shared among
military veterans who transitioned to work on the defense committee staffs, one that
emanated from a common ethos and culture along with other experiences unique to the
profession of arms. The effect of that connection was also recognized and influential on
members seeking counsel on a policy direction, especially among those who had also
served in uniform. One former staffer who served with the HASC in the late 1990’s
recalled: “Military veterans in Congress are good because they often provide and can
share influential, well-rounded views and insight on defense issues that others may not
have; they are respected and sought for their personal experiences in that regard”
(Interview, January 31, 2017). Yet, another characterized the expertise of former military
members working on committee staff as “esoteric,” their origins of a somewhat separated
subculture of American society, though not in a necessarily negative sense (February 7,
2018). Ultimately, such recognition further validates the unique expertise enveloped in
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the counsel provided by military veterans-turned congressional staffers. It also adds
another facet to the collegial culture among those working on defense policy on the Hill,
consequently evident in their deliberations and the consistent passage of the NDAA, year
after year.
In conclusion, the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) staff is organized,
“housed,” and operate in a manner more conducive to bipartisan collaboration than other
committees in the House of Representatives. The unique attributes of shared travel
space, office space, and cyberspace are all notable factors lending to a more collegial
environment on the HASC. Those factors, coupled with the HASC staff’s organizational
features, and in conjunction with their methods of operation and culture, are cumulatively
influential in creating a uniquely collegial staff environment compared with those of
other House committees. Perhaps most notable, while other committee staffs shared some
of the cultural attributes evident with the HASC, they did not seem to be collectively
present, nor as consistent. Information about the Agriculture and Transportation
Committees indicated staff operations were largely a reflection of committee leadership
desires in the moment, rather than being guided by an underlying culture carried over
time. Finally, the leadership of other committees did not seem to foster the same robust
and overt support for the policy pursuits of all its members, regardless of party affiliation,
as with the HASC. Collectively, they are influences of the institution of Congress,
influential on its processes and political character, and most notably evident in the
stubbornly dependable annual passage of the NDAA.
Institutional Influences: People & Ideology
Defense-related committees in Congress attract members of a certain ideological
type over time, setting them categorically apart from others. Smith and Deering (1990,
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133), for example, branded the views of members of the House Armed Services
Committee (HASC) on defense matters, as “much more conservative than House
Democrats and somewhat more conservative than the House as a whole.” Bolstering
Smith and Deering’s conclusion, a prominent Washington D.C. think tank scholar and
extensively published political scientist, observed: “Defense committees are different in
the members they attract, they pull members of a certain disposition due to the substance
(Interview, January 23, 2018). Additionally, according to Patricia Hurley (1989, 128),
“Several scholars have presented findings which suggest that voting in both the House
and Senate on all issues is motivated by the ideological preferences (liberal or
conservative) of the members. Research based on interview data as well as roll call votes
in 1971, 1972, and 1975 suggests that this is a reasonable way to think about
congressional voting alliances.” In concert, accounts like those presented by Smith and
Deering (1990) and Hurley (1989), among others, inspired the underlying question
addressed in this section: Are defense committee members and their leadership more
predisposed toward collegial behavior in formulating defense policy because they share
certain ideological characteristics?
In light of the underlying question and given the overall hypothesis of this study
the following two sub-hypotheses were derived and tested:
1. The ideological dispositions of HASC members are expected to be closer
aligned than that of other House Committees like the Agriculture Committee and
the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee during the case study periods in
question.;
2. HASC Chairmen and Ranking Members are expected to be more
ideologically aligned with their fellow committee members as compared with the
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leadership of other House Committees, like the Agriculture Committee or
Transportation Committee.
The second sub-hypothesis was derived and tested specifically to compare ideological
dispositions of committee leadership based on the assumption that the ideological
character of the leadership weighs on the overall collegial nature of their respective
committees. Furthermore, both hypotheses were approached under the assumption that
the membership of House committees represent a spectrum of political ideologies not
necessarily aligned with political party membership nor specifically reliant on political
pressures emanating from the parochial interests of members’ districts (jobs, industry,
geography, local economy, etc.)—the influence of which are examined further in the
chapter on domestic political influences.
The research presented in this section was also conducted to provide a coherent
comparative baseline of the ideological characters of House committee membership and
leaders over time. Qualitative and quantitative assessments were used to compare and
examine the HASC and House Agriculture and Transportation Committees specifically,
with detailed attention (though, not exclusively) paid to the time periods associated with
the case studies explored in Chapters 5 and 6: 1960 to 1965, 1994 to 1999, and 2007 to
2012.
This section provides analyses and discussions organized into three subsections.
The first subsection builds on information first introduced in the literature review found
in Chapter 2. More specifically, it explores what researchers have concluded in the past
regarding the ideological disposition of defense committee members and leaders and how
those dispositions relate to the overall perceived collegial nature of institutional processes
within Congress. The second subsection presents an array of experiences and
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conclusions conveyed via interview by former congressional staff, members, scholars,
think tank representatives, and others closely associated with the legislative process, their
personal reflections dating from as early as 1968. The third subsection presents a
quantitatively-based comparative analysis derived from the ideological categorization of
policymakers and their leaders assigned to the HASC, the Agriculture, Transportation,
Ways and Means and Rules Committees, and based on members’ voting records.
The overall assumption which drove the analyses presented in this section was: If
the preponderance of HASC members are ideologically aligned as compared to other
House committees, a more fertile foundation exists for collaboration and cooperation on
the HASC. If the assumption is true, it can help explain why scholars and others have
historically highlighted defense policy formulation as uniquely collegial.
People & Ideology I: Existing Scholarship
The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 provided limited insight as to what past
research revealed regarding how member ideology might translate to collegial behavior
and influence on policy formulation in Congress. Therefore, to broaden the aperture, this
subsection builds on a summarized recount of the research and findings of Chapter 2 with
additional analyses from pertinent scholarship and references. From an academic
perspective, there is a solid theoretical basis to support the premise that collegial
collaboration in defense policy formulation is fostered in part by ideologically based
factors which also help define the institutional character of Congress. Therefore, relevant
theoretical frameworks are reviewed first in the ensuing paragraphs followed by an
examination of notable thematic tendencies found in the literature. Together they help
define the relationships between the ideological nature of committee members and
leaders and the collegial behavior so often observed in the defense-related legislative
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process.
Richard F. Fenno (1973, 278) found there to be two types of committees in
Congress, a theoretical framework which helps provide a basis for understanding
institutional influences driving collegial behavior in Congress. Of the two committee
types, the HASC is justifiably categorized by the “orientation of its decision rules, the
autonomy of its decision-making processes, its emphasis on committee expertise, its
success on the House floor, its members’ sense of group identity, and the relatively
higher ratio of member to non-member satisfaction with its performance” (Fenno 1973,
278). Smith and Deering (1990, 170) proposed somewhat of a parallel-minded
“autonomous committees perspective” in which, “members of each committee determine
policy within their jurisdiction, irrespective of the policy preferences of the parent
chamber and parties.” While Smith and Deering’s definition arguably fits a
characterization of the HASC more precisely than Fenno’s, their conclusion was
diminished by a caveat they applied to their proposal. The caveat explained that there
were few, if any, instances of pure committee autonomy in the House, along with the
following observation:
…those members whose constituencies care most about the jurisdiction of a
committee are assigned to a committee and dominate its decisions…and members
not assigned to the committee defer to the committee when the legislation comes
to the floor, primarily because there is little political incentive to take an interest
in the legislation. Therefore, in this view, policy is a product of the preferences of
committee members and their constituencies, and reflects their biases. (Smith and
Deering 1990, 170)
While Smith and Deering’s caveated conclusion somewhat reflects characteristics of the
HASC, their definition is debatably a better characterization of authorizing committees in
Congress overall, to include the Agriculture and Transportation Committees. More
specifically, Fenno’s definition better captured pertinent cultural characteristics of the
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HASC lending to a collegial environment throughout the annual NDAA process. On the
other hand, Smith and Deering’s definition highlights a more transactional approach, one
focused on individual agendas and which tends to characterize most other authorizing
committees in general in how they approach major legislation like the Farm and Highway
Bills. Ultimately, while the framework proposed by Fenno is subtly different than Smith
and Deering’s, there is enough distinction between the two to delineate a foundational
difference in how committees approach and process jurisdictional legislation which can
then be translated into a characterization of the collegial nature of those committees.
Theoretical frameworks like Fenno’s and Smith and Deering’s provide a
contextual basis for making conclusions from existing scholarship, linking ideological
disposition to cooperation on policy formulation as a defining institutional characteristic
of Congress. Accordingly, scholars have highlighted certain thematic tendencies to help
explain why defense policy formulation is so often perceived as more collegial than other
issue areas. Those thematic tendencies are further distilled into three areas of categorical
consequence and predicate to the exploration of insights gleaned from interviews with
current and former policy practitioners.
First of the thematic conclusions discussed here is that ideology provides a basis
for unity when it comes down to how policymakers make decisions on defense and
foreign policy related issues. Recalling references from Chapter 2, Rundquist and Carsey
(2002) provided a summary view: “Several scholars have argued that ideology is
significant for explaining legislative behavior regarding defense policy (e.g. Moyer 1973;
Lindsay 1991a).” The conclusions of Abdolali and Ward (1999, 229) reinforced
Rundquist and Carsey and found that conservative policymakers generally supported
higher levels of additional defense spending, much as Fleisher 1985; Lindsay 1990;
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1991b; Poole and Daniels 1985 found. Rundquist and Carsey (2002, 53, 59) also
concluded ideology correlates more strongly with voting on defense policy than other
issues that may benefit the constituencies of members, and that the HASC was an
“ideological outlier” that attracted more hawkish members from both sides of the aisle.
Similarly, when Abdolali and Ward (1999, 236) challenged the assumption that defense
committees draw disproportionally from conservative members, as cited by Shepsle
1978; Krehbiel 1990; Cox and McCubbins 1993, they ultimately agreed with Krehbiel
(1990), that the HASC was a “preferential outlier” when it came conservatives or prodefense members assigned to that committee. Also, very pertinent is the previously
mentioned observation by Patricia Hurley (1989, 128) that, “voting in both the House and
Senate on all issues is motivated by the ideological preferences (liberal or conservative)
of the members.” Hurley’s conclusion, combined with that of Abdolali and Ward’s
(1999, 245) that, “ideology is a strong predictor of defense voting, independent of party,
presidential party, or state military benefit,” together provide a foundation to assert that
ideology is a broader unifying factor in defense policy formulation than partisan-based
alliances in other policy issue areas. In other words, collaborative efforts on defense
policy are not limited to coalitions of members solely from the Democratic or Republican
conference. Rather they appeal to a broader combined audience with members from both
sides of the aisle, of which ideology is one of many possible unifying factors.
The broader ideological appeal of defense policy, in part allowed by its ability to
transcend partisan loyalties, is tangent to a second thematic point found in the literature:
There is strength in the numbers convened in the name of ideological unity and
substantive political capital to be gained and leveraged from that strength. Patricia
Hurley (1989, 131) provided support for that premise: “Members of the House and
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Senate are elected as individuals, but in Congress they function as members of groups.
The most salient group is certainly the party, but members may find themselves pulled
away from party and into alliances based on particular policy issues or ideological
concerns.” Accordingly, ideologically based alliances within the defense committees and
the broader House chamber have banded together over time on defense-related issues,
often belying competing, politically driven interests in their wake. 12 Perhaps the most
frequently cited example is the enduring cooperation between the Republican
Conservative Coalition and Southern Democrats. The two groups banded efforts starting
as early as the 1930’s, lasting through World War II, the Cold War, and up through the
first few years of the 21st century. These “hawks” made for a historically formidable
voting-block, used to see their agenda through and unified in sustained support for
foreign and defense policy initiatives that benefitted the entire group and their
constituencies (Rundquist and Carsey 2002, 16). Essentially, there was “safety” in
pressing policy through via ideologically-aligned “numbers.”
A third significant theme addressed in the literature proposed that members of
Congress have more political latitude to pursue defense policy goals based on personal
ideology versus other policy areas. For example, Rundquist and Carsey (2002, 35)
concluded that the unified ideological strength of the Southern Democrat-Conservative
GOP alliance also provided members political top-cover to foray into bipartisan actions
beyond those solely focused on benefitting their individual constituencies. The
partnership was a stable and predictable means for members of Congress from both
parties to pursue policy goals sometimes distant from the minds of their electorate with
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Other non-ideologically based reasons for congressional alliances on defense policy (geography,
economy and industry, electorate, etc.) are discussed further in the chapter on domestic political influences.

127

little to no political consequence. Ripley and Lindsay (1993 243, 251) found much of the
same; defense policy formulation is somewhat disconnected from the concerns of the
electorate and therefore allowed political space for ideological convergence on policy not
necessarily available elsewhere. Reelection considerations could therefore be
conceivably less urgent in defense policy decision making calculus (Ripley and Lindsay
1993, 243, 251).
Finally, a brief recount of the literature focused on the influence of committee
leadership on bipartisan collaboration is appropriate, especially in light of the hypotheses
proposed earlier in this section. Smith and Deering (1990, 124-125) provided a fitting
summarized account: “Constituency committee members who want to complement their
chairs describe them as ‘consensus builders,’ ‘pragmatists,’ and permissive leaders, rather
than as aggressive friends or foes.” They further noted “comity” as “stronger on
constituency committees [like HASC and Ag] than elsewhere, and leaders are expected to
reinforce these norms” (Smith and Deering 1990, 124). Taken together, existing research
that examines the role of ideology in policy deliberation provides a compelling basis for
explaining the uniquely collegial behavior observed in defense policy formulation, one
reinforced by first-hand accounts from veterans of that process.
People & Ideology II: Interviews
Interviews with former and current members of Congress, congressional staff,
CRS researchers, lobbyists, and others from the policy community close to the legislative
process were queried about how, in their experience, member ideology impacted the
character and culture of committees and subsequently influenced collegiality in the policy
formulation process. More narrowly, interviewees were asked about the influence of
ideology on the perceived collegial nature of defense policy formulation. Respondents’
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observations were categorically focused in four general areas: member ideology,
bipartisanship, committee assignment and membership, and committee leadership.
In general, the influence of ideology on the policymaking process was framed in a
somewhat pessimistic light by interviewees, a reflection of the steep polarization of the
contemporary political environment. For example, one twenty-year veteran of the Hill
reflected, “Both sides are held hostage by the extreme [ideologically-motivated] fringes
of their party caucus” (Interview with congressional staffer, January 26, 2018). Ideology
was proposed by another to be the driver of fundamental institutional change in the
House: “Congress is transitioning to a more parliamentary model, coalitions are essential,
voting-blocks have real power to contend with,” citing the “Freedom Caucus,” and the
“Tuesday Group”13 (Interview with former congressional staffer, January 29, 2018).
Conversely, the framing of ideological influences specific to defense policy
formulation and the defense committees was relatively optimistic. For example, one
retired committee staff director reflected: “[HASC] members were generally like-minded,
which helped with getting along on policy. Conversely, committees like the Judiciary
[Committee] were inherently partisan and members came ready to fight” (Interview,
December 22, 2017). A CRS researcher echoed with, “The principal nature of many
policy issues has been related to ideologies that drive a wedge, defense is not one of
them” (Interview, December 4, 2017). Placing the issue in a broader socio-political
context, a renowned political scientist and think tank scholar long-focused on
congressional process and politics observed, “Partisanship today emanates from regional
changes—homogeneous demographics and sorted ideologues…HASC is the exception of
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Traditionally, members of the House Freedom Caucus and the Congressional Tuesday Group Caucus
(Congressional Member Organizations or “caucuses”) are ideologically conservative.
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that in a lot of ways, transcendent due to patriotism, there is a different view of defense
by members [of Congress]” (Interview, January 23, 2018).
“Bipartisanship” was used frequently when respondents categorized member
behavior on defense policy matters. One MLA summarily concluded, “the premise is
correct that the HASC and SASC are more bipartisan than other committees, as is the
issue of defense policy itself” (Interview, December 1, 2017). Conversely, little
reference was specifically made to “ideology,” which was instead used almost
exclusively in the context of political gridlock and discord. While perhaps just a
vernacular nuance, the discernment provides valuable insight as to the mindset of
policymakers (and those who they work with) in approaching defense policy, much like
the think tank scholar described as the “different view of defense,” above. Another thinktanker and previous Hill staffer, proposed the “tradition of bipartisanship” on the armed
services committees originated in part from a sought after and shared “prestige” gained
from directly supporting members of the U.S. military, a product, he claimed, of the
military being one of the most popular and respected institutions in American society
(Interview, January 29, 2018). Ag Committee members could arguably claim parallel
prestige in supporting another historically iconic cultural institution in the American
farmer. Yet, there are enduring ideologically based policy debates associated with the
Farm Bill—like crop supports and food stamps—which debatably have no lasting equal
in the NDAA. With few exceptions, equivalent ideological policy debates associated
with the NDAA (like the repeal of the Don’t Ask Don’t Tell policy) are usually addressed
and resolved in relatively short order, postponed, or dealt with in separate legislation to
keep the bill moving toward passage (Shogan 2011, 25-26). Even less could be said for
unity in championing the “freedom of the open road,” as in the Highway Bill, though the
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concept is wholly American in its own right. Thus, one CRS researcher and former
HASC Professional Staff Member (PSM) described the ideological and political environs
of the committee as a “safe place for members to trust their colleagues unfounded
elsewhere on the Hill or in their districts at home. They pretty much know with relative
certainty they will not get attacked in HASC” (Interview, January 31, 2018). Her
conclusion helps explain why another former HASC policy staffer and later staff director
similarly observed, “People were attracted to the [Armed Services] Committee for
substance and ideology,” which is an appropriate introduction for how interviewees
described the makeup of the HASC membership and why they saw it in that light
(Interview, December 22, 2017).
Members of Congress were said to be drawn to the HASC for a variety of reasons,
also pulled or diverted by leadership for the assignment depending on the member. One
younger MLA described the ideological pull to the HASC, which resonates with
members who “care about something greater than themselves, national security issues,”
and they “take that responsibility seriously” (Interview, February 1, 2018). The MLA’s
sentiment was echoed by a well-experienced think tank scholar and defense policy
counselor to generals and presidents: “The defense committees attract members who are
serious about national security, not just about gathering pork. They think it is an
obligation of Congress to ensure the security of the country” (Interview, January 23,
2018). Another senior aide to a member occupying a top leadership posts in Congress
reflected, “Armed Services Committees tend to attract more hawkish, conservative
members, especially the case during Vietnam; there was ideological cohesion and it is a
self-perpetuating culture” (Interview, February 7, 2018).
One defense staffer, a twenty-year Hill veteran, reasoned the ideological thread
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among HASC members and culture was the product of many military veterans drawn to
serve, or to continue their service, as members and staff with the committee: “Members
with prior military service on both sides of the aisle are able to come together because of
their shared [military] service experiences…Post 9/11 veterans have a common platform;
the bond among vets in Congress is notable” (Interview, January 26, 2018). She
pondered the reason for the perceived collegial nature of the HASC as a correlation,
“Perhaps its respect for each other, respect and decency as part of military culture, even if
you do not agree on policy ideas?” (Interview, January 26, 2018). To make her point, she
provided an example in the deliberation over the legislation which authorized the Global
War on Terror memorial, the character of which, she emphasized, was unlikely to be
mirrored in other circumstances. Though it fell under the jurisdiction of the Natural
Resources Committee, the bill was jointly introduced by two HASC members, both
military veterans of the campaign, Congressmen Mike Gallagher (R-WI) and Seth
Moulton (D-MA). She recalled the legislation was supported via several “emotional
floor speeches” by veterans from both sides of the aisle in a session she observed as
“therapeutic” for those who had shared combat experience to unifying them during the
debate (Interview, January 26, 2018). The staffer continued her assessment of HASC
members, noting:
House leadership picks committee membership based on several factors, including
prior military service, if members have bases or major manufacturers in their
district, and if there are significant politically related defense issues to deal with.
However, they might shy away from members who are more outspoken, like Tom
Cotton, who was not assigned to HASC… (Interview, January 26, 2018).
In her elaboration, she essentially concluded Congressman Cotton had been too
ideologically polarizing for House leadership to assign to the traditionally even-keeled
HASC (Interview, January 26, 2018). Her sentiment was reflected in the views of
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another former staffer who assessed the strategy of HASC assignments by House
leadership: “Personnel is policy. People make a difference in the message sent by the
policy path taken” (Interview, January 29, 2018). Ultimately, it was inferred that both
parties assigned members to HASC who were unexpected to rock the ideological boat, a
characterization which bled over to those chosen to be the committee’s leaders.
A highly experienced CRS researcher, extensively published in the science of
congressional process, observed, “Those chosen to lead on the defense committees tend
to be unifiers, attractive to House leadership,” reiterating the common conclusion that,
“HASC attracts a certain kind of member” (Interview, November 3, 2017). Bolstering
his point, a seasoned Hill staffer noted,
House leadership, the steering committee, does not tend to pick controversial
figures for the Chair or Ranking Member on HASC. They like team players they
can depend on to help get the agenda passed with an occasional ‘pass’ when
required by constituent pressures to vote or act against the mainstream of the
party. Chairmen must be ‘awake’ to mind the store. They need to know the
issues well enough from an institutional and historical standpoint to avoid
political pitfalls that can derail agreements or understandings with the other side
on specific issues. [Former HASC Chairman ‘Buck’] McKeon was an
[education] policy guy but picked as HASC Chair because of those reasons.
(Interview, January 26, 2018).
Another former HASC PSM, turned CRS defense policy researcher corroborated:
“Leadership assigns Chairmen and Ranking Members that are relatively moderate and
keep members out of the partisan muck; Skelton, McKeon, and Hunter were not political
firebrands” (Interview, January 31, 2018). The assessment of another former HASC
policy staffer, who served with the committee during the 1990’s, built on the previously
inferred link between the HASC’s ideological culture and a membership rife with
military veterans: “Leadership and people make a difference. Much of the committee and
the Congress at the time [1990’s] consisted of World War II vets. Many changed from
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Democrat to Republican and vice versa” (Interview, December 22, 2017). The result was
ideological tempering of the committee’s environment by it leaders, ingrained in the
culture and replicated over time. The former policy staffer recalled an episode when his
Republican boss tried to advance an ideologically touchy legislative proposal past the
GOP Chairman, Floyd Spence (who had rejected it), by trying to take advantage of the
collegial atmosphere and appealing to the Ranking Member, Sonny Montgomery, to get
the provision pushed through. The member, still relatively new to the committee, was
unaware of how strong the friendship was between Spence and Montgomery, both World
War II veterans, and their staunch, joint dedication to keeping the committee above the
fray of such political gamesmanship. The two shut the young member down along with
his provision, “…they stuck together. The players and their backgrounds mattered, not
necessarily their parties” (Interview, December 22, 2017). Ultimately, there was relative
consensus. The keepers of defense policy formulation in the House fostered a culture on
both sides of the aisle that insulated the HASC and the issues it addressed from
ideological hijacking, a virtual stand-alone feature when compared with the
characteristics of its counterpart House committees.
People & Ideology III: Quantitative Analysis
Quantitative analysis was also conducted to examine how the ideological makeup
of the HASC membership over time related to its collegial nature as compared with other
House committees. Ideological baselines for five different House committees over three
different time periods were derived quantitatively and compared using existing historical
indices which categorized members of Congress by ideological persuasion based on past
voting behavior.
Keith T. Poole’s and Howard Rosenthal’s (2007) Dynamic Weighted NOMINAl
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Three-step Estimation (DW-NOMINATE) research was employed to build the
ideological reference points for comparative analysis. Poole and Rosenthal’s method, as
presented in their Voteview website, “allows users to view every congressional roll call
vote in American history…on a liberal-conservative ideological map including
information about the ideological positions of voting Senators and Representatives”
(University of California, Los Angeles, Department of Political Science and Social
Science Computing [UCLA] n.d.). The website further explained Poole and Rosenthal’s
methodology:
Ideological positions are calculated using the DW-NOMINATE (Dynamic
Weighted NOMINAl Three-step Estimation). This procedure was developed by
Poole and Rosenthal in the 1980s and is a "scaling procedure", representing
legislators on a spatial map. In this sense, a spatial map is much like a road map-the closeness of two legislators on the map shows how similar their voting records
are. Using this measure of distance, DW-NOMINATE is able to recover the
"dimensions" that inform congressional voting behavior.
The primary dimension through most of American history has been "liberal" vs.
"conservative" (also referred to as "left" vs. "right") (UCLA n.d.).
Given the discussion above, “Ideology Scores” derived from the DW-NOMINATE
“primary” or “first” dimension for each committee member of the committees examined
were gathered for comparison. An individual Ideology Score “estimate[s] a single ideal
point for each member of Congress based upon his/her entire record of service in
Congress” and range from -1 (most liberal) to 1 (most conservative) (UCLA n.d.). The
method therefore conveniently represents the ideological character of members of
Congress in a comparable continuum. That is, the scores reflecting the ideologies of
legislators are comparable across time, making them useful for comparisons like those
found in the case periods within this study (Bateman and Lipinski 2016, 147).
To provide a useful comparison, all the lists of the members of five different
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House committees over nine numbered Congresses were collected and matched to
individual DW-NOMINATE scores. Visual representations of the variable distributions
are provided in Appendix 4.1. Summarily, all the variables were bimodally distributed
with the exception of the Armed Services Committee and Agriculture Committees from
1961 to 1966.
Each of the three case study time periods covered a six-year span inclusive of
three, two-year numbered Congresses: 87th – 89th Congress (1961-1966); 103rd – 105th
Congress (1993-1998); 110th – 112th Congress (2007-2012). While DW-NOMINATE
scores are independent of political party, it should be noted that Democrats controlled the
House during the 87th-89th Congress, with majorities split in the other two periods
(Democrats led the 103rd, 110th and 111th Congresses and Republicans the 104th, 105th,
and 112th).
Committee assignment information was gathered from the Office of the House
Historian’s official website for the five committees, which included: 1. The Armed
Services Committee (known as the National Security Committee in the 104 th and 105th
Congresses); 2. The Agriculture Committee; 3. The Transportation and Infrastructure
Committee (known as the Public Works Committee for the 87 th-89th Congresses); 4. The
Rules Committee; and 5. The Ways and Means Committee. The membership lists of
each committee type were then aggregated within their respective time periods for
analysis. For example, the membership lists of the Armed Services Committee from the
87th, 88th, and 89th Congresses were compiled into one list (reoccurring members—those
who served consecutively on a respective committee—were counted only once). The
resulting list then represented the sample set for the Armed Services Committee for 1961
to 1966.
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The latter two committees, Rules and Ways and Means, were added to provide a
broader base for comparing the ideological character of the committees examined. More
specifically, the two committees were assumed to provide contrast based on their
institutional role (Rules) and substantive policy role (Ways and Means), historically
characterized as venues which highlight ideological divides among members, yet still
desirable for assignment because of their “prestige and influence” (Smith and Deering
1990, 86-90). The Rules Committee, for example, has been called the “Speaker’s
Committee” because its members are essentially the majority party’s gatekeepers for
legislation considered on the House floor—a task delegated by the Speaker and guided by
his agenda. Accordingly, the Ways and Means Committee has jurisdiction over the
nation’s tax code—how the federal government raises revenue—a politically divisive
issue since the nation’s earliest days (see the Boston Tea Party) perhaps best
demonstrated in the modern era by the thirty-year interim between the last two major
federal tax code overhauls (1986 and 2017). Ultimately, the membership of the Rules
and Ways and Means Committees were assumed to be more ideological divergent,
contrasting with the ideological alignment expected of members of the Armed Services,
Agriculture and Transportation Committees.
Sub-hypothesis #1 was tested first: The ideological dispositions of members of
HASC are expected to be closer aligned than that of other House Committees like
the Agriculture Committee and the Transportation and Infrastructure Committee.
The underlying rationale for the test was that if collegiality was truly greater among
members of the HASC over time, it would be reflected in the ideological alignment of
committee members, even when compared with other committees which have been
characterized as having a relatively collegial nature. Results are presented in Table 4.1,
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Committee Membership Ideology.
Committees with the smallest standard deviations in Table 4.1 were assumed to
have the most ideologically aligned memberships, as they were collectively closest to
their respective ideological mean. Based on that criteria, the Armed Services Committee
of 1961-1966 demonstrated the most ideologically aligned membership, even though it
was most dispersed. The Agriculture and Public Works (Transportation) Committees
were the next most ideologically aligned committees of that time period, roughly equal in
that regard, with standard deviations of 0.30 and 0.31, respectively. Finally, as expected,
Table 4.1 Committee Membership Ideology
Dem avg GOP avg

Unit

Obs

Mean

Std Dev

Min

Max

1961-1966 (87th - 89th Congress)
Agriculture Committee
Armed Services Committee
Public Works Committee
Rules Committee
Ways & Means

-1 to 1
-1 to 1
-1 to 1
-1 to 1
-1 to 1

57
57
59
19
38

-0.09
-0.08
-0.08
-0.06
-0.08

0.30
0.27
0.31
0.36
0.36

-0.56
-0.52
-0.50
-0.50
-0.49

0.59
0.80
0.54
0.56
0.63

-0.29
-0.26
-0.31
-0.39
-0.33

0.26
0.20
0.27
0.28
0.35

1993-1998 (103rd - 105th Congress)
Agriculture Committee
National Security Committee
Transportation & Infrastructure Committee
Rules Committee
Ways & Means

-1 to 1
-1 to 1
-1 to 1
-1 to 1
-1 to 1

79
93
116
19
56

0.09
0.02
0.03
0.06
0.03

0.38
0.37
0.35
0.42
0.42

-0.56
-0.64
-0.65
-0.55
-0.67

0.86
0.71
0.60
0.56
0.79

-0.28
-0.28
-0.31
-0.37
-0.37

0.42
0.39
0.41
0.41
0.40

2007-2012 (110th - 112th Congress)
Agriculture Committee
Armed Services Committee
Transportation & Infrastructure Committee
Rules Committee
Ways & Means

-1 to 1
-1 to 1
-1 to 1
-1 to 1
-1 to 1

85
98
110
21
51

0.11
0.06
0.07
0.02
-0.06

0.37
0.37
0.39
0.48
0.41

-0.59
-0.48
-0.65
-0.57
-0.67

0.74
0.75
0.75
0.66
0.56

-0.24
-0.28
-0.31
-0.41
-0.40

0.46
0.42
0.41
0.65
0.40

the Rules and Ways and Means Committees had the most ideologically maligned
membership of the period, each with a 0.36 standard deviation.
For the period between 1993 and 1998, members of the Transportation Committee
showed the most ideological alignment with a standard deviation of 0.35. Yet, members
of the Agriculture and National Security (Armed Services) Committees membership for
that period were not far off, with 0.38 and 0.37 standard deviations, respectively. In
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subtle contrast, the Rules and Ways and Means Committees again were demonstrated to
have the most ideologically maligned memberships of the period, each with a standard
deviation of 0.42. The Ways and Means Committee had the greatest dispersion, followed
closely by the Agriculture Committee.
Finally, for the period of 2007 to 2012, the memberships of the Armed Services
Committee and the Agriculture Committee were shown to be most ideologically aligned
of the five committees each with standard deviations of 0.37, while the Transportation
Committee, with a 0.39 standard deviation, had the next most closely aligned
membership even with the largest dispersion within the time period. Of the committees
during 2007-2012 period, the Rules Committee showed the most ideological disparity
among its members, with a standard deviation of 0.48.
While by no means definitive, one conclusion and two notable inferences could
be feasibly drawn from the results. First, sub-hypothesis #1 was only supported by the
results of the period between 1961 and 1966 and rejected for the two latter periods.
Therefore, it was rejected overall for this particular quantitative test. However, the data
did demonstrate relatively close ideological member alignment within and among the
three primary subject committees of this study: HASC, Agriculture, and Transportation.
The shared nature of the three committees in that regard provides justification for
their broader comparison in this study overall, as relative peers of ideological
character within the House, a baseline that places the three committees on relatively
equal footing for a more balanced comparative evaluation. Finally, because the
ideological characters of the Rules and Ways and Means Committee memberships were
clearly more maligned over time compared with the three other committees, the
underlying premise of sub-hypothesis #1 was arguably supported. In other words, it
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could be inferred that closer ideological alignment within a committee is reflected in how
a committee’s subject jurisdiction is perceived to be approached, politically. That is,
while further research is in order, defense (or agriculture or transportation) policy
formulation is probably more collaborative than the work done by policymakers on tax
policy; an idea further bolstered by the fact that the Ways and Means Committee and
Rules Committees are traditionally assigned a much greater ratio of majority to minority
members to “assure party control of committee decisions” (Smith and Deering 1990, 63).
Using the same data-set, sub-hypothesis #2 was tested next: HASC Chairmen
and Ranking Members are expected to be more ideologically aligned with their
fellow committee members as compared with the leadership of other House
Committees, like the Agriculture Committee or Transportation Committee. The
underlying rationale for the test was that if the policy formulation process of a committee
is perceived to be more collegial than others, it might be explained, in part, by closer
ideological ties between the committee leadership and its rank-and-file members. In
other words, if committee leaders view certain policy issues through a political lens
relatively similar to their committee colleagues, it might be easier for all of them to
collaborate on those issues, especially if the leaders pursue a policy agenda
complementary to the general ideological sway of the committee members. Results are
presented in Table 4.2, Committee Leadership Ideology, below.
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Table 4.2 Commmittee Leadership Ideology
Committee
Mean Score

Leaders
Mean Score

Cmte v. Leaders
Difference

Overall Leader Scores
Min
Max
Difference

1961-1966 (87th - 89th Congress)
Agriculture Committee
Armed Services Committee
Public Works Committee
Rules Committee
Ways & Means

-0.09
-0.08
-0.08
-0.06
-0.08

0.06
0.05
-0.09
0.21
0.10

0.15
0.12
0.01
0.27
0.18

-0.19
-0.21
-0.49
0.04
-0.24

0.32
0.30
0.22
0.38
0.33

0.51
0.51
0.71
0.34
0.57

1993-1998 (103rd - 105th Congress)
Agriculture Committee
National Security Committee
Transportation & Infrastructure Committee
Rules Committee
Ways & Means

0.09
0.02
0.03
0.06
0.03

0.12
-0.08
-0.06
0.04
0.08

0.03
0.10
0.09
0.02
0.05

-0.26
-0.64
-0.55
-0.42
-0.51

0.42
0.32
0.42
0.49
0.50

0.66
0.97
0.97
0.91
1.01

2007-2012 (110th - 112th Congress)
Agriculture Committee
Armed Services Committee
Transportation & Infrastructure Committee
Rules Committee
Ways & Means

0.11
0.06
0.07
0.02
-0.06

0.13
0.11
-0.01
0.01
-0.02

0.02
0.05
0.08
0.01
0.04

-0.15
-0.28
-0.55
-0.47
-0.51

0.50
0.40
0.45
0.48
0.39

0.65
0.68
1.00
0.95
0.90

The mean ideological scores of committee chairmen and ranking members were
calculated and compared with the mean ideological scores of the overall committee
memberships for each of the time periods examined. Presumably, the smallest difference
between the means for each time period (“Cmte v. Leaders” column in Table 4.2)
indicates which committee should expect to enjoy the most collegial interaction in
formulating policy, and thereby help explain why the discourse on defense policy by the
Armed Services Committee, for example, is perceived as characteristically more collegial
than similar discourse on other committees.
With the above criteria employed, results indicated that the leadership of the
Public Works (Transportation) Committee was aligned most closely, on average, with its
rank-and-file members for the 1961-1966 period. Interestingly, that committee’s
leadership also had the largest ideological score difference (0.71) between the leaders of
that period. The Armed Services Committee garnered the next closest ideological
alignment between the leadership and the overall committee membership, but it was
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noticeably distant (0.12) from the Public Works Committee and closer to Agriculture
(0.15) and the Ways and Means Committees (0.18). The Rules Committee appeared to
have the most ideological distance between its leaders and rank-and-file members (0.27),
much more distant than others of the same time period.
In contrast, the Rules Committee demonstrated the smallest difference in ideology
(0.02) between committee leaders and members for the period 1993-1998. The
Agriculture Committee (0.03) and the Ways and Means Committee (0.05) were the next
closest aligned for the period, while the Armed Services Committee leadership indicated
the farthest distance (0.10) in ideology between the overall membership and its leaders.
For the 2007-2012 time period, the results again indicated the Rules Committee
leadership was most aligned (0.01) with its overall membership, while the Agriculture
Committee was again the next closest with a difference of only 0.02. The Armed
Services Committee shared the middle ground (0.05) with the Ways and Means
Committee (0.04), while the Transportation Committee demonstrated the most
ideological difference between its leaders and the overall membership for the period.
Given the data presented in Table 4.2 and the analytical criteria outlined above,
sub-hypothesis #2 was rejected. While not wholly conclusive, the data as analyzed did
not support the notion that the leaders and overall membership of the Armed Services
Committee were more ideologically aligned than other committees. Therefore, in this
case, based on the results, the perception that collegiality is more prolific on the Armed
Service Committee could not necessarily be explained by demonstrated ideological
alignment of committee leaders and overall committee membership.
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People & Ideology: Concluding Observation
The relatively narrow quantitative analysis presented in this section rendered
justification for a comparative baseline between the House Armed Services, Agriculture,
and Transportation Committees, essentially marking them as relative ideological peers.
In turn, that justification provided a more balanced evaluation platform used throughout
this study. However, the quantitative analysis did not necessarily support the premise
that ideological alignment among committee members charged with formulating defense
policy could explain why that process has been characterized as more collegial compared
with others over time. Conversely, there is a notable literature, complemented by a
variety of personal accounts of well-experienced members of the policy community, that
supports the notion that ideology is a factor in how policymakers approach defense policy
formulation, and that their approach tends to be uniquely collaborative when compared
with how policymakers approach other issues. Therefore, to help reconcile the disparity,
the discussion and analysis in this section should be considered in conjunction with other
potential explanations, as provided in this study, as to why defense policy formulation is
often perceived as more collegial than other policy issue areas.
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Appendix 4.1 – Graphs: House Committee Ideological Distributions
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Chapter 5 - Domestic Influences: Case Studies
To paint a complete picture of the factors weighing on the perceived collegial
nature of defense policy formulation over time—the crux of this study—it was essential
to account for the influences from the domestic political environment. It was assumed
certain pressures on the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) would be
distinguishable from the Farm Bill and Highway Bill by virtue of the unique collegial
approach defense deliberations evoke in policymakers. That assertion aligned analysis in
this chapter with the overall hypothesis of this dissertation: The formulation of defense
policy in the U.S. House of Representatives is approached with more collegiality
than other policy issue areas, mainly due to domestic, institutional, and
international political pressures that transcend competing partisan motivations.
Ultimately, this chapter aims to reveal: 1. domestic political influences driving member
expectations and decisions on how to political approach the NDAA process; 2. if member
motivation to support the NDAA could be explained other than by principles of
distributive politics; and, 3. if defense policy deliberations were notably different than
other policy areas, like agriculture (Ag) or the transportation policy.
To maintain consistency across the study, the NDAA process in the House, led by
the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), was used as the primary vehicle to
examine domestic political influences on the collegiality of defense policy formulation.
It was compared with similar processes within the House Ag Committee and
Transportation and Infrastructure Committee to delineate what (and how) domestic
political influences were weighed by policymakers in decisions to collaborate across the
aisle on the Farm Bill and Highway Bill, respectively. Given significant domestic
political influences exerted on the NDAA, the Farm Bill, and the Highway Bill have
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frequently been explained via the lens of distributive political theory, the discussion and
analysis began there. Following was the rationale which drove the derivation of the subhypothesis which helped guide the rest of the chapter: Certain domestic political
pressures are unique to defense policy formulation in Congress and render it more
collegial than other policy issue areas. The sub-hypothesis was then tested via a series
of case studies which compared deliberations over the Farm Bill, the Highway Bill, and
NDAA from 1961 to 1966, 1993 to 1998, and 2007 to 2012, in order to highlight
domestic political influences that could be identified as factor in setting cooperation
defense policy apart from the other two areas considered. It was apparent aspects of the
domestic political environment from each period weighed on each of the bills and the
matters that drove their central debates. Those matters were often overtaken by the
influence of distributive politics with the exception of the NDAA of 1962, and 2011.
Though, as expected, distributive politics appeared to rule how members politically
approached bill deliberations, primarily motivated by opportunities to gain political
capital or favor for their district than to realize sincerely substantive policy goals.
Distributive Politics in Context
Members of Congress are highly focused on influencing legislation and policy
that affect the well-being, (economic or otherwise) of their constituents, to include
initiatives that impact jobs, private industry, and government benefits, among others.
That focus is manifested in part by members maneuvering to secure federal dollars (pork)
and policies beneficial to their constituencies in an effort to build political capital,
essentially trust or favor built up with colleagues or constituents to be leveraged in future
political efforts. Such behavior by policymakers is often categorized as “distributive
politics” by social scientists. Representative examples of distributive political behavior
150

may be found then in deliberations over provisions of the Farm Bill, the Highway Bill,
and the NDAA, as provisions of those bills authorize the appropriation of billions of
federal tax dollars to fund programs, projects, and benefits at the local level, where
constituents work, live, play, and—perhaps most important to policymakers—vote.
Accordingly, the divvying up of the federal budget to fund provisions of
legislation like the Farm Bill, the Highway Bill, and the NDAA garner close attention by
members of Congress. For most members, it is arguably the central focus of their duties
on Capitol Hill, a direct correlation to their perceived performance as representatives of
the electorate who sent them to Washington. Assuring the well-being of the electorate is
then a predominate factor in making decisions on policy, as failure to take care of the
district has consequences in elections. The case of former Congressman and House
Majority Leader, Eric Cantor (R-VA), provides an example in point. Wasserman (2014)
recalled Cantor, a rising GOP star presumably destined to be House Speaker, was
shocked by losing an election blamed in part by the Congressman being disconnected
from his constituents. Wasserman (2014) observed, “Voters don’t like to be taken for
granted, and they need a little attention every now and then to know that their leaders,
however powerful or high on the congressional leadership ladder, still ‘care about them.’
By nearly all accounts, Cantor blew the layup.” The dynamics of distributive politics
then, was the basis for initially identifying domestic political pressures that weigh on
policy deliberations.
Recalling the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, scholars have often framed
deliberations over defense policy in Congress through the lens of distributive politics.
Colleen Shogan (2011, 6), for example, concluded that the only truly exhaustive
examination of how Congress produces defense policy was found in the literature of
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distributive politics. Distributive aspects of the domestic political influences weighing on
defense policy formulation have been described in a variety of ways, concepts further
leveraged in this chapter. Mayhew (1974, 88) for example, pegged “universalism,” as a
more nuanced version of distributive politics, a scenario in which essentially all members
of Congress benefit from legislation or a policy regardless of rank or party. Along those
lines, national security is a public good of universal benefit enabled by the NDAA and
could help explain why bipartisan cooperation thrives in defense policy formulation.
However, the interest of individual House members in the NDAA is not solely motivated
by the security it provides, but in how security is enabled in the bill’s provisions.
Scholars portend members are primarily interested in legislation like the NDAA
(and the Farm Bill and Highway Bill) because of the political benefits the bill affords
them. Authorizing legislation like the NDAA allows members to build political capital
with constituents because these authorizations fund jobs, services, infrastructure, and
other benefits in members’ districts. Logrolling then, the swapping of political favors, is
an immediately recognizable symptom of universalism in the NDAA process, as virtually
all the players conceivably have some “skin in the game” and therefore an underlying
incentive to negotiate to find middle ground and get the bill passed each year. Rundquist
and Carsey (2002, 40) asserted the reward for those incentives can be strong enough to
transcend committee and party loyalties and even trigger the swap of political favors in
other policy areas, thereby influencing the dynamics of other committee proceedings or
even floor action on a bill.
Consequently, the primary methods of discovery leading to the discussions in this
chapter were largely based on the hypothesis that unity among policymakers during
defense policy deliberations can be explained by the principles of distributive politics. In
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other words, if observations by Shogan and like-minded colleagues hold, exceptionally
collegial behavior witnessed among members of Congress deliberating on the NDAA
each year could be attributed to the expectations members had to gain politically from the
process.
Methodology
In light of the primary hypothesis and the discussion above regarding the
principles of distributive political theory and existing scholarship, factors were sought
within the domestic political environment that distinguished defense policy formulation
from that of agriculture or transportation policy. Once identified, it was assumed those
factors could ultimately help explain why defense policy deliberations have been
routinely recognized as more collegial in Congress over time. Accordingly, the Farm
Bill, the Highway Bill, and the NDAA were assumed to be supported by members of
Congress for their transactional value first, and secondarily for achieving a policy agenda.
In other words, I hypothesized that a Representative’s fundamental interests in the
legislation was driven by the political capital expected to be gained from the provisions
of each respective bill and how those provisions might benefit a member’s constituency.
The question was then how to reveal other factors (distributive, or not) that
distinguished the NDAA from the other two bills and which conceivably evoke more
collaboration among policymakers. To evaluate those factors, I developed the following
sub-hypothesis: Certain domestic political pressures are unique to defense policy
formulation in Congress and render it more collegial than other policy issue areas.
The sub-hypothesis was tested via a series of case studies which compared deliberations
over the Farm Bill, the Highway Bill, and NDAA from 1961 to 1966, 1993 to 1998, and
2007 to 2012, a function of the rough comparative baseline established for those time
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periods in the previous chapter.
The primary aim of each case study time period was to identify “certain
domestic political pressures” that distinguished NDAA deliberations from that of the
Farm Bill and Highway Bill and, in doing so, indicate possible causes of the collegiality
uniquely attributed to defense policy formulation in Congress. Essentially, bills with a
substance-based central debate topic (as opposed to ideologically-based or one dependent
on distributive politics) and which garnered at least two-thirds of the final House vote
were categorized as subject to “certain domestic political pressures,” explained further
in ensuing paragraphs. To identify those certain domestic political pressures, the primary
issue that fueled debate in each of the three bills for each of the three time periods was
isolated using historical accounts from the congressional record, media, and interviews.
It was expected, based on the discussion outlined earlier, that issues central to the primary
debate on the bills would be best explained by distributive political theory. That is, bill
debate was expected to mainly stem from how the resources authorized in the bill would
be divvied up—who should expect to get what, translated to political capital gained by
individual members. If the central debate was subjectively assessed as not primarily
based on distributive politics, it was categorized as either ideologically based or
substance based. If the central issue of debate on the bill was focused on a
conventionally partisan issue and the final floor vote tally was essentially down party
lines, it was categorized as ideological. If the central debate of the bill was determined to
be focused on a substantive subject matter (an issue whose value is estimated to transcend
mere potential distributive reward) with a notable mix of support in the floor vote tally
from Democrats and Republicans it was subjectively assessed to be substance based.
Bills with a substance based central debate topic and which garnered at least two-thirds of
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the final House vote were categorized as subject to “certain domestic political pressures,”
per the sub-hypothesis, and therefore more prone to collegial cooperation than the others.
That is, because supermajority (two-thirds of the chamber) support of those bills was not
shown to be based on ideology or distributive politics, it was assumed other elements or
“pressures” brought members together to support it so strongly, and therefore made it
more prone collaboration among members of Congress. It was expected the NDAA case
subjects for each of the time periods examined would predominantly fall into this final
category, more prone to collegial collaboration based on the anecdotal history of defense
policy formulation in Congress. A summary of the subjective bill assessment criteria is
found in Table 5.1.
Table 5.1 Summary Bill Assessment Criteria
Was the bill's central debate primarily focused on:
1. Distributive political motives? YES / NO?
2. If #1 is "NO," then ideology? YES / NO?
3. If #2 is "NO," then a substantive policy issue? YES / NO?
4. If #3 was "YES," did bill garner ≥ 2/3 vote? YES / NO?
5. If #4 is "YES," than bill considered more collegial.
The Sixties: 1961-1966
The period between 1961 and 1966, was an especially tumultuous time for the
United States in domestic politics. Nonetheless, Congress passed landmark legislation
like the Food Stamp Act and the Civil Rights Act, funded mass transit for the first time,
and established the Peace Corps and the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) during that period (U.S. House of Representatives [House]
2018b). America’s involvement in Vietnam was in its initial stages and the failed
invasion at the Bay of Pigs in Cuba challenged President John F. Kennedy’s early in his
administration. Despite the domestic tumult, the young president inspired optimism
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during his short tenure. Especially noteworthy was his “Special Message to Congress on
Urgent National Needs,” delivered on May 25, 1961, in which he called on the country to
place a man on the moon despite the darkest shadows of the Cold War looming (NASA
2004).
This decision demands a major national commitment of scientific and technical
manpower, materiel and facilities, and the possibility of their diversion from other
important activities where they are already thinly spread. It means a degree of
dedication, organization and discipline which have not always characterized our
research and development efforts. It means we cannot afford undue work
stoppages, inflated costs of material or talent, wasteful interagency rivalries, or a
high turnover of key personnel.
JFK’s words illuminate domestic political focus points of the time—security, responsible
government spending and operation, pursuit of innovation and prosperity for the good for
the nation—themes also reflected in deliberations over the Highway Bill, the Farm Bill,
and the NDAA of 1962. Congress considered those bills during the 87 th Congress (1961
to 1963), wherein the House had 437 Representatives, which included 264 Democrats
and 173 Republicans (as of election day) (House 2018b).
Federalism: The Highway Bill of 1962
H.R. 12135, the Highway Bill considered by the House in 1962, was arguably the
clearest case (of the three bills examined in this period) of domestic distributive politics
at work in the legislative process. Every state in the union benefitted from the federal
dollars disbursed across the country to build the national interstate and defense highway
system, providing an incentive for universal support by members of Congress to
authorize funding in H.R. 12135 (CQ 1965, 736). Unity was solidified by the likes of
testimony delivered by M. Clare Miller, president of the Associated General Contractors
of America, who estimated legislation similar to H.R. 12135 would create jobs for
192,000 men (CQ 1962, 450). Others who testified also foresaw notable economic
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growth resulting from the proposed legislation, states expected to benefit from provisions
that directed the federal government to cooperate in long-term comprehensive highway
and transportation plans aligned with overall metropolitan area (>50,000 people)
development (CQ 1962, 451). Despite the relatively universal appeal of its over $2.3
billion in authorizations, the bill did attract some controversy based on one of the most
enduring debates of the republic.
The main debate in deliberations over H.R. 12135 was product of the federal
system—the core of the argument a fundamental disagreement over the power of the
respective states versus that of the federal government. Success of the interstate highway
system depended upon the displacement of thousands of American families and
businesses. Rex M. Whitton, the federal highway administrator with the Commerce
Department, testified on April 17, 1962, that approximately 15,000 families and 1,500
businesses would have to move annually for the next six to eight years to ensure the
government’s aggressive construction plan stayed on track at a cost of approximately $50
million for compensation to those individuals (CQ 1962, 450). Given the possible
political consequences, there was minimal debate over whether the financial burdens and
hardships placed on citizens forced to move because of where the highways were built
should be compensated. The controversy arose instead in the means by which H.R.
12135 proposed to dispense that compensation from the federal government to the states
and onto displaced citizens.
Proposed language for the Highway Bill as drafted by the administration included
a provision that directed the Secretary of Commerce to “require state highway
departments to aid those displaced by acquisition or clearance of rights-of-way for federal
aid highways,” and would authorize federal relocation aid of up to $200 for families and
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$3,000 for businesses displaced by the highway construction (CQ 1962, 450). The bill
reported from the Public Works Committee retained the relocation assistance clause and
directed the Commerce Secretary to require “‘satisfactory assurance’ from a state
highway department that a ‘feasible’ method” was in place to aid those displaced by the
construction before projects were authorized to begin (CQ 1962, 450). Thirteen GOP
members of the committee expressed opposition to the relocation assistance provision,
claiming it gave unchecked power to the Secretary over states to set requirements for the
relocation of people displaced by the construction (CQ 1962, 451). Opposition to the
provision spilled over to the floor debate and quickly became the central point of
contention, primarily down party lines. Some Republicans claimed the provision would
make the Commerce Secretary a “dictator over local and state governments,” “put
highway departments in the housing business,” and would allow those displaced to stop
virtually any project by claiming alternative housing was unavailable (CQ 1962, 451).
An amendment offered by John F. Baldwin (R-CA) provided a remedy by allowing states
to retain discretion on methods of relocation, the proposal characterized by Congressman
Ed Edmonson (D-OK), as “a vote of no confidence” in the Commerce Secretary and
federal highway administrator (CQ 1962, 451). Nonetheless, the amendment passed by a
roll call vote of 236-159, and the bill passed by voice vote, as amended, on July 18 (CQ
1962, 451). Of the “yea” votes, 77 came from mostly Southern Democrats, who joined
the entire Republican Caucus to pass the amendment (University of California, Los
Angeles, Department of Political Science and Social Science Computing [UCLA] n.d.).
Based on the fact H.R. 12135 authorized over $2.3 billion dispersed across all
fifty states (or, virtually all House districts), would fund many jobs, and potentially spur
an unknown amount of economic growth for decades to come, it easily fell under the
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auspices of distributive politics, and in particular, universalism. While the central debate
over the Baldwin amendment was essentially ideological in nature and unsurprisingly
brought the conservative Southern Democratic voting block to join with Republicans to
pass it, the roll call was by no means close to a party line vote. Furthermore, the
amended bill passed by voice vote, signaling the relocation issue was not important
enough from an ideological standpoint to contest by the rest of the Democratic Caucus
thereby provided implicit approval. Given the debate over the Baldwin amendment was
essentially marginalized in the shadow of the distributive politics at play, the Highway
Bill of 1962 did not subjectively meet the criteria that would render it especially prone to
collegial consideration by members of Congress.
Feed Grain Controls: The Farm Bill of 1962
The central debate of deliberations over H.R. 12391, the Food and Agriculture
Act (Farm Bill) of 1962, focused on the Kennedy Administration’s proposal to impart
“permanent, mandatory production controls on feed grains” (CQ 1962, 94). Peripheral to
the central debate were deliberations on a “permanent, mandatory production control
program for dairy products” (not adopted); a permanent two-price system which would
establish higher federal supports for wheat marketed for export or domestic human
consumption than for wheat grown for animal feed; and, authorities to provide federal aid
to farmers who voluntarily transitioned cropland from production to use for other means
of revenue (recreation, etc.), the latter two adopted in the final bill (CQ 1962, 94).
The “most stringent” controls “in history” proposed by the Kennedy
Administration on the “three major surplus commodity groups—feed grains, wheat and
dairy products”—sidelined the first version of the bill despite the administration
assurances that surplus controls would limit supply enough to keep prices (and thus
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farmers’ income) stable, and thereby undermine the need for heavy federal price supports
(CQ 1962, 94). A variety of interest groups weighed-in on wheat and feed grain
provisions as well as on dairy and other proposals with nuanced support and opposition
depending on the provision, making the bill a clear vehicle of distributive politics (CQ
1962, 108-110). The initial version of the bill, H.R. 11222, was reported to the full
House by the Ag Committee on May 16, 1962 and sent back on June 21, effectively
killing it, with a vote by the full House of 215-205 (CQ 1962, 94). Opposition to H.R.
11222 was led by the American Farm Bureau Federation which leveraged a combination
of ideological disdain for federal controls (primarily production controls on wheat and
feed grains) with “regional economic rivalries” to entice almost all Republicans to vote
against it along with a few Southern and Northern Democrats (CQ 1962, 96).
A new bill was introduced, H.R. 12391, almost identical to the original, but
provisions that mandated production controls for feed grains were replaced with the
extension of a temporary program already in place that provided federal compensation for
farmers who voluntarily took feed grain acreage out of production (CQ 1962, 96). The
only other change dropped the floor of corn price-supports from 65 to 50 percent of
parity, a move that threatened farmers for the 1964 season unless Midwest “Corn Belt”
Republicans accepted production controls in the 1963 session in exchange for raising the
floor above 50 percent (CQ 1962, 97). The removal of the feed grain mandates was
enough to get more Southern Democrats onboard with the new bill, and the conference
report ultimately gathered enough support (despite only two Republicans voting for it) to
secure passage in the House by a narrow vote of 202-197 (CQ 1962, 96).
Summarily, deliberations over the Farm Bill in the House in 1962 were not an
especially collegial affair based on the central debate over feed grain production controls.
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While overall deliberations were certainly characterized by distributive politics, most
notably in how price supports and other aid would be doled out to farmers and other
beneficiaries, one would be hard-pressed to categorize the legislation as an example of
universalism as defined earlier in this chapter. The bill did not garner a significant
backing (greater than two-thirds) by the House and its provisions pitted Democrats
against themselves within Congress and against the Democratic administration while
Republican support was all but absent for the final bill with the exceptions driven by
distributive political pressures. While ideology was an influencing factor, regionalism, as
a product of distributive politics played a more influential role in the central debate, both
ultimately focused by the substantive issue of feed grain production controls. In
conclusion, the Farm Bill of 1962 did not subjectively meet the criteria that would render
it especially prone to collegial consideration by members of Congress.
Bombers or Missiles: The NDAA of 1962
In 1962, the central debate over H.R. 9751, the bill that essentially served as the
NDAA for fiscal year 1963, revolved around funding for the RS-70 manned bomber
(Congressional Quarterly [CQ] 1962, 416). The crux of the debate was not focused
internally to Congress. Rather, it represented a struggle between the power of the
executive versus the legislative branches of government and their respective
constitutional roles in preserving national security. The debate centered on whether to
employ strategic missiles or manned bombers to deter Soviet aggression. Missiles were
favored by the Kennedy administration (and Eisenhower’s before it) primarily because of
their low cost, a prime domestic political concern, while the Air Force (which employed
both weapons) and Congress preferred the manned bomber because of its reliability,
versatility, and proven record in combat (CQ 1962, 417).
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In the bill, Congress authorized $491 million above the $171 million requested by
the administration for the accelerated development of a “reconnaissance” and “strike”
version (designated the RS-70) of the controversial high-speed, high altitude, B-70
bomber (CQ 1962, 416). The administration had only planned to buy three experimental
aircraft despite the wishes of Congress and the Air Force for full production (CQ 1962,
416). Perhaps playing on the fears of the American people and their elected
representatives, Air Force Chief of Staff, General Curtis E. LeMay, argued the plane’s
full employment could make the difference between “winning or losing” in a conflict
with the Soviets (CQ 1962, 417). The missiles versus bombers debate also carried over
to the $525 million the bill authorized to purchase additional B-52 bombers, funding also
not requested by the administration (CQ 1962, 416). While its plausible distributive
politics were at play—committee members advocating for extra funds to support bomber
factory jobs in their districts—General LeMay’s large and hawkish personality, known
well in political circles, enjoyed considerable sway and professional respect in Congress
on the issue, especially considering his background as commander of Strategic Air
Command which oversaw both the U.S. missile and bomber fleets. Additionally, in 1961
both the Senate Appropriations Committee and House Armed Services Committees
(HASC) “made strong statements in favor of continuing the B-70 as a weapons system”
(CQ 1962, 417). The HASC referenced two committee reports, from 1961 and 1962,
which assessed bombers were “the one strategic weapon which has been tried and which
works,” and concluded bombers were preferable to missiles for two primary reasons:
versatility and reliability (CQ 1962, 417). Further minimizing the role of distributive
politics, the $514.5 million eventually appropriated for the B-52s was never actually
spent (not a small sum to be ignored by members actively seeking distributive gains) and
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production shut down due to the anticipation of the bombers’ replacement by missiles
(CQ 1962, 416). (Ironically, the B-52 still remains the backbone of the U.S. bomber fleet
today, deep into the twenty-first century.)
During bill deliberations, it eventually became clear that the funds authorized to
develop the RS-70 would not be used by the administration, the issue only to be “studied”
instead (CQ 1962, 416). As a result, a report outlining the case for manned bombers by
the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), cited “Executive disregard of
Congressional will” as justification to insert bill language that “directed” the authorized
funds be spent on the program by the Secretary of the Air Force (CQ 1962, 417). The
report argued Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution placed the power to “raise and
support armies” and govern their use with Congress and not the president (CQ 1962,
418). Consequently, citing duties outlined in Article II, Sections 2 and 3 of the
Constitution, President Kennedy sent a letter to HASC Chairman, Carl Vinson (D-GA),
requesting he change the language from the “directed” to “authorized” use of funds, in
recognition of the “spirit of comity” between the branches (CQ 1962, 418). A sincere
debate over constitutional responsibilities ensued, but Vinson earned the praise of his
colleagues when he claimed the will of Congress had been heard in the drama and
relented by offering an amendment, passed by voice, which removed the language (CQ
1962, 419)
Summarily, the central debate regarding the H.R. 9751’s passage was based on
substantive issues. Were missiles or bombers best to preserve national security and who
ultimately had the constitutional authority—the executive or legislative branch—to make
the decision? It is plausible distributive political pressures were at play, as certain
members of Congress would benefit from constituent jobs created from the manufacture
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and/or deployment of either system in their districts. However, the priority to protect the
country and maintain comity between the branches outweighed any glaring distributive
political pressures. This was perhaps best delineated in the HASC report which boldly
stated, “it seems that our only knowledge of the actual workability of an ICBM
[intercontinental ballistic missile] fired in anger is in textbooks and laboratories. The
Committee is unwilling to place the safety of this country in a purely academic attitude,
and for this reason has added to the authorization for bombers” (CQ 1962, 417). Adding
to the veracity of their conclusion, the HASC report somewhat conceded to the
administration’s contention that an overreliance on bombers came with notable
vulnerabilities then used that rationale to justify funding efforts to improve bomber
technology while also ensuring their survivability as a weapons system in the B-52 in the
interim (CQ 1962, 417). The impact of ideology as a primary factor of domestic political
influence was overridden too, as Democratic and Republican administrations both
clashed with the Democrat-controlled Congress over the missile versus bombers
question, not to mention a Democratic president faced off with a Democratic House on a
serious question of constitutional authority. Ultimately, the bill passed with greater than
two-thirds majority, 404-0, final roll-call vote on March 21, 1962 (CQ 1962, 416). Given
the fact that the final vote count captured more than two-thirds of the House chamber and
the central debate over H.R. 9750 was primarily focused on genuinely substantive issues,
the bill could be subjectively considered as especially prone to collegial consideration by
members of Congress.
The Nineties: 1993-1998
The domestic political environment in the United States between 1993 and 1998
was framed by the election and impeachment of President William “Bill” Jefferson
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Clinton and growing political polarization. The young Democrat and former governor of
Arkansas beat incumbent Republican George H.W. Bush in what symbolized a
generational transition of power from the “Greatest Generation” to the “Baby Boomers.”
Not to be outdone, Newt Gingrich and his fellow Republicans, campaigning with their
“Contract with America” agenda, swept the midterm elections in 1994, and took control
of both the House and Senate for the first time in 40 years (House 2018c). Clashes
between the White House and the Congress ensued and resulted in two government
shutdowns, the product of gridlock on federal budget deliberation which followed
Clinton’s successful veto of GOP spending and tax cuts (House 2018c).
Despite partisan challenges between the White House and Congress, several
significant domestic policy successes marked the era, to include overhaul of the nation’s
welfare system and substantial changes made to long-standing farm laws virtually
untouched since the end of the Great Depression (House 2018c). While healthcare
reform pressed by the administration flopped, domestic political influences were driven
by the dot-com boom that fueled a healthy economy and the nation enjoyed a rare federal
budget surplus. That surplus was partially enabled by the “peace dividend,” a series of
dramatic cuts to defense spending, the arguable result of Americans feeling safer in a
world without a peer competitor in the Soviet Union. It also set the stage to provide a
better understanding for the political dynamics of defense policy formulation at a unique
time of relative peace and prosperity and despite a split government. The period ended
with the impeachment of President Clinton in 1998, which drove the tenor of much of the
domestic political debate until he left office. Mindful of the historical context,
deliberations over the Highway Bill of 1998 and the Farm Bill of 1996 were compared
with deliberations over the 1997 NDAA to elucidate factors revealing whether defense
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policy formulation is truly more collegial than what its counterpart issue areas enjoy.
The Highway Bill of 1998
Much like the Highway Bill of 1962, deliberations over the Transportation Equity
Act for the 21st Century (H.R.2400), considered by Congress in 1998, were manifestly
characterized by distributive politics notably influenced by the domestic political climate.
Part of that climate included House Transportation Committee Chairman, Bud Shuster
(R-PA), getting the bill past deficit hawks who torpedoed his proposal the year prior to
increase transportation funding by cutting other discretionary programs by a 214-216
vote (Congressional Quarterly [CQ] Staff 1998a). The central debate on H.R. 2400 was
instigated by another Republican, Lindsey Graham of South Carolina. Graham, elected
with the GOP wave of 1994, saw Shuster’s bill as representative of the clash between
“old-fashioned ‘pork barrel’ politics” and the fiscal restraint promised to the American
people by the “Contract with America” (CQ Staff 1998b). As such, Graham offered an
amendment to the $219 billion bill that would have stripped the $9 billion in member
earmark requests to fund transportation projects throughout the country (CQ Staff
1998b).
Perhaps anticipating the battle based on the defeat of the previous year, Shuster
leveraged projections of a likely budget surplus to fund the bill and offered new jobs and
economic growth as the payoff (CQ Staff 1998b). To make the bill even more enticing,
in a blatant example of universalism, the chairman offered all members an opportunity to
earmark $15 million each for their own project requests, an offer “tacitly supported by
House leaders who hoped projects would help win elections” (CQ Staff 1998b). Further
sweetening Shuster’s offer was his assertion that H.R.2400 would create 6.6 million new
jobs across the nation (Tully 1998). The response by his colleagues was dramatic,
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demonstrated by the 1,850+ earmarked projects worth over $20.5 billion incorporated in
the final version of the bill (Tully 1998). Ironically, as pointed out by Shuster, even
Graham had requested funding for projects in his district, though he later withdrew his
request (CQ Staff 1998b).
In the end, Shuster’s enticement campaign worked and Graham’s amendment was
defeated handily, by a bipartisan vote of 79-337 (CQ Staff 1998b). The House approved
H.R. 2400 on April 1 by 337-80 and the conference report on May 22 by 297-86, the
latter of which included a provision pressed by Shuster which mandated all federal gas
tax revenues be spent on transportation (CQ Staff 1998a). While also critical of the cost
and concept of all the earmarked projects, President Clinton reasoned the bill did “a lot
more good than harm” and signed it into law (P.L. 105-178) on June 9, 1998 (CQ Staff
1998a).
Based on the assessment criteria presented earlier in the chapter, the Highway Bill
of 1998 was clearly an example of distributive politics at work. Even the principles of
the Graham Amendment, based on the “Contract with America” and which highlighted
the GOP agenda, did not garner enough Republican unity to render a party-line vote and
quantify the effort as an ideological imperative. It also did not help that Graham made
earmark requests for his district in contravention to the premise of his own amendment
and that the Democratic White House, while critical of all the earmarks in the bill, did not
threaten to veto it. Ultimately, given the situation, one could justifiably conclude that the
Highway Bill of 1998 was not especially prone to unique collegial consideration by
members of Congress, rather simply a matter of divvying up public resources.
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Move to Free Markets: 1996 Farm Bill
In 1995, a proposal to adjust expiring farm laws, aligned with the goal of the
GOP-controlled Congress to balance the budget, backfired when it was incorporated into
a budget-reconciliation bill vetoed by President Clinton for proposed changes to
Medicare and Medicaid entitlements, among other reasons (CQ 1996, 3-17). With only
four months remaining to implement a remedy or revert back to the 1949 farm act,
“which would triple government loan rates for some commodities and create upheaval in
the commodity markets,” policymakers were spurred into action, also motivated by an
impending economic crisis driven by severe drought on the Great Plains which resulted
in low production and thus rapidly rising commodity prices (CQ 1996, 3-17).
Commodity market prices were too high for the government to issue subsidies, but
farmers needed the subsidies based on low crop yields and even faced repayment on
advance subsidies based on lower than expected forecast commodity prices (CQ 1996, 317). It was a recipe for financial ruin for some farmers, including constituents of House
Agriculture Committee Chairman, Pat Roberts (R-OK) (CQ 1996, 3-17). Additional
economic and political pressures came from farmers not knowing what kind of seed and
fertilizer to buy for the spring and potential commodity market turmoil if farm programs
were not reauthorized before the winter wheat harvest (CQ1996, 3-17). While significant
policy adjustments were considered unlikely during the election year (1996), the looming
crisis provided domestic political space to for Roberts to introduce comprehensive farm
law reform in his “Freedom to Farm” legislation (CQ 1996, 3-17).
The bill Chairman Roberts introduced, H.R. 2854, was fundamentally market
focused, aimed at farmers producing based on demand and free of government supply
controls—subsidies previously based on low market prices were traded for fixed,
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declining federal payments irrespective of market prices (CQ 1996, 3-15). The
legislation also lifted requirements for farmers to plant the same commodities each year,
did not subsidize for idled land, and allowed for crop rotations responsive to prevailing
market demands and weather conditions (CQ 1996, 3-15). While the American Farm
Bureau Federation supported H.R. 2854 because of the high subsidies proposed for the
first two years of the bill’s enactment, alternatives from either side of the aisle challenged
the bill and targeted various farm programs along the way (CQ 1996, 3-17). Major
debates were primarily partisan or regionally-based, with Democrats focused on
preserving a subsidy-based social safety net (especially for smaller farms), while a
bipartisan group representing peanut and sugar growers from the south collaborated to
counter consumer groups and manufacturers threatening price supports for the two
commodities by way of a “coalition of free-market conservatives and urban liberals” (CQ
1996, 3-16). The southern coalition narrowly prevailed on behalf of both commodities
and the bill passed on February 29, by a vote of 270-155 (CQ, 1996, 3-16).
On the surface, the crux of the debate over the 1996 Farm Bill seemed to be
centered around a potentially formative shift to free market economics and away from a
long-established social safety net. However, upon closer examination, loyalty to those
principles took a back seat to the countless interests pandered to throughout the bill. The
final conference report reauthorized nutrition programs (food stamps included), funding
for research and conservation programs and for rural development, loans and subsidies
for dairy, soybeans and rice, funds to market U.S. products overseas and myriad other
programs that benefitted the districts of members across the nation irrespective of party
(CQ 1996, 3-25 - 3-26). The wide and eclectic collection of supported programs engaged
much more influential forces of universalism—distributive politics realized—as
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demonstrated by the lopsided strong bipartisan passage of the bill’s conference report,
318-89 on March 29 (CQ 1996, 3-26), as compared to the earlier 270-155 vote on the
original House bill on February 29 when the primary debate was still in full swing (CQ
1996, 3-16). Many of those who voted against the bill’s final passage in the House ended
up voting for the conference report, realizing the political consequences attached,
especially in an election year. Based on the criteria and consideration of the strong
distributive political influences at play, it is difficult to contend that the 1996 Farm Bill
was especially prone to unique collegial consideration by members of Congress.
BRAC and the NDAA of 1997
A long-time scholar of congressional politics and processes at the Congressional
Research Service (CRS) interviewed for this study observed, “Budget authorizations are
often viewed as jobs bills. Therefore, there is bipartisan pressure for all to ‘win’ and get
the NDAA passed” (Interview, November 3, 2017). He went on to explain that
“countering BRAC [Base Realignment and Closure Commission] is a repeating
manifestation” of why the NDAA repeatedly brings members together from both sides of
the aisle, especially considering the “electoral” consequences stemming from jobs
potentially lost due to a base closure (Interview, November 3, 2017).
The BRAC oversees a politically tenuous process normally authorized by a
provision in the NDAA to review DOD infrastructure for closure or reorganization.
Congressionally appointed BRAC commissioners are tasked with providing a
comprehensive recommendation to Congress along those lines. In doing so, individual
members of Congress are essentially insulated from direct “blame” and therefore
conceivably not fully subject to all the political consequences associated with a military
base being closed (or recommended for closure) in their district. Furthermore, parochial
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and universal political interests of members of Congress are realized (regardless of party)
when they counter a request from the administration for a BRAC round to be authorized
in the NDAA. In such cases members can claim they voted to save bases and jobs in
their districts (parochial) while also justifying the decision as necessary to preserve
national security needs (universal). Ironically, because individual members are insulated
from direct implication in recommended closures of specific bases (blame transferred the
commission), fulfillment of parochial political obligations (member did not directly
jeopardize a base in his district) as well as universal political obligations (for the good of
national security writ large) can also be rationalized if a member ends up supporting the
commission’s overall recommendation. That is, because commission recommendations
are usually presented as a comprehensive package designed to balance requirements
DOD-wide with adjustments taking into consideration bases from all across the country
and mission requirements from all military services and functions. Members then can
blame the commission for adverse impacts on their district while also claiming to help the
DOD save money or divert tax dollars to be spent on more pressing national security
requirements. Either way, the dual logic applicable to implementation or avoidance of
the BRAC process can be politically enticing to both sides of the aisle depending on the
circumstances and provides another example in the domestic political realm of influences
on collegiality of defense policy formulation.
An instance of a BRAC issue that brought members of Congress together from
both sides of the aisle took place during the late 1990’s. Intervention by President Bill
Clinton in the 1995 BRAC round was characterized as “unprecedented political
meddling” motivated to “curry favor” among voters in Texas and California to help his
reelection bid (Lockwood, 2002, 4). The president claimed the two states had suffered
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inordinately in previous BRAC rounds and therefore authorized privatized work to
continue at underutilized military depots, one in each location (Lockwood, 2002, 4). In
doing so, the president undermined the 1995 BRAC depot realignment plan and thereby
threatened jobs and work planned to be transferred to depots in Utah, Georgia, and
Oklahoma, conceivably making them more vulnerable in the next BRAC round should
the privatization plan be allowed to continue in Texas and California (Lockwood, 2002,
4). Accordingly, a bipartisan group of legislators led by members from Utah, Georgia,
and Oklahoma revolted against the president’s privatization plan and garnered enough
lasting resentment in Congress that no further BRAC rounds requested by President
Clinton were approved through the rest of his tenure (Lockwood, 2002, 4).
The clash came to the forefront in 1997 during consideration of the NDAA, as the
draft bill contained a provision approved by the full Senate Armed Services Committee
and House National Security Committee (aka, the HASC) that would have prohibited the
president’s privatization plan unless the depots in Utah, Georgia, and Oklahoma had 80%
or greater utilization rates (Lockwood, 2002, 4). Not surprisingly, the provision triggered
the Republican Senators from Texas to join with the Democratic Senators from California
to issue a filibuster threat, forcing the offending language to be pulled from the bill prior
to floor consideration—a demonstration of the bipartisan respect for the institutional
process of the NDAA as discussed in Chapter 4 (Lockwood, 2002, 4).
Amendments to restore the provision offered in both chambers during floor
consideration were defeated in the House and withdrawn in the Senate; the issue became
the last obstacle to be resolved in the bill’s conference committee and triggered a veto
threat from the White House (Lockwood, 2002, 4).
The whole scenario was recalled by a former HASC professional staff member
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who witnessed it firsthand: “In 1997, the Depot Caucus stood up a bipartisan effort to
counter Clinton’s effort to privatize depots. Clinton threatened to veto the NDAA and
the Caucus fought back. Congress overrode the veto [threat] because of the economic
impact and jobs…it unified opposition to a Democratic president by members of
Congress from both sides of the aisle.” (Interview, December 22, 2017). A compromise
was finally agreed to by both sides of the issue and the bill signed into law with strong
bipartisan support in both the House (passed 286-123, with the support of 94 Democrats
in the GOP-controlled chamber) and Senate (passed 90-10) (Lockwood, 2002, 5).
In total, the domestic political influences that weighed on the NDAA BRAC case
of 1998 motivated compromise that garnered the support of more than two-thirds of
members who voted for the bill’s final passage, irrespective of the partisan slants at play
within the Congress and between the legislative branch and the administration. However,
in this case, given the motives and actions of the players involved, the central debate
surrounding the 1998 NDAA was assessed to be a product of distributive politics that
emanated from a BRAC-related process and which created enough dissention to threaten
the bill’s derailment. As a result, it is difficult to justify that the 1998 NDAA was
especially prone to unique collegial consideration by members of the House.
The Twenty-first Century: 2007-2012
The period between 2007 and 2012 started with the last days of the George W.
Bush Administration and a surge of American troops being sent to Iraq—an especially
impactful event in domestic politics as the toll of an already long-fought war expensive in
American blood and treasure settled in with little chance for end in sight. Other major
domestic political factors that influenced policymaking at the time included the election
of the first African American president, Barack Obama, who ran in part on a platform to
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end the war in Iraq. Political discontent associated with the government’s response to the
2008 financial meltdown spawned the rise of the Tea Party and a debate raged over the
costs and the role of government in healthcare as the President Obama pushed his
signature Affordable Care Act (Obamacare) through into law on the heels of a failed
attempt to authorize a federal carbon cap-and-trade system. Thousands of Americans lost
their jobs and homes as the mortgage crisis spread and excited partisan discord and
frustration over government bailouts of the financial and other industries. The bailouts
and “quantitative easing” emplaced by the Federal Reserve to keep markets stable
sparked political movements like Occupy Wall Street which openly rejected free market
capitalism as a pillar of American society. Ultimately, partisanship and hard financial
times overshadowed a national debate on the fundamental roles and responsibilities of
government.
The political divide among Americans was the highest it had been in two decades
(Pew Research Center 2014). The divide was reflected by increased polarization in
Congress which subsequently threatened consensus on defense, agriculture, and
transportation policymaking. Any bipartisan policy outcomes were a remarkable feat
when and if they occurred.
One particular case which demonstrated the complexity of the domestic political
environment at the time had fiscally conservative Tea Party members and Libertarians on
the right in Congress join together with those on the fringe left, to vote against defense
spending at the height of the war in Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2010, Senator Lindsey
Graham (R-SC) expressed his greatest worry was about the potential political power that
came with such a coalition (Russell 2014). In that context, Russell (2014) observed it,
“would pose the gravest threat to the joint war-making project of the Republican and
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Democratic establishments.” From the Tea Party’s view, deficit spending of any kind
was essentially unacceptable. Even money spent to supply troops in harm’s way must be
stopped in their eyes, as the deficit and debt presented more of a principled threat to the
country. Libertarians argued the U.S. never should have intervened in the first place. On
the extreme left, the war was a wholly unacceptable violation of international law and an
embarrassment that should not be supported. The sides strangely found refuge together
in countering the same policy efforts but while appealing to completely different values.
Ultimately, partisan discord in Congress over federal spending and deficits
eventually led to the Budget Control Act (BCA) of 2011. The law forced deep cuts
spread equally across the entire federal government and put in place budget caps on
future spending. While Democrats controlled the House and Senate early in this time
period, a majority in the House was gained by the GOP for the 112 th Congress, splitting
the chambers between party control (ProQuest 2011). It was within that overall domestic
political context, and the period leading up to it, in which deliberations over the Highway
Bill of 2012, the Farm Bill of 2008, and the 2011 NDAA were considered by Congress.
The 2012 Highway Bill
The surface transportation authorization bill passed by Congress in 2012,
otherwise known as the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21 st Century Act (MAP-21),
was the product of three years of deliberations largely centered around debate on how to
pay for the bill, deregulation and regulatory reform, and a litany of demands made by
conservative House members which forced Speaker John Boehner (R-OH) to repeatedly
maneuver to keep the bill moving (Austin 2012, 11-5).
Revenues streaming to the Highway Trust Fund, which should have covered the
cost, had slowed over the years, the result of more fuel-efficient vehicles, less Americans
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driving, and a general lack of political gumption to raise the federal gas tax in the midst
of the most severe economic downturn the nation had experienced in decades (Austin
2012, 11-5). A January 2012 CBO report estimated that in 2014 the trust fund would run
out of the $35 billion infusion made from general Treasury funds between 2008 and 2010
(a stopgap by Congress) unless there was an intervention (Austin 2012 11-5). House
Republicans sought to close the shortfall with revenue from “expanded oil and gas
drilling and eliminating trust fund financing of mass transit projects” while Senate
Democrats, who controlled the upper chamber, aimed to raid the Leaking Underground
Storage Tank or LUST Fund, and President Obama expected to pay for it in savings
drawn from troop reductions in Iraq and Afghanistan (Austin 2012, 11-5).
Ultimately, in light of the tough economic times, Democrats sought political
capital for supporting the bill from the improvements it authorized to infrastructure and
jobs expected to be created as a result while Republicans surmised real economic growth
would come from deregulation and removing government impediments to transportation
projects (Austin 2012, 11-5). Democrats made noise to that end during the bill’s
consideration by the Transportation Committee and complained that the bill reported to
the full House, H.R. 7, went too far with regard to regulation and not far enough to fund
projects (Austin 2012, 11-6). Tea Party conservatives forced several tweaks to the
reported bill and Boehner eventually had to pull it from the floor schedule (despite an
approved rule for debate), as many of its members were “unconvinced that infrastructure
was worthy enough program to warrant spending beyond what was in the Highway Trust
Fund, or even to avoid cuts,” (Austin 2012, 11-7).
When the House moved to approve an interim extension (H.R. 4348), Boehner
warned a compromise must be made by June 30 or else an extension of existing law
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would carry members into the November elections (Austin 2012, 11-8). Perhaps in
recognition of the political risk associated with a mere extension in an election year
tainted by a vitriolic, partisan environment and tough economic times, both sides allowed
for notable concessions that crystalized the true politics of the debate for what they
were—a product of distributive politics. While conservative groups like the Club for
Growth threatened a vote in favor of the bill would be a black mark for conservative
members, the conference report garnered loud praise from advocates for infrastructure
investment, to include the U.S. Chamber of Commerce (Austin 2012, 11-8).
Ultimately, the overwhelmingly bipartisan support demonstrated by the final vote
count on the conference report (373-52) reflected what was foremost in the mind of most
House members—the potential political leverage to be gained by being able to claim
some “wins” from the bill, in addition to resources doled out to their districts that could
be linked to jobs and economic growth (Austin 2012, 11-8). Consequently, the 2012
Highway Bill was assessed to be driven primarily by distributive political influences and
therefore not prone to extraordinarily collegial consideration by House members.
The 2008 Farm Bill
Deliberations over the 2008 Farm Bill took place as the housing market crumbled
and the Bush Administration and Federal Reserve took steps to unsuccessfully stave off
what ended up transforming into the global financial crisis (Amadeo 2018). As a result,
“The bill’s price tag—specifically its cost compared with a 2007 March baseline from the
Congressional Budget Office (CBO)—was the source of nearly every hurdle, stalemate,
and fight along the way” (Austin 2008, 3-3). Work on the substance of the initial 2008
Farm Bill, H.R. 2419, had spanned over a year and a half and in the end the bill approved
by the Democratic-controlled Congress provided a five-year authorization met with a
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White House veto, justified by President Bush because of its cost, to include the farm
subsidies he viewed as overly generous at a time when crop prices and farm revenues
were healthy (Austin 2008, 3-3).
The estimated $289 billion measure attributed at least two-thirds of its cost to
nutrition programs like food stamps (which it expanded) and school lunches provided to
children of low-income families (Austin 2008, 3-3). Other provisions reflected the
agenda one might expect from a Democratic-controlled Congress with a more liberal and
urban-based constituency as it also expanded conservation programs and “offered new
incentives for alternative energy” while it simultaneously narrowed “income eligibility
limits for farm payments,” the recipients of which tended to be more rural and
conservative (Austin 2008, 3-3). The policy differences highlighted the increasingly
partisan mood of the time, yet the crux of the debate over the bill remained focused on
how to pay for it.
H.R. 2419 overran the 2007 CBO baseline by $5.7 billion over five years and
leveraged a completely different combination of taxes and offsets to make up the
difference than the Senate’s approach, which was $5.3 billion over the baseline (Austin
2008, 3-3). A fight ensued over which programs to cut and by how much—essentially a
representative example of distributive politics at work. In the end, crop insurance and
commodity supports (to include a reduction of acreage eligible for direct payments) took
the biggest hits, while “disaster aid, nutrition, conservation and alternative energy topped
the list of programs that benefitted from increased spending in the bill” (Austin 2008, 33). The coverage of the final $5 billion overrun from the CBO baseline by an accounting
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gimmick14, along with GOP-opposed tax increases, helped justify the president’s veto
rationale (Austin 2008, 3-3). Despite White House veto threats and aside concerns over
its cost and the new slew of tax provisions it would authorize, 100 Republicans still
supported H.R. 2419 when it passed the House 318-106 on May 14, thus demonstrating
the strength of the distributive political elements at play (Austin 2008, 3-5). President
Bush vetoed the bill, as promised, and the veto was overridden (twice, due to what
essentially was a clerical error) by a vote of 317-109 on H.R. 6124 (a replacement bill,
virtually identical to H.R. 2419) in the House on June 18 (Austin 2008, 3-5).
The central debate on the 2008 Farm Bill was primarily driven by its cost. Per the
assessment criteria outlined earlier, the final vote on the bill did not follow party lines—it
was rather far from it—indicating the discord was not ideologically-based. While
President Bush did express policy concerns about the generosity of the bill’s farm
subsidies, it was the cost of the subsidies that motivated his concerns (and the concerns of
some fellow Republicans), thus minimizing arguments that the debate was primarily
fueled by a specific substantive policy issue. Provisions of the 2008 Farm Bill politically
benefitted a wide array of members from both sides of the aisle in the public goods it
distributed. The political weight of those benefits was enough to support a strong
bipartisan veto override (twice), and it was therefore evident deliberations on the 2008
Farm Bill was ruled by distributive political influences and not necessarily prone to
unique collegial consideration for other reasons.

14

Members of the conference committee “used an accounting maneuver to cover the five-year cost.
Congress offset the 10-year cost by extending customs user fees” (Austin 2008, 3-3).
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The 2011 NDAA
While much attention was paid to a multitude of proposed provisions of the 2011
NDAA that sought to limit the 2010 repeal of the “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” (DADT) policy
which had barred military service of openly gay people, it was surprisingly not a debate
over social issues that almost derailed the bill’s unprecedented fifty-year streak of annual
successive passages into law (Austin 2011, 5-3). Instead, the central debate of the bill,
H.R.1540, was focused on how to interpret principles of the most basic rights afforded by
the Constitution and a contest of power between the legislative and executive branches.
Essentially, the debate was primarily one of policy substance first, and foremost.
H.R. 1540 swirled in controversy over how America should deal with the custody
of terrorist suspects that were not U.S. citizens. The provision in question directed the
military to maintain custody of “the core group of al Qaeda detainees suspected of
plotting or carrying out attacks against the United States” instead of being held by
civilian law enforcement officials (Austin 2011, 5-7). This was a problem for many
lawmakers, who saw it as a dangerous move that threatened long-held societal principles.
The language was supported by the GOP-controlled House and by the Democratic leaders
of the Senate Armed Services Committee (Chairman Carl Levin (D-MI) was in favor)
(Austin 2011, 5-7). However, it lured a veto threat by President Obama that warned
against provisions which might constrain him from collecting intelligence and
prosecuting action against terrorists in order to preserve national security.
Public discourse exploded into misinterpretations of the proposed provisions and
hyperbolized conjecture as to whether or not American citizens might ultimately lose
their rights and be held indefinitely should they be accused of being a terrorist (Chesney
and Wittes 2011). The public debate was in part fueled by a distrust of government
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growing in the wake of the financial crisis, latent feelings about the mire of the wars Iraq
and Afghanistan, and libertarian voices amplified by an already divisive political
atmosphere. But, the debate was fundamentally grounded in very American values that
transcended partisan loyalties and contemporary political arguments—due process,
constitutional rights of the accused, civilian control of the military, and the balance
between personal liberty and national security.
Congress essentially ignored the veto threat and the face-off between the White
House and the legislature was settled by the bill bestowing waiver authority on the
Commander-in-Chief and a signing statement by President Obama outlining his concerns
and intended implementation. Ultimately, the House showed strong bipartisan resolve
for the bill’s conference report, which garnered support from greater than two thirds of
those voting, at 283-136. Given the policy substance of the bill’s central debate aligned
with the supermajority backing it received during final floor consideration, the bill could
be subjectively considered as especially prone to collegial consideration by members of
Congress.
Summary Observations
While by no means exhaustive, the cases presented provide valuable comparative
insight into what primarily drove the debates on the versions of the three bills over time.
While clearly the dynamics of the domestic political environment of the time weighed on
each of the bills and the matters that drove the central debates of their consideration were
significant (bent by ideology or substance), those matters were nonetheless regularly
trumped by the greater influence of distributive politics with the exception of the NDAA
of 1962 and 2011. As expected, distributive politics ruled how members ultimately
approached the majority of the bills from a political standpoint; they were primarily
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motivated to bring home the bacon or to secure a policy favorable to their home district in
the hope to gain political capital more than by a seeing a substantive policy issue through.
The cases of the NDAA of 1962 and 2011 were arguably different. The central
debate of both bills focused on a substantive policy issue that transcended distributive
politics and partisan loyalties and not found with the other bills. In the case of the 1962
NDAA, weapon system cost and capability were certainly considerations in vying
between a bomber or missile-centric deterrence strategy, as was support of an industrial
base that had research and technological capacity to bring either option to fruition.
However, the Soviet threat was very real and the question viewed as a matter of national
security that transcended politics. That aspect pressed members to contemplate the
motives of their decision on the underlying bill beyond influences and potential rewards
encompassed in distributive politics. The sentiment was reflected in the 1961 and 1962
HASC reports on the practical substance, monetary, and operational costs (and risks) of
the bomber versus missile decision, also echoed in public proclamations made by the
HASC and Senate Appropriations Committee as to the matter’s central importance to the
preservation of national security. Essentially, the debate was centered on how to best
keep Americans safe and deter Soviet attack.
The case of the 2011 NDAA equally transcended distributive political motivations
in its central debate. Again, the focus was on existentialism, though not primarily in
terms of physical safety as much as in the survival of American values. Due process,
civilian control of the military, and the rights of the accused were all issues central to
whether or not the bill would pass. The debate not only weighed the values embraced by
the Constitution but also the construct of the government it prescribed, manifested in the
argument over which branch had ultimate authority to made consequential decisions on
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national security. As such, deliberations on the 2011 NDAA garnered an unusually wide
spectrum of attention from Americans (and others across the globe). Spectators were not
necessarily interested in the latest version of the defense policy bill, but to see if
policymakers would remain loyal to the nation’s revered values despite a challenging
security environment, intense partisanship, and the pressures of dire financial tumult.
The vigorous public debate over the bill’s provisions in Congress as to whether American
citizens could lose their rights and be held indefinitely was a clear demonstration that the
issue itself was core to the American ethos and transcended the partisan mire of the day.
Summarily, given the assessment criteria outlined earlier in this chapter, the
central debates of the NDAA of 1962 and of 2011 were determined to encompass
“certain domestic political pressures” distinguishable from the other bills examined.
The central debate of both bills focused on deeply substantive matters that transcended
loyalty to distributive political pressures, supported as such by a notable bipartisan mix of
members, of which at least two-thirds of voted for the bills’ final passage. As such, the
matters addressed by the central debates of the NDAAs of 1962 and 2011 indicated
possible reasons as to why defense policy formulation in Congress is often viewed as
more collegial than other issue areas.
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Chapter 6 - Domestic Influences: Interviews
While distributive political theory is an established scholarly platform for
explaining the dynamics of defense policy formulation, this study searched beyond the
theory’s confines to more thoroughly identify domestic political influences that shape the
perceived collegial nature of defense policy deliberations over time. To do so, interviews
were conducted with twenty-five individuals from the policy community, including
former and currently serving members of Congress, congressional staff, lobbyists and
academics. Interview subjects were primarily queried about their experience with the
defense policy process in Congress. More specifically, for the purposes of this chapter,
they were asked about National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) deliberations and to
identify domestic political influences in the NDAA process which weighed on the overall
perceived political character of defense policy formulation in Congress. In other words,
“Why do people seem to get along better on defense policy?” Finally, interviewees were
asked to share experiences and perceptions related to how policymakers approached the
Farm Bill or Highway Bill compared with the NDAA.
Collectively, these interviewees explain that distributive concerns are a key part
of the domestic political influences that weigh on the political nature of defense policy
formulation in Congress, but not the only thing. The ensuing sections present several
underlying themes from both aspects as shared by those interviewed and included: The
dual obligation of House members to their district and the nation; the political savvy of
the Department of Defense (DOD); the massive size and reach of the NDAA with regard
to policy and budget; and political aspects of civilian-military relations, among others.
Ultimately, identifying a single aspect of the domestic political environment as the
primary cause for the perceived collegial nature of defense policy is not realistic, as a
184

combination of factors provide a more credible explanation, depending on the individual
and the situation.
Two masters: District vs. Nation
The NDAA process was frequently characterized in interviews as a vehicle of
domestic political consequence from a parochial and universal sense which to help
explain how members approached the bill politically. The NDAA was viewed as feeding
into both sides of the obligation members of Congress struggle to balance to fulfill the
duties of their office. On one hand, the NDAA process was viewed as helping members
satisfy the needs, wants, and concerns of the constituents from their home districts. On
the other hand, the bill helped members meet their obligation to the nation at large,
namely national security. NDAA deliberations were then viewed as an opportunity to
satiate parochial and universal political demands in one bill, and therefore provided an
exceptional reason to cooperate, often aside partisan loyalties.
One congressional staffer with almost twenty years of experience dealing with
defense policy in the House provided an example:
HASC members often see eye-to-eye on quite a lot, like Rob Wittman [R-VA]
and Joe Courtney [D-CT] on sub[marines]s on the seapower subcommittee. They
have a real chance to bond over policy issues the rest of their respective caucus
members may not due to the substance of the policy issues they are addressing.
(Interview, January, 26 2018)
Both members, Wittman and Courtney, while distant in political ideology, had U.S. Navy
submarines associated with jobs, basing, and industry in their respective congressional
districts (parochial interests). Furthermore, by virtue of their missions and capabilities,
the submarines helped fulfill the universal obligation Congress has to the nation to ensure
its security. Both parochial and universal interests were met then, conjoined in the
environs of the House Armed Services Committee—a uniquely collegial venue, as
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witnessed by the staffer, a venue not necessarily available to other members (discussed
more extensively in Chapter 4). Finally, the staffer implied a sincere professional interest
by both members, one accentuated by their joint exposure to the subject matter over time
(Wittman was the sea power subcommittee chairman and Courtney its ranking member).
Ultimately, it was inferred that potential political gains—universal and parochial—
enabled by a complementary venue (HASC & the NDAA), grant members unique
motivation to approach deliberations on defense matters more collegially.
DOD’s Political Attentiveness
By interview accounts, DOD was very aware of, and catered to, the domestic
political influences members of Congress grappled with—the balance between district
demands and those of the nation at-large—which often led to a more collaborative
NDAA experience for all involved. As previously illustrated by “Staffer Days” events
leading up to the annual deliberations on the NDAA in Congress, DOD’s attentiveness
set a high bar to match by other agencies in dealings on similar authorizing legislation
(the Farm Bill and the Agriculture Department, for example). A former senior HASC
policy staffer recounted an example of the military’s awareness of domestic political
pressures on members and how it was acted upon to keep the policy process in motion:
When the service, like the CNO [Chief of Naval Operations], would prioritize and
the [Armed Services] Committee found money to authorize infrastructure projects
not asked for [by individual members], PSMs or the Chairman would go to the
member and notify them and make sure they got credit for the project, even if
they did not ask for it. That moved the bill [NDAA]. (January 31, 2018)
Like dialogue between the Hill and DOD was noted as especially robust during the
annual budget and posture hearing season leading up to the NDAA’s consideration by the
HASC (as discussed in Chapter 4). The discourse continued at a constant rate throughout
the rest of the year, but with varied in intensity depending on the issue and the domestic
186

political environment. Nonetheless, the ongoing discourse was cited as elemental to
collaboration. One former Air Force pilot, turned HASC PSM, then CRS researcher
reflected:
HASC PSMs would be in direct contact with program managers in DOD and the
[military] services as to whether or not they needed or wanted items being
earmarked [by members in the NDAA]. Just an earmark authorized was often
good enough, even if it was not funded by appropriators, because it could be
politically leveraged as a ‘win’ for the district. (Interview, January 31, 2018)
The ongoing discussion was therefore politically and substantively attentive by with
minor regard for party affiliation. In the case mentioned above, programs deemed
unnecessary by appropriators might nonetheless get a public nod by authorizers (in the
NDAA) to fulfill domestic political needs of members with full knowledge the programs
might never see the light of day.
Such practices were enabled via intimately tight links between the defense
committees and the DOD, attributes unmatched in recollections shared about the
Agriculture Department on Farm Bill deliberations and the Transportation Department
regarding the Highway Bill. One former congressional staffer who worked on
transportation policy as well as security issues (to include the NDAA) recalled:
“Congress did what they wanted on transit and highway funding. There was occasional
discussion on a few high-level policy issues between the Transportation Department and
Congress during the bill’s deliberation but not really on funding” (Interview, April 3,
2018). Another former long-time ag policy congressional staffer turned lobbyist recalled
the Farm Bill legislative process usually started with a review of the bill’s last successful
iteration to determine where policies should be “tweaked” (Interview, February 9, 2018).
She continued, “[United States Department of Agriculture] USDA weighs in [on the
review], but it depends on the relationship [with the Hill]. Split government can have an
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impact with the administration as to how much collaboration there is on the draft bill
(Interview, February 9, 2018). Another former ag congressional staffer who later served
as a Deputy Assistant Secretary at USDA supported her observation, but also recalled a
notable exception in former Agriculture Secretary Dan Glickman who “was very
involved with the [Farm Bill] process” as he had served on the House Ag Committee
over twenty years before becoming Secretary (Interview, February 7, 2018). One final
former staffer turned lobbyist observed, “While the [Ag] Committees will take some cues
from the administration on where [Farm] policy should fall and what will be acceptable,
in general the administration listens to the Ag Committee leadership to guide policy and
their legislative agenda” (Interview, January 11, 2018). Clearly, the dialogue on the
Farm Bill and the Transportation Bill were not as robust, routine and more dependent on
political dynamics than the annual dialogue on the NDAA between the Hill and the DOD.
Budget Size (and Reach) Matters & More
The fact that DOD is the largest department in the federal government was cited
to help explain the consistent success of the NDAA and the unique collegial nature of
related deliberations. One CRS researcher and former reporter long steeped in the
machinations of defense budgeting in Congress observed: “It’s the nature of the beast.
The NDAA and DOD are just so broad and diverse. Virtually everyone can find an issue
to work on or with, from child care to the officer promotion system to the CV-22”
(Interview, December 4, 2017). He continued with a comparison, highlighting the
distinction between the wide menu of NDAA policy options to collaborate on versus the
relatively narrow distributive provisions available elsewhere:
The Farm Bill or Highway Bill are a collection of ‘one-offs’ or ‘eaches’ versus
[being] guided by an overarching principle [as in national security with the NDAA];
There is a lot more ‘meat’ to dig into with the NDAA. It is management and
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oversight of a massive organization, an economic force with industry and peoples—
so many things, more to do versus other agencies. (Interview, December 4, 2017)
Essentially, the largesse and reach of DOD’s influence on the domestic political arena is
valued for the wide shadow it casts, an unmatched abundance of opportunities to
collaborate on in order to realize agenda goals across the political spectrum.
As the nation’s largest employer, DOD also supports a workforce of
indeterminate magnitude in the private sector—from the largest defense contractors to the
smallest mom and pop suppliers in virtually every corner of the country (CBO 2016).
Along those lines, one prominent scholar with the American Enterprise Institute,
seasoned from decades of work studying congressional process and politics, brought to
light another notable aspect of the domestic political environment referred to in the
interviews as to why deliberations over defense spending was different than in other
policy areas:
Major defense contractors know and share the[ir] economic impact in each district
and state; how many jobs and how the industrial base is impacted. Things are not
quite as clearly articulated with food supplies and prices, even though everyone
eats. The impact is different in a significant way and members respond to that.
(Interview, December 23, 2017)
Interviewees also asserted the defense budget (the NDAA) primarily competed for
resources within its own provisions proper, while the Farm Bill and Highway Bill
competed both within its own provisions and with other priorities vying for resourcing in
the larger domestic spending pot of the discretionary budget. In other words, defense
spending was viewed as almost wholly distinct from domestic spending and the
competition for resources in the latter was fiercer.
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Defense is inherently apolitical therefore fully on equal budgetary footing with
the whole of the domestic policy agenda. The question for transportation funding
is, “how much” in competition with all the other domestic budgetary issues. How
to divide the pie among them is very contentious versus defense, which is alone
and divided within itself. There are no “losers” in DOD spending when dollars
are separated between defense and non-defense spending because defense dollars
are only in competition with themselves. (Interview with CRS researcher,
December 4, 2017).
Non-defense policy areas were thus viewed as pitted against each other for budget
priority while the defense budget was relatively insulated from that politicking, not to
mention the partisan divisiveness that came with it. One former Hill staffer turned food
industry lobbyist remarked: “Its political these days, budgets…its ideological—
[government] handout dependent jobs versus food stamps” (Interview, February 9, 2018).
Additional influences from the domestic political environment were also cited for
increasing competition within the non-defense spending realm further, giving additions
reason for defense budget deliberations to be viewed as more collegial.
One prominent think tank scholar provided an example that highlighted increased
competition between programs authorized in separate titles of the Farm Bill due in part to
the changing dynamics of associated domestic political pressures:
…it comes down to logrolling of commodities. There was a balance. Bob Dole
and others—Reagan Republicans—would get price supports, et cetera, in
exchange for support for food stamps. That changed when food stamps were
demonized by the “welfare queen” stereotypes; Republicans and the public
pushed back on supporting them.
Democrats also migrated from rural areas and farms to a more urban demography
and the Southern Democratic blocks diminished. The myth of small family farms,
despite large agribusiness taking over was proliferated and kept alive by the farm
lobby and capitalized on – still to this day. Strong conservative intellectual
arguments against farm supports have found receptive ears even among farmers
and more rural, agriculturally dependent populations, thereby further damaging
the opportunity for balance in the Farm Bill. (Interview, December 23, 2017)
So, “balance” within the domestic spending portfolio has deteriorated over time due to
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partisanship. Conversely, the same scholar did not view defense policy as prone to the
same political pressures that the domestic policy issues faced during the same time
period—or in broader terms for that matter—which provided further reason for its
perceived collegial nature over time.
The scholar’s colleague, a former Hill staffer from the same think tank, provided
similar conclusions on the Farm Bill in a separate interview: “The Ag Committee has
urban and rural coalitions that historically transcend partisanship but have been frayed in
recent years because of the Nutrition Title. Common ground is limited due to social
sorting. Red state versus blue state on food stamps, for example” (Interview, January 29,
2018). Examples from the interviews were not limited to the Farm Bill and extended to
other policy areas.
The highway transportation bill has common appeal but is also impacted by antigovernment campaigns and earmark scandals—like the “Road to Nowhere”—
which has changed the culture away from support of “bringing home the pork.”
The Highway Bill is funded through the gas tax which, due to the anti-tax
campaign of Roger Norquist, is not acceptable to adjust for any member, aside
from reducing it. (Interview, December 23, 2017)
As inferred in the reflections above, member decisions on issues within the domestic
policy arena were viewed as much more politically consequential than decisions on
defense policy. As a result, policymakers enjoyed somewhat of an additional buffer from
political lash-back for collaborating on defense policy.
The notion then, that political risk associated with the NDAA was minimal
compared to other authorizing legislation provided justification as to why collaboration
might be construed as easier in defense policy deliberations. One think tank scholar and
former HASC PSM quipped: “Members can vote for the NDAA without a downside.
The risk/reward ratio greatly favors supporting it. There is virtually no risk.” The lack of
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risk, he reasoned, was because, “Post-Cold War defense policy has been on the way
down with regard to importance. All [members of Congress] used to require having a
position on defense because the enemy was looming and everyone felt threatened, it was
clear, but no longer the case” (Interview, December 22, 2017). He also boldly conjected,
“The Budget Control Act would not exist if people really cared about defense”
(Interview, December 22, 2017). A military legislative assistant (MLA) of a HASC
member agreed, “Defense policy is not largely on the radar of constituents in daily life;
they know less about defense issues” (Interview, February 1, 2018). His observation is a
very important point, referred to as the “information gap” and explored more in depth
later in this study as part of the international political influences weighing on the nature
of defense policy formulation. Another former congressional staffer had a similar view
but went a step further: “There are no interest groups fighting against national security,
no domestic constituency against defense…there can be collegiality on the Hill on
defense related issues without political consequence” (Interview, April 3, 2018).
When pressed for reasons why there was no viable lobby against spending on
national security, it was generally concluded such arguments are simply too easy to
demonize, especially when the nation is at war.
Who wants to stand the political heat of not funding soldiers in combat? There
are a few rare exceptions. Even at the worst times of the Iraq War, the NDAA,
OCO [overseas contingency operations] funds, and defense appropriations still
passed with bipartisan support. Who wants to be the guy that did not vote to
defend against the unseen threat, post 9-11? (Interview with think tank scholar,
January 23, 2018).
His point extends beyond the federal budget debate into other reasons interviewees
commonly noted as why defense policy is often viewed as more collegial.
Members of Congress want to be viewed as supportive of military members and
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their families, especially in times of conflict and regardless of party affiliation. One
member, who also happened to have military experience observed: “Democrats tend to
focus more on personnel rather than hardware when it comes to supporting the military
because they see it as their means of ‘supporting the troops,’” inferring Republicans
tended to focus more on hardware in that regard. “This is a good combination from the
right and left, in addition to support for soft power and U.S. global leadership from both
sides to get to compromise on foreign and defense policy issues” (Interview, March 28,
2017). An experienced scholar of military policy expressed a slightly different but
parallel stance:
Since the actual decision to commit troops to battle is not a core function of the
Congress, even when war is declared, deliberation over the NDAA is reduced to a
debate over resources. The Farm Bill and Highway Bill are the same—resource
allocation bills—without the moral imperative of committing and supporting
troops to combat and without the threat of consequences from inaction.
(Interview, January 23, 2018).
The NDAA then, provides a visible opportunity, on the record, for members to express
their support through collaboration. The deputy chief of staff to a senior member of
congressional leadership weighed in similarly, “Constituent interests are an element in
the NDAA, compelling because they authorize military pay raises and recognize the
sacrifices servicemembers make” (Interview, February 7, 2018).
The urge policymakers feel to support the military can also be compounded by the
fact very few members of Congress are military veterans. Therefore, supporting the
NDAA is viewed as a means to bridge the civilian-military gap.
[M]embers and their constituents want to recognize the sacrifices they make to
serve the Country. Every community across the country has service members or
veterans or families impacted. There is some policy attachment as a result – jobs,
PTSD, healthcare, et cetera. (Interview with legislative director of a House
member, February 1, 2018).
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A member of Congress agreed: “It’s hard to get past the political power of VSOs
[Veterans Service Organizations] and veterans when you have not served yourself…”
(Interview, March 28, 2017). Additionally, less than one percent of the U.S. population
is actively serving in uniform and they all volunteered to serve (not drafted) (Chalabi
2015). Consequently, it does not necessarily play well with voters when institutions at
the bottom end of the public trust spectrum (Congress) are viewed as culpable in shorting
the military (at the top of the trust spectrum) on funding, especially in wartime (Kennedy
2016). Another former staffer provided a somewhat more superficial but pertinent reason
members might approach defense policy with a more collegial bent:
The military is a popular institution, especially since their sweeping win in the
first Gulf War, often glamorized in pop culture. Members [of Congress] want to
be associated with popular things and support them to also feel or be popular by
association by virtue of offering their support. It is a remnant of the way the
military was treated during Vietnam War, still not forgotten; on the swing back,
but possible it has swung too far in valorizing vets, putting them on a pedestal. It
is overcompensated on the civilian side. (Interview with former congressional
staffer, January 29, 2018)
Wholly, the combination of circumstances can result in the military being placed on a
pedestal (rightfully, or not) by the public, reinforced by policymakers, percolating a
“need” to “do more” to ensure the military is “taken care of.”
Interviews: Concluding thoughts
Much like the case studies presented at the beginning of this chapter, personal
observations of those closest to the policy process placed much stock in distributive
political theory to explain the enduring collegial nature of defense policy formulation as
subject of domestic political pressures. However, also like the case studies, distributive
political theory did not provide exhaustive answers. The observations recounted in this
chapter therefore only represent a meager cross-section of underlying themes—some of
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the primary reasons interviewees contemplated in attempting to explain the domestic
political pressures at play that make deliberation on defense policy seem more collegial.
Those explanations included: the notion that defense policy provides a means for
members to balance parochial, district-related obligations with those of the nation at
large; the attentiveness of DOD to the political concerns of members and the robust
communication between the Hill and the department; the largesse of the department in
budget authority, policy reach, and sheer spectrum of issues it deals with across the
enterprise; and political aspects of civilian-military relations, among others. Summarily,
it would be difficult to identify a singular aspect of the domestic political environment as
cause for the perceived collegial nature of defense policy. Rather, a combination of
factors provides a more plausible explanation, depending on the situation.
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Chapter 7 – International Influences: Interviews
This chapter is focused on identifying how elements of the international political
environment weigh on the collegiality of defense policy formulation in Congress.
Influences from the international front represent the last of the three primary sources of
political pressure (institutional, domestic and international) asserted by this study’s
hypothesis as driving collegial behavior on defense policy matters. It helps to round out
the study’s overall attempt to provide the most complete picture possible to qualify the
notion that defense policy formulation in Congress is ultimately more collegial than other
policy areas. To do so, members of the policy community were interviewed; asked about
what events on the international political stage were most likely to influence the decision
making of policymakers in Congress, and how. They were also asked about what events
or issues in the international political environment might trigger members of Congress to
collaborate more with their colleagues across the aisle. Finally, they were asked to
compare the defense policy process (specifically, the NDAA process) in Congress with
that of other policy issues, to include agriculture and transportation policy (specifically,
the Farm Bill and Highway Bill), with consideration for how pressures from the
international political arena impacted each one.
The chapter is organized into five subsections outlined by interview discussions,
each of which presents a general theme. The themes were identified by interviewees
from their policy experiences to be primary factors emanating from the international
political arena weighing on how policymakers approached the defense policy process
politically. Those themes included the following: Security; America’s role in the world;
Presidential leadership; Defense versus other policy areas; and, The “information gap”.
The interview themes also acted as a foundation for organizing historical case studies in
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the next chapter, a final step to produce the most comprehensive explanation possible of
international political influences weighing on the political nature of discourse on defense
policy. Wholly, the themes encapsulate underlying reasons why respondents thought the
formulation of defense policy in Congress is often construed as more collegial than other
policy areas, specifically with regard to international political pressures.
Security
When members of the policy community were asked about what events on the
international stage were most likely to influence the decision making of policymakers in
Congress to cooperate across the aisle, a common answer was relayed by a former
appropriations committee staffer, “An attack on U.S. territory by a foreign state. As we
saw after 9/11 - a catastrophe of that magnitude forced Congress to come together,”
(Interview, December 17, 2017). Another former defense policy staffer framed his
response over a broader scope: “First, the lives and safety of Americans abroad; events
that close a U.S. embassy; terror attacks abroad; Second, conflict or a treaty crisis with an
ally or when core U.S. interests are in danger, like with the Senkaku Islands in the South
China Sea; Third, persecuted refugees or ethnic minorities under duress; R2P
[Responsibility to Protect]15 questions; massacres like with the Rohingya 16” (Interview,
January, 29 2018). His third point, on crisis, was echoed by the seasoned legislative
director of a House member, “All come together in support of defense policy in a national
crisis” (Interview, February 1, 2018). While vital American interests were foremost on

15

“R2P” or Responsibility to Protect – concept that nations have an obligation to intervene when
atrocities/crimes against humanity are being carried out, even if it violates another nation’s sovereignty
(United Nations, n.d.).
16
In 2017, over 600,000 ethnic Rohingya people fled Burma into neighboring Bangladesh due to alleged
crimes against humanity, ethnic cleansing, and genocide by the Burmese military (Martin, Margesson, and
Vaughn 2017).
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the minds of those interviewed, there was virtually no deviation from the convention that
security is a primary duty and goal of all elected officials, regardless of ideology, and that
Congress and the president are charged specifically with the security of the nation from
external threats.
Many of those interviewed emphasized that political ideology had little bearing
on the matter of national security being the foremost priority for policymakers. One
Military Legislative Assistant (MLA) for a member of the House Armed Services
Committee (HASC) observed, “core national security interests have buy-in from both
sides; defense policy is country above all else, in the national interest” (Interview,
February 1, 2018). His colleague, a staffer for a member from across the aisle agreed,
“National interest above political interest…is what sets apart defense policy from others”
(Interview, February 1, 2018). A policy expert with CRS also noted, “Defense has a
national constituency—hawks and doves alike” (Interview, December 4, 2017). The aim
to satisfy the “national constituency” extended into actual policy deliberations: “The
[National Defense Authorization Act] (NDAA) cut across a lot of divisiveness over the
years, even now for many reasons” (Interview with legislative director of a House
member, February 1, 2018). Continuing with that theme, a foreign and defense policy
research fellow at the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) observed of members of
Congress: “On broad questions, they're more likely to agree on national security policy.
When it comes to the details, that is the source of debate. So, both parties
overwhelmingly will approve the defense bill for final passage but they will vociferously
debate priorities underneath that umbrella like nuclear weapons, detainee policy, torture,
etc., etc.” (Interview, February 6, 2018). In other words, policymakers tend to approach
legislation like the NDAA in a more collegial manner because they realize the risks to
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society if they fail to provide resources and policy guidance adequate to preserve national
security.
As inferred by the AEI fellow, while interviewees made clear security was a
universal policy goal shared by members of Congress—one frequently able to transcend
the snare of partisan politics—they also made clear the devil was in the details regarding
how to provide that security. A distinguished think tank scholar long-studied in the
machinations of congressional politics, shared his perspective: “The NDAA debate and
defense have not always been rosy. Reagan had bitter disputes over the MX missile and
the B-1…The Reagan military buildup led to tensions with the Democrats, at odds with
the [DOD post-Vietnam] reforms made in the 1970s” (Interview, January 23, 2018). As
contentious as debates might have been over problems arising from international
pressures (or threats), to include those which addressed serious moral or ethical questions
or challenged preservation of fundamental rights, incentives to reach agreement were
oftentimes stronger and not necessarily better for it—liberty versus security. That is in
part a result of “the post-9/11 sacrosanct nature of all things security. PATRIOT Act and
FISA courts and Gitmo and re authorization of all these 'secret' authorities always passes
(sic) even though there are real reasons to question a system with little to no
sunshine/oversight” (Interview with AEI defense fellow, February 6, 2018). The
common view then was security is an invaluable linchpin for society to flourish, cause
enough for unity to take precedent among policymakers when addressing threat elements
of the international political environment.
Ultimately, the importance of security to society (especially an open society like
the United States) was conveyed; to allow freedom for the private sector to flourish and
citizens to “pursue happiness” with minimal worry while also allowing public institutions
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to operate and serve the needs of the people. Policymakers summarily saw security as
“job #1” of their responsibilities in Congress, which entailed collegial discourse to find
consensus on policies and resources to adequately address threats from the international
stage. In other words, when the nation has been threatened or faced serious crisis,
especially when American lives are at risk, policymakers have demonstrated a propensity
over time to bypass partisan loyalties, even in the most challenging domestic political
environments, to employ policies and resources to protect the country.
America’s role in the world
A commonality among those interviewed pointed to international pressures
associated with America’s unique role in the world as a reason for explaining the
collegial nature of defense policy formulation. A member of Congress assigned to the
House Foreign Relations Committee offered, “American global leadership is a point of
agreement, though what it looks like may be different. Some translate that as military
strength, others as soft power (Interview, March 28, 2017). Regarding the former
(military strength), a House MLA referred to results of a recent Wilson Center survey
circulated among members that showed Americans were skeptical of alliances with other
nations but also think we should work with others to counter threats (Interview, February
1, 2018). Regarding the latter (soft power), the House member explained further,
“Human rights are an issue that brings people together. Republicans may say they do not
care about it, but their actions prove otherwise” (Interview, March 28, 2017).
A former HASC policy staffer provided an example to illustrate the member’s
point in the U.S. response to the 2014 Ebola virus outbreak in West Africa. The staffer
characterized the event as an “overnight crisis” which required a “whole of government
approach…the president announced 3,000 troops would be in country, dedicated to the
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effort” and support the international humanitarian response (Interview, December 22,
2017). In stunningly swift fashion, “Mike McCord17 reprogrammed $1 billion of $5
billion leftover OCO18 funds and was able to have all eight committee heads, 19 minority
and majority, sign off on it” (Interview, December 22, 2017). The international pressure
to stave off the outbreak, coupled with its attention as a presidential priority, overrode a
streak of partisan tensions in Congress stemming from Democrats blaming Republicans
for cuts to Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and Prevention funding, as it was
recognized the U.S. (military) was the only global entity with the capacity to deploy
adequate personnel and resources to the austere region rapidly enough to be effective
(Weisman 2014). Timing of the rancorous rhetoric was curiously aligned within weeks
of upcoming midterm elections (Republicans picked up thirteen House seats), as
campaigning Republicans were accused of goading Democrats to embrace a travel ban
sought to protect the U.S. from potential hosts bringing the virus into the country
(Weisman 2014). Ultimately, the Obama White House provided reassurance CDC
funding was adequate (close to what congressional Republicans supported) and the
partisan squabbles were overcome in light of the greater threat resulting in a successful
DOD-enabled government-wide response that quelled the outbreak and both sides
eventually claimed credit for (Weisman 2014).
A prominent Washington think tank scholar well-versed in congressional politics

17

McChord was the DOD Comptroller/Chief Financial Officer in 2014 (U.S. Department of Defense
[DOD], n.d.).
18
Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) or supplemental war funds appropriated beyond the regular
baseline defense budget.
19
Chairmen and ranking members of the four defense-related congressional committees (House & Senate
Armed Services and Defense Appropriations) must sign off on DOD reprogramming of funds beyond a
certain threshold.
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suggested a different source of motives regarding the U.S. role in the world. He assessed
domestic political unity in response to international political pressures was based on
estimated benefits the U.S. might reap by acting with unity: “Democrats and
Republicans—Americans—are all in the same boat together and must compete with the
rest of the world” (Interview, January 23, 2018). He was referencing the U.S. need to
invest in infrastructure to maintain a competitive edge in the world economy, an issue,
when linked to jobs, is reason enough for most any elected official to find middle ground
on. A CRS researcher bridged the gap from another angle with his observation: “PostCold War and Post-9/11 there is no shared mental map of National Security Strategy, yet
still overarching agreement on the basic questions to be answered – security” (Interview,
December 4, 2017). Both views are supported by the vast literature published on grand
strategy since the end of the Cold War, and then Post-9/11, topped by ponderings on
America’s past and future role in the world order (Kissinger 2014, 362-363). Amidst the
debate, as the Congressman and the CRS researcher pointed out, there is still a notable
“point of agreement” on security. That is, in navigating the political pressures of the
international stage, despite lack of agreement on specific goals and elements of U.S.
strategy, policymakers do largely agree on the need to protect the nation’s vital interests
above partisan loyalties. Those vital interests, as defined by Deibel (2007) are rooted in
the pursuit of security and prosperity, the preservation of fundamental societal values,
and the ability to project those values abroad. And, the collegial unity they drive in
Congress is arguably a remnant of the conventional “politics stops at the water’s edge”
approach to national security policy.
Other interviewees suggested proclivities toward bipartisan consensus on defense
policy due to international pressures were actually the product of national soul-searching
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itself, given the underlying need to provide for the nation’s defense was understood. As
the world changes and evolves, the international order shifts—an especially prominent
global dynamic of the last forty years or so as billions have risen out of poverty largely
due to rapidly expanding markets. While many scholars point to a resultant U.S. decline,
others counter, arguing that the rest of the world is just catching up to U.S. standards and
thereby forcing American introspection on its role in a world with more near-peer
competitors. Such was the basis of the National Security Strategy published in 2018.
“Unity can be found in countering common threats to the U.S., like in addressing
threats like North Korea and China,” reflected a House member when he contemplated
the pressures policymakers grappled with to preserve U.S. interests in the Pacific region
(Interview, March 28, 2017). A senior think tank fellow and former HASC policy staffer
reflected, “All [members of Congress] used to have a position on defense because the
enemy was looming and everyone felt threatened, it was clear, but no longer the case”
(Interview, December 22, 2017). He explained the search for clarity could be a unifying,
as policymakers struggled together to define a path for defense policy in a world devoid
of Soviet Russia. Another former HASC policy staffer who served on the Hill in the
1990s provided contrasting context: “Newt Gingrich turned the tide toward partisanship
in Congress, away from Cold War comity and unity. The fall of the Soviet Union left no
common enemy to unify against” (Interview, December 22, 2017). He further explained
that the “peace dividend,” or the military draw-down pressed by the Clinton
administration, was partially how national soul-searching for the U.S. role in the world
manifested itself in the post-Cold War era (Interview, December 22, 2017). While there
may have been angst stirred by Speaker Gingrich, there was still strong bipartisan
consternation in Congress over the depth of the proposed defense cuts because of
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uncertain future security commitments associated with the crumbling Eastern Bloc
(Interview, December 22, 2017). Ultimately, despite debates on grand strategy and the
soul-search for America’s role in the world, policymakers across the ideological spectrum
consistently found common ground to formulate policies and provide resources for the
U.S. to address pressing international political pressures. Passage of the NDAA for 50+
years straight is just one example.
Presidential Leadership
Members of the policy community emphasized repeatedly during interviews that
the president’s rhetoric and actions play a significant role in how international political
pressures translate into the approaches members of Congress take on defense policy. As
discussed in Chapter 2, the role of the president in that regard is well-supported in
literature. Aaron Wildavsky (1966, 23) provided a classic example in his concept of one
president and two presidencies—one focused on domestic policy, the other on matters of
foreign and defense policy. In that vein, explanations as to how the actions of the
president in international affairs weighed on the collegiality of congressional defense
policy deliberations aligned in a few broad themes.
First, as Wildavsky’s argued, the president tends to set the agenda on matters of
international politics and Congress generally follows suit. One think tank scholar mused,
“Members of Congress who share the same party as the president will almost always
support the president” for political reasons or otherwise, a conclusion also cited often in
related literature (Interview, January 23, 2018). However, it was clear among
respondents that following the president on foreign matters was by no means isolated to
members of his own party, quite the opposite at times. “The Congress tends to follow the
president in most instances of crisis abroad and in defense policy too. [Then House
204

Speaker, Representative Nancy] Pelosi [(D-CA)] and Democrats almost always gave
room for their caucus to vote for the NDAA during the worst parts of the Iraq War”
(interview with former congressional staffer, January 29, 2018). One MLA explained
further: “It’s very difficult politically to vote no on the NDAA because they usually
include troop pay raises, etc. They are powerful political tools, pro and con, as they
support what troops need which is very hard to oppose (Interview with House MLA
February 1, 2018). Along those lines, interviewees noted almost universally that partisan
loyalties were abandoned (with minor exception) in times of crisis or in situations where
Americans were in harm’s way (as exemplified in detail in ensuing case studies).
“Members feel the need to ensure that troops have what they need, be it for political
reasons or because it is truly heartfelt” (Interview with HASC member’s MLA, January
26, 2018). Another think tank fellow concluded that if, “troops are in harm's way
especially if it's high profile, they're more likely to cooperate” Interview, February 6,
2018).
Congress then, manifests its solidarity with the troops and with a president’s plan
to deal with matters of international consequence in the authorities and resources
provided in the legislation it passes. As such, one House defense staffer noted, “The
NDAA and defense policy is successfully bipartisan because servicemembers…have
their lives on the line,” and as a result, he explained, defense-related legislation
supporting troops in combat is routinely prioritized on the agenda (Interview, February 1,
2018). Another former HASC staffer echoed the sentiment: “Defense is different
because it is looked at institutionally as job #1. Especially when there are troops in the
field that depend on the legislation to get through” (Interview, December 22, 2017).
Summarily, there is immense pressure, especially when American lives are at risk, to
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follow the president’s lead as commander-in-chief above partisan loyalties due to the
potential political backlash of being contrary. As a result, collaboration on and support of
legislation like the NDAA exists where it may not in other policy areas.
As discussed in Chapter 4, the people in Congress (namely members and staff of
defense-related committees) charged with formulating the legislative means to employ a
president’s proposed path on a matter of international politics were also viewed as
primary drivers of the bipartisan unity evident in that process. A CRS expert and former
congressional fellow who worked on the NDAA noted:
The people that worked on defense issues, [professional staff members] PSMs,
MLAs, and members alike were all concerned about the well-being of
servicemembers and it was unifying. It was about the health of the military; not
just resources but about the right kind of resources, the types needed to be ready to
defend the country. The people were motivated by it, to get it right. Unity came
from urgency to help solve real problems that servicemembers were facing in
wartime. (Interview, December 14, 2017).
When it came to getting those legislative proposals through the Congress, the president
was also cited as using his role as commander-in-chief or as the nation’s top diplomat to
build bipartisan support in Congress. This was especially the case if the international
political situation was strong enough to demand it. A former Republican HASC deputy
staff director recalled such an occasion with President Bill Clinton during the mid-1990s
debate over the controversial U.S. intervention in Bosnia.
The president called [the Republican member] off the floor in the middle of
amendment debates for the NDAA because he knew [the member] was going to
offer an amendment he disagreed with on the Balkans. [The member] debated
whether or not to take the call because he knew the president would try to talk him
out of offering the amendment. [The member] asked me if he should take the call
and I said he should because it was the president, and to at least hear him out, so he
did. [The member] respectfully thanked the president and told him he was not
persuaded but would be open to further discussion. Clinton cordially accepted and
the amendment was offered, nonetheless. (Interview, January 31, 2018).
In light of the collegial discourse, the staffer noted the chief executive’s focus on the
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substance of the debate and his respect for a “no politics” approach to the authorization of
policies and resources that would ultimately enable the president’s desired path in Bosnia
(Interview, January 31, 2018). Both sides (not necessarily divided by party) were
brought together, largely based on pressures to intervene from the international
community (Interview, January 31, 2018).
Depending on the dynamics of the international political environment,
interviewees observed Congress would occasionally turn the tables on the president and
drive the debate, often unified across party lines in doing so. One think tank expert
pointed out, “Presidential leadership - including when presidents CHOOSE NOT to lead is also a big factor” (Interview, February 6, 2018). To illustrate his point, another scholar
noted, “President Obama tried and failed to legislate the end of the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan,” and eventually had to direct the withdraw from Iraq (Interview, January
23, 2018). He further explained:
Congressional responses to the president have an effect on policy and agenda
implementation. [President] Clinton was marginalized because of the [Monica]
Lewinski scandal but [President G.W.] Bush was legitimized immediately by the
GOP Congress. [President] Obama from the start faced a Congress that was going
to be hostile at every chance possible [during the period of Republican majorities
on the Hill]. (Interview, January 23, 2018)
A former Hill staffer referenced the Russia sanctions bill of 2017 and noted how its nearunanimous bipartisan support in Congress drove presidential action; President Trump
signed the legislation despite his reservations (Interview, January 29, 2018). The staffer
also recalled how Congress blocked President Reagan’s efforts to support the Contras
(which arguably resulted in the Iran-Contra Affair) and the Senate challenged President
Carter’s unilateral nullification of the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty with
Taiwan (Interview, January 29, 2018). In other words, these exceptions prove the rule.
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That is, Congress can drive bipartisan defense policy even in the face of presidential
inaction or resistance. Yet, despite such occasional successful unified dissonance in
Congress, the president is still equally recognized for leading its members, of all political
stripe, in a unified “U.S. response” to international pressures, especially when American
lives are in jeopardy.
Defense vs. other policy areas
Exceptional bipartisan cooperation in response to international political pressures
in policy areas other than defense was cited by interviewees as largely subject to
distributive politics or to the ideology of individual members. One long-time lobbyist on
agriculture policy noted, “When the president’s agenda stays out of the fray,
bipartisanship [on the Farm Bill] flourished (Interview January 11, 2018). And, a former
Hill staffer submitted, “Trade battle lines are no longer driven by party,” an assertion has
yet to withstand the test of time (Interview, January 29, 2018).
Political rewards associated with policy areas other than defense were additionally
characterized as somewhat more dispensable. As such, an example from agriculture trade
policy was shared by another seasoned lobbyist:
Clinton was well-versed in ag policy, a product of his Arkansas roots and time as
governor. He understood the policy greatly but never really carried the ‘Farm vote.’
He did not want it to be an issue either so he paid attention to it and it paid off at
the state level, where it mattered. Obama lost the support of rural farmers and
environmental groups associated with ag policy because he let it become an issue.
He did not pay attention to it (Interview, February 7, 2018).
In other words, while Bill Clinton generally did not politically carry those who cared
most about Farm Bill policy issues, he did not that shortcoming to hurt him politically.
So, he paid just enough attention to associated issues and constituencies to keep them in
check and Obama did not, which ended up hurting him politically. The lobbyist further
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submitted that irrespective of party affiliation, ag trade issues were at top priority for
members in Congress due to recent policy volatility (Interview, February 7, 2018). He
cited Trump administration actions on the Trans Pacific Partnership (withdraw), North
American Free Trade Agreement (threatened withdraw), and Korean and Chinese tariffs
(threatened increases), as reason for growing fear that the U.S. would “quickly fall behind
others” like Australia, India, and Japan with regard to economic and political power in
the region if not careful, especially if the U.S. could not be trusted as a reliable supplier
which played havoc on markets (Interview, February 7, 2018).
To emphasize his point, the lobbyist recalled how President Carter’s embargo on
U.S. grain destined for the Soviet Union (used as a stick to deter aggression in
Afghanistan) was more broadly damaging to U.S. economic interests because the U.S.
was labeled an unreliable supplier in global markets (Interview, February 7, 2018).
Viewed as worsening already tough economic times in the U.S., Congress changed the
law to limit the president’s ability to use food as leverage in international politics
(Interview, February 7, 2018). In that case, unity in Congress came from domestic
political and economic incentives and trumped a White House response to international
political pressures—notably, no U.S. forces were immediately in harm’s way. Along
those lines, one think tank expert mused: “Stock market; interest rate increases;
value/strength of the dollar; employment rates in the U.S.; immigration levels. You'll
notice there isn't much internationally that actually CHANGES the decision making of
Congress. It might inform some debates but is unlikely to change much” (Interview,
February 6, 2018). In other words, there is an underlying sense of unity in Congress
when it comes to crossing a threshold that elicits a response to international pressures,
regardless of ideological sway.
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Wholly, as revealed in interviews, policymakers could politically afford to pay
less attention to issues of international consequence when security was not an underlying
factor—meaning American lives or vital interests 20 were not immediately at risk.
Succinctly put by one think tank scholar: “The Farm Bill and Highway Bill are the same:
resource allocation bills without the moral imperative of committing and supporting
troops to combat and without the threat of consequences from inaction” (Interview,
January 23, 2018). Additionally, a CRS expert noted, “The Highway Bill was no more
than an “earmark-fest,” much the same as the Farm Bill; a way to logroll and to pay back
people they owed, a chance to exercise politics (Interview, December 14, 2017). A
different CRS defense policy analyst and former professional committee staffer
encapsulated another view:
Defense matters are personal to members in justification. As for the Farm Bill, food
policy is just not as personal. Transportation issues are more parochial. [Members]
need to have a big project at stake for them to care about the Highway Bill,
otherwise they don’t have skin in the game. Infrastructure can take decades of
investment to build a dependent constituency on; it is more bipartisan with defense
due to priority.
While the Farm Bill, the Highway Bill, and the NDAA were all acknowledged as being
subject to distributive politics, the latter was viewed uniquely. Other policy types were
not viewed as sharing the same consequences when international political pressures were
addressed as a corollary and therefore viewed as less politically risky. Summarily,
incentives for collaboration on defense policy were essentially viewed as unmatched
compared with the other areas discussed.

20

Vital interests, as defined by Deibel (2007) include the pursuit of security and prosperity, the
preservation of societal values, and the ability to project those values abroad.
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The “information gap”
When asked why defense policy in Congress might be approached by members in
a more collegial manner especially in light of international political pressures weighing
on legislation like the NDAA, “the information gap” another consistent theme. A former
homeland security and transportation policy staffer used the phrase specifically when he
shared the following insight during a telephone interview on April 3, 2018:
The average American voter does not really have the time or inclination to
independently verify the state of national security and assess it with any accuracy.
So, they depend on what policymakers tell them about their security and must trust
whether or not it is true. What matters is whether or not they feel safe and whether
they feel they can trust their leaders to keep them safe. They delegate national
security to [Washington] D.C. and because of the “information gap” the public
doesn’t have to deal with the realities of national security.
The need to feel secure and to have confidence in the nation’s leaders that they
know what needs to be done and are doing what is necessary to ensure national
security is unifying. People believe what they are told about the nation’s security
because they do not follow it daily and are limited in their ability to access
information to verify or counter what they hear from public officials. Everyone
wants to be secure though. There is unity in rhetoric calling for security. You
cannot lobby against it.
Essentially, rallying the masses regardless of ideology to address an issue (especially a
threat) on the international front is easier because the public has no real way to verify
what policymakers tell them about the threat and what must be done to mitigate it. The
MLA of a HASC member agreed in an interview on February 1, 2018, and noted it
wasn’t just policymakers who stirred solidarity in their rhetoric on international policy
matters, be it informed or not:
Many [of the public] they think they are “informed” by talk radio on both sides.
They are engaged but get their information from unreliable sources which is
damaging and influences how they respond to their policymakers. Many
constituents love the troops and hate terrorists but they’re not exactly sure why.
The average citizen sees when the price of produce goes up in their grocery bill and may
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navigate crumbling roads on their way to work every day. But, they do not have access
to classified intelligence reports that indicate where the next terrorist attack might be.
That information gap as a means to explain the collegial approach to defense policy
formulation was echoed by others too, to include a foreign and defense analyst from a
prominent Washington think tank:
[T]he public is not in tune with what is going on in Iraq and Afghanistan after 17
years at war. Members only really pay attention to constituents’ opinions when it
comes to events of more immediate consequence like the recent ambush incident
in Niger, the first American casualty in Syria, etc. The public is rarely aware of
specifics regarding troops in harm’s way and therefore members are not really
influenced much by constituents when it comes to determining an approach to
associated policies.
There is a difference between HASC and SASC members and the rest of the rank
and file when it comes to defense policy. [Defense committee] members are more
acutely aware and usually supportive of operations abroad (emphasis added). Both
influence the level of support they will demonstrate for the NDAA. (Interview,
January 29, 2018)
Another defense policy staffer with twenty years on the Hill qualified the last point and
gave credence to the idea that the rhetoric of members “studied up” on international
political pressures were respected and garnered followers: “Members on the HASC seem
to be more informed about the issues and intellectually involved” (Interview, January 26,
2018). Additionally, as discussed in Chapter 4, members tend to follow the lead of their
colleagues by way of the committees they are assigned to. In other words, non-defense
committee members tend to follow HASC members on security policy matters. And,
both may look to the president to fill their information gap, as exemplified in cases
studies later in this study.
Nonetheless, the trust placed in elected leaders and other public officials to guide
with fortitude given the information gap was also characterized as fragile: “The [2003]
Iraq War was a breach of trust on national security issues that led to a less secure feeling
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on the left and right, especially on the left,” cited a former congressional staffer
(Interview April 3, 2018). He continued, “9/11 changed things significantly with regard
to how safe people feel due to the nature of the threat. People feel less safe now and
there are most domestic constituencies to support our security.”
In summary, the American people are compelled to trust policymakers (and
policymakers their colleagues) when it comes to the veracity of pressures emanating from
the international political arena, as the average citizen does not necessarily have access to
the same information elected officials do, nor do they have the means (nor the interest) to
verify such information. As a result, policymakers can take advantage of the resulting
“information gap” to build coalitions around narratives that advocate means to address
international pressures (especially threats).
Summary analysis of interview observations
Security, first and foremost, was identified as why defense policy formulation is
perceived to be more collegial that other policy issue areas. Citizens feel more secure in
the notion there is consensus on the issue and that something is being done to ensure their
safety. Policymakers, and Americans in general, band together when their way of life,
values, or vital interests are threatened. The consequences of not providing adequate
authorities or resources to counter threats from abroad greatly outweigh political and
other risks associated with “getting it wrong” in other policy realms—over 3,000
Americans killed on 9/11 is just one example, Pearl Harbor, another. As such,
policymakers are uniquely driven toward collegial behavior on matters of defense policy,
especially given possible risks of failure that could threaten American society and
institutions.
Policymakers generally see eye-to-eye on America’s place on the world stage,
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though may not fully agree on what to do about it. Nonetheless, views are common
enough to provide a robust basis for collegial discourse on policy and legislation to
address international political pressures.
Presidential leadership can, and often does, play a significant role in aligning
policymakers in Congress on how to best address political pressures from the
international arena. Historically, members of Congress fall in line to support the
executive in times of national crises or when faced with an immediate threat from abroad.
Members may follow the president for the sake of political solidarity or for fear of
political repercussion, among other reasons.
The Highway Bill is essentially a product of distributive politics. Even the federal
highway system, justified in part for national defense purposes, is ultimately a product of
resource allocation. There are winners and losers and log-rolling to balance the field.
The Farm Bill is largely the same, though some aspects—namely trade—are directly
subject to global markets and international political pressures. Tariffs and food aid are
also tools of diplomacy and economic development that engender opportunities lending
to an ultimate goal of increased prosperity for all Americans. Yet, security is a
precondition of the prosperity generated by stable commodity markets and transportation,
benefits reaped in part from the Highway Bill and the Farm Bill. Defense policy is
different because without security distributive politics are at risk. Economic discourse
and growth require a minimal level of security to flourish. Livelihoods may be at risk
with an economic slowdown or crises but lives of citizens are at risk (civilians and
servicemembers) when it comes to security crises. Losses in the former are recoverable,
improvements in well-being and overall quality of life only matter if one is alive to take
advantage of those gains.
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Americans want to feel secure. That said, they do not have the capacity to know
the true nature of international threats nor if those threats are being effectively addressed
other than from what policymakers tell them. That “information gap” can and is
leveraged to build coalitions and advocacy to address threats regardless of partisan
tendencies. As a result, the nation is more secure and policymakers gain politically when
their constituents feel more secure.
Conclusion
This chapter sought to identify factors from the international political
environment that influence the collegiality of defense policy formulation in Congress. To
do so, members of the policy community were polled about aspects of the international
political environment likely to trigger more collegial behavior among policymakers—
what truly motivates collaboration across the aisle? They were also asked to compare the
defense policy process (specifically, the NDAA process) in Congress with that of other
policy issues, to include agriculture and transportation policy (specifically, the Farm Bill
and Highway Bill), with consideration for how pressures from the international political
arena impacted each.
Primary factors identified by interviewees from the international political arena
weighing on policymakers’ approach to the defense policy process were categorized into
five thematic subsections: Security; America’s role in the world; Presidential leadership;
Defense versus other policy areas; and, The “information gap”. Those themes also
became the foundation for the historical case studies in the next chapter—a presentation
of discussions operationalizing factors identified by interviewees in the effort to provide
the most comprehensive explanation possible for how international political influences
weigh on the political nature of defense policy deliberations. Together, they provide a
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plausible evidence which helps better explain why defense policy formulation in
Congress is often construed as more collegial than other policy areas.
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Chapter 8 - International Influences: Case Studies
The purpose of this chapter is to provide the final piece of this study’s attempt to
build a comprehensive picture of the factors that explain the perceived collegial nature of
defense policy formulation in Congress. More specifically, it is focused on illustrating
how pressures from the international political environment, as identified in interviews
with members of the policy community presented in the previous chapter, were
practically manifested in historical events and subsequently resulted in evidence of
recognizable collegial discourse on defense policy among elected leaders in Congress.
Those pressures include how concerns about security, America’s role in the world,
presidential leadership, and the “information gap,” among other adjoining elements,
incited members of Congress to lay aside otherwise strong partisan loyalties to
collaborate on policy solutions.
To do so, three cases are presented. Each case represents a scenario during which
international political pressures weighed on the United States uniquely, but also
commonly in that each situation initially manifested notable partisan or ideological strife
among members of Congress in addressing the issue at hand. In all three cases, often
during which there were multiple failed attempts at finding common ground and
considerable partisan obstacles, elected leaders eventually came together from both sides
of the aisle to enact a joint policy solution to serve the national interest. To maintain
continuity within the overall study, the time periods of the cases used in this chapter
overlap those used in previous chapters: 1961-1966, 1993-1998, and 2007-2012. The
first case from 1965, provides a recollection of how Congress dealt with a $700 million
supplemental appropriations request from President Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ) to
Congress to enable a notable escalation of U.S. military operations in Vietnam. The
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second case examines hard fought events that eventually led to wide bipartisan support in
Congress for the deployment of U.S. military personnel to Bosnia to support the Dayton
Peace Accords in 1995. The third and final case examines how President George W.
Bush announced, funded, and succeeded in the employment of a surge of the Iraq War in
2007 despite sagging public confidence and faced with a newly-elected Democraticallycontrolled Congress with a mandate to end the war in Iraq. All three cases consider
pressures from the international environment at the time that eventually led to
cooperation in Congress despite political strife within the domestic political context.
Case 1: Vietnam
On May 5, 1965, H.J. Res. 447 passed the House with a roll call vote of 408-7
(Poynter and Poynter 1965, 180). Much like the 1964 Gulf of Tonkin resolution which
authorized U.S. military action in Vietnam, H.J. Res. 447 passed the House and Senate
with sweeping bipartisan support and authorized the reprogramming of $700 million in
defense funds to help pay for a marked escalation of the war in Vietnam (McMaster
1997, 282-283). The legislation demonstrated strong solidarity in Congress despite
dissenting voices advocating for a more diplomatic policy, or just to pause to examine the
matter further. It was the first time the administration had requested an appropriation
specifically for Vietnam above the regular defense budget and therefore represented a
material increase to U.S. commitment (Poynter and Poynter 1965, 180). As such,
President Johnson suggested, “‘an overwhelming vote’ on the appropriation would
clearly show national unity,” as well as, “prompt support for our basic course: resistance
to aggression, moderation in the use of power and a constant search for peace” (Poynter
and Poynter 1965, 180-181).
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More broadly, the case of H.J. Res. 447 provides a marked example of how
pressures from the international political environment led to exceptional cooperation in
Congress which stemmed from: policymaker concerns about U.S. national security; the
role of the U.S. in the world at the time; presidential leadership and influence in
Congress; the “information gap” about what was actually happening on the ground in
Asia versus what the public perceived and was told; and by the fact there were U.S.
troops in harm’s way. In doing so, it helps validate interview evidence provided by
members of the policy community (as presented in the last chapter) as to how political
pressures from the international environment translate to exceptional bipartisan
collegiality in deliberations over defense policy in Congress.
Vietnam: U.S. role in the world and national security
The U.S. role in the world at the time H.J. Res. 447 was passed, coupled with
concerns for U.S. national security, were instrumental in driving exceptional bipartisan
unity among members of Congress. The Cold War was at high tide in 1964, and for all
intents and purposes, the conflict between the Soviet-backed Communists in North
Vietnam and the weak democratic government in the South was a satellite manifestation
of that War. “The Cold War had begun with a call to support democracy and liberty
across the world…[and] the containment policy migrated into the fringes of Asia”
(Kissinger 2014, 296). If South Vietnam fell to the communists, the “Domino Theory”
conjected that the rest of Asia would also fall in succession, not to mention provide
confidence for communist revolutionaries to act in other places around the globe
(Kissinger 2014, 297). While “America’s initial motivation involving itself had been that
the loss of Vietnam would lead to the collapse on noncommunist Asia and to Japan’s
accommodation to communism…America was fighting for itself, [its own security,]
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regardless of whether South Vietnam was democratic or could ever be made so.”
(Kissinger 1994, 658). That Cold War mindset was accepted as common knowledge by
policymakers in Congress and supported by the Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson
administrations.
A young Congressman at the time, Donald Rumsfeld (2011, 72) recalled the time
only a few years after the Cuba missile Crisis: “the Communists were testing American
resolve on several continents. It was hard, if not impossible, to ignore the challenge the
Communists were posing in Southeast Asia.” There were instances of hesitation in
Congress as to the exact objectives and U.S. national interests in Vietnam, even early on,
but ultimately little argument as to the validity of the Domino Theory and the imperative
that the U.S. must stop it to contain the spread of communism.
Many also pointed to America’s post-World War II undertaking in Europe as
validation intervention in Vietnam was worth the effort. The economic and political
successes of the Marshall Plan were clear, preserved by President Eisenhower’s
containment policy via the NATO alliance (Kissinger 2014, 297). As such, intervention
in Vietnam was “initially supported by a considerable majority and raised to its existing
dimensions by a president, [John F. Kennedy], citing universal principles of liberty and
human rights…” (Kissinger 2014, 298). Fighting for such values was viewed as an
extension of the ideological Cold War battle between the Soviets and the United States,
and “with each passing month, America’s stakes were raised further” (Kissinger 1994,
657).
Summarily, support for H.J. Res. 447 was construed to be a vote for America and
its role as world leader in ensuring the preservation of liberal democratic values—the
polar opposite of what the Soviet Union represented in the global ideological battle. It
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could also be correlated directly to the nation’s security, an investment worth the risk as
illuminated by the existential threat Soviet missiles in Cuba had presented just a few short
years prior. As a result, the sweeping reception of H.J. Res. 447 by both sides of the aisle
in Congress as motion to ensure U.S. security and affirm America’s commitment to their
Cold War role was wholly understandable.
Vietnam: Presidential leadership
As already alluded to, presidential leadership on the question of funding an
escalation to U.S. military involvement in Vietnam, per H.J. Res. 447, could also be
attributed to bringing members of Congress together in a unique display of collegiality.
Having spent decades of his political career in both the House and Senate, LBJ
understood both institutions well, to include what facilitated its processes and
incentivized its members to action.
In that light, Johnson sent a message on May 4, 1965 to the House and Senate
foreign relations committees, armed services committees, and appropriation committees
(Poynter and Poynter 1965, 180). The President framed support for the request in H.J.
Res. 447, would be interpreted as, “Congress and the President stand[ing] united before
the world in joint determination that the independence of South Viet Nam shall be
preserved and Communist attack will not succeed” (Poynter and Poynter 1965, 180). The
Senate minority leader, Everett McKinley Dirksen (R-IL) took such rhetoric as goading
from the White House: “You criticize the war-making power of this Administration and
your aiding Communism,” yet, he ultimately voted for the measure (Poynter and Poynter
1965, 181). Democratic House members, like Appropriations Committee Chairman
George H. Mahon (D- TX) noted, “the President asked us [Congress] to counsel with him
and work with him, as members of the team.” a view apparently taken by the vast
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majority of House members from both sides of the aisle as demonstrated in the final 4087 roll call vote by which the measure passed (Poynter and Poynter 1965, 181).
As a leader of the American people and the Democratic Party, LBJ also had to
compete with the shadows of his popular predecessor and the legacy of the policy agenda
JFK initiated before his assassination in 1963. Despite JFK’s popularity, Henry
Kissinger assessed “each successive reinforcement to Vietnam made [President
Kennedy’s] choices more stark, and the consequences of either commitment or withdraw
more painful and costly” (Kissinger 1994, 657). LBJ was the recipient of that legacy and
would otherwise “have to jettison the apparent policy of a revered, fallen predecessor,”
not to mention, “none of the advisors he inherited from Kennedy made the
recommendation to disengage” with the exception of Undersecretary of State George Ball
(Kissinger 1994, 657). “It would have taken a leader of truly extraordinary selfconfidence and knowledge to undertake a retreat of such magnitude so soon after taking
office. And when it came to foreign policy, Johnson was extremely unsure of himself”
(Kissinger 1994, 657). He solidified that stance by invoking President Eisenhower’s
support for his actions in Vietnam, essentially using of a respected general and former
president of the other party to build a bipartisan fortification (Rumsfeld 2011, 71). So,
LBJ carried forward the momentum of the leadership of his predecessors provided in
making his case for the $700 million request in H.J. Res. 447 to Congress.
At Johnson’s prompting, the House passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution in
August of 1964 (Poynter and Poynter 1964, 331). Immediately before the second attack
by the Viet Cong that precipitated the resolution, LBJ “told legislators that if there was
another attack, the United States would have to retaliate” and he hoped, “Congress would
pass a resolution follow retaliatory action to demonstrate the government’s solidarity
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behind both the reprisal and his Vietnam policy in general” (McMaster 1997, 125). The
legislators agreed with the president on both accounts—the need for a resolution and that
military action was necessary should another attack occur (McMaster 1997, 125). As a
result, the Gulf of Tokin Resolution passed 414-0 in the House authorizing the use of
military force in Vietnam (Poynter and Poynter 1964, 331). Donald Rumsfeld, conjected:
“Johnson clung to that vote like a life preserver” to qualify clear bipartisan support for
escalation of the war from that point forward” (Rumsfeld 2011, 71). He further mused:
“After Johnson became president and the American war effort expanded, I was willing to
support a more robust military campaign in Vietnam, as were many other members of
Congress” (Rumsfeld 2011, 70).
Vietnam: Troops in contact
President Johnson also invoked bipartisan support in Congress for H.J. Res 447
by appealing to the needs of troops in the field. More American lives had been lost in
Vietnam in 1964 than the previous three years and it had only gotten worse in 1965
(Poynter and Poynter 1964, 331). The President argued a vote against the bill was a vote
against those troops and would be a slap in the face to the families of the 400 Americans
already lost in the conflict to that point (McMaster 1997, 282). “Rhode Island’s
Claiborne Pell, a Democrat, observed, voting against the appropriation would have been
‘like voting against motherhood’” (McMaster 1997, 283).
Vietnam: The information gap
Finally, over time it became clear the information gap between what the Johnson
White House portrayed as the situation on the ground in Vietnam in 1964-65 and its
reality were not aligned and was used repeatedly to foster wide political support by
members of Congress and the public. Former National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster
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(1997, 125) concluded that the restraint LBJ demonstrated in response to the attacks on
the U.S. destroyer, Maddox in the Gulf of Tonkin and his downplay of associated events
were to garner widespread support. “His holding strategy was consistent with poll results
showing that two-thirds of the American public paid little attention to the situation in
Southeast Asia. A July, 1964 poll conducted in Maryland indicated that voters cared
little about foreign policy issues in general” (McMaster 1997, 125). “[Johnson] wanted
to appear reluctant to order military action” as the frontrunner in the upcoming
presidential race and support peace as most Americans did (McMaster 1997, 125). Henry
Kissinger agreed with McMaster’s assessment, “[T]he Tonkin resolution was not based
on a full presentation of the facts” (Kissinger 1994, 658).
Taken together, it was clear President Johnson’s demonstrated leadership, based
on his intimate understanding of the politics and processes of Congress, support for the
legacy and guidance of his predecessors, his exploitation of the information gap, and for
the plight of troops lost and for those still in harm’s way, were attributable to the wide
margin of bipartisan support H.J. Res. 447 ultimately enjoyed in the Congress.
Collectively, the path of H.J. Res. 447 through Congress showed how pressures
from the international political environment led to exceptional bipartisan support in
Congress emanating from concerns over U.S. national security, the role of the U.S. in the
world at the time, presidential leadership and its influence over members of Congress,
manipulation of the information gap, and exploitation of the fact U.S. troops had been
killed in Vietnam (and more were in harm’s way). Wholly, the case helps qualify the
conclusions shared by members of the policy community as to how political pressures
from the international environment translate to exceptional collegiality in matters of
defense policy in Congress.
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Case 2: Bosnia
In late 1995, after the death of an estimated 100,000 people, the result of over
three years of brutal fighting among factions within Yugoslavia’s most ethnically diverse
republic, the civil war in Bosnia looked to be at an end (Rosegrant 1996, 1). Despite
pleas from Bosnia’s president for the international community to intervene and growing
evidence mass atrocities—genocide, rape, murder, torture—were occurring, the United
States and Europe both refused to commit ground troops to quell the violence and instead
left the task to United Nation (UN) peacekeepers (Rosegrant 1996, 1). The scenario
stirred tremendous debate in Congress as to U.S. commitments and responsibilities and
its members were divided by the issue, though clearly not along partisan lines. As a
negotiated settlement between the warring Bosnian parties was finally underway at an air
force base just outside Dayton, Ohio, the intense political strife within the Congress and
between the Congress and the White House as to accompanied U.S. policy also
culminated in reconciliation (Rosegrant 1996, 40-41). Concerns over national security,
America’s role in the world, the influence of presidential leadership, and the possibility
of placing U.S. ground forces in harm’s way, gave members of Congress from across the
political spectrum strong incentive to find common ground on the issue. As product of
the international pressures stemming from the war in Bosnia, those factors help illustrate
why members of the policy community concluded their reasoning about the collegial
discourse that underlies defense policy deliberations in Congress.
Bosnia: To deploy, or not to deploy?
The primary debate among policymakers regarding U.S. involvement in the war
in Bosnia circulated around whether or not to commit American ground forces. Early in
the debate the question was whether or not to send U.S. troops to relieve UN
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peacekeepers deemed underequipped and unprepared to handle the mission they had been
charged to prosecute. “Lawmakers sought strict limits on the use of troops” to “help
extricate beleaguered UN peacekeepers, should the war intensify” (Austin 1995, 10-10).
By late fall of 1995, as it became apparent a peace agreement was in sight, the question
policymakers faced transitioned to whether or not U.S. ground forces should be deployed
as part of a NATO peacekeeping element that would help enforce the expected peace
agreement.
The debate over deploying U.S. troops pitted members against each other,
regardless of party, throughout the three years the war raged. Yet, the majority of
members within the GOP-controlled Congress did not support the deployment of troops
the Clinton White House was insistent upon. “Most Republicans and many Democrats,
particularly in the House, vehemently opposed the deployment” of the 20,000 U.S.
ground forces promised by President Clinton, without the consent of Congress, to help
facilitate a NATO force to police the peace effort (Austin 1995, 10-10). During one
House floor session, after recounting cases of the atrocities occurring on the ground,
Representative Frank Wolf (R-VA) proclaimed, “ending the war in Bosnia was a moral
issue—‘forget the geopolitical things’” (Austin 1995, 10-13). On the other side, Wolf’s
Republican colleague, Larry Combest of Texas, Chairman of the House Intelligence
Committee, whose son had served as a Marine just a few years prior in the 1991 Gulf
War, emphasized he would not send his son, or anyone else’s son to Bosnia (Austin 1995,
10-13). The differing views between Wolf and Combest illustrate the divide across the
Congress at the time, regardless of party. House Speaker Newt Gingrich was “scathingly
critical” of the deployment, for example, but shared Clinton’s view that the U.S. “had
high stakes riding on the success of the Bosnian peace effort” and the form of U.S.
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involvement in the resultant peacekeeping mission “was essential to the preservation of
U.S. leadership in Europe” (Austin 1995, 10-14). On the other hand, from early on
Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole (R-KS) supported a limited U.S. deployment to relieve
UN peacekeepers and the lifting of a UN sanctioned weapons embargo, of which, “There
was no dispute that the ban had worked to the advantage of the Serbs,” accused of
carrying out atrocities (Austin 1995, 10-12). Ultimately, much of the debates stemmed
from the perceived U.S. role in the post-Cold War, post-Gulf War environment.
Bosnia: U.S. role in the world & security
Much of the debate in Congress stemmed from the unsettled role the United
States had in the world at the time. A primary question was whether or not the U.S. had
the right or interest to intercede into the civil war of a sovereign nation. Some looked to
the justification of the 1991 Gulf War that liberated Kuwait as precedent, “Where viral
American interests or cherished values were imperiled and where the risks were
reasonable, the United States should act,” as described by former U.S. Ambassador to the
United Nations Samantha Power (2013, 261). While Serbia’s aggression against Bosnia
was clearly recognized as an “international conflict, top U.S. officials viewed it as a civil
war. And it was still not clear whether the rights of individuals within states would have
any higher claim to U.S. protection or promotion than they had for much of the century”
(Powers 2013, 261). That said, twenty-seven human rights groups and organizations,
most for the first time in their history, to include the Quakers, “overcame their opposition
to using force” and called for military intervention in Bosnia to stopped the genocide
taking place there (Power 2013, 434).
For many, the humanitarian crisis in Bosnia simply did not meet the threshold of
the Weinberger/Powell Doctrine used to justify intervention in Kuwait and which
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demanded: (1) vital interests to be at stake; (2) commitment to win; (3) clearly defined
military and political objectives; (4) confirmed public and congressional support; (5) it
was a “last resort” option that employed “decisive force” and had a “clear exit strategy”
(Power 2013, 262). On June 5, 1995, in testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee and House National Security Committee, Secretary of Defense Willian J.
Perry admitted: “While the United States did not have a vital interest in Bosnia, it held
security interest in containing the war” (Austin 1995, 10-10). The possible risk to NATO
and to the stability of Europe concerned many, as a senior Clinton advisor put it: “It had
become clear that continued failures in Bosnia was going to spill over and damage the
rest of our domestic and foreign policy,” and passivity was no longer an option (Powers
2013, 436).
Bosnia: Presidential leadership
With an eye to the opposition in Congress, President Bill Clinton tried to sidestep
the Republican legislature when he could, especially as it became evident the cost for a
U.S. deployment approached $1 billion and lawmakers became more insistent he request
formal authorization for any mission in Bosnia, just as had been done for the 1991 Gulf
War. “In a clear attempt to avoid a battle on Capitol Hill, Clinton planned to use special
drawdown and waiver authorities that did not require congressional approval” (Austin
1995, 10-11). A bipartisan group of Senators sent Clinton a letter on October 26,
expressing serious concern that a solid case had yet to be made that a deployment was in
the national interest and that a senior administration official announced that they “would
not be bound by legislation barring the use of funds to deploy forces to Bosnia” (Austin
1995, 10-14). As a result, on September 29, the Senate voted 94-2 on a non-binding
resolution expressing the sense of the Senate that the president request the approval of
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Congress before any deployment was ordered (Austin 1995, 10-14). However, “Clinton
insisted that foreign policy should not be made on Capitol Hill” (Power 2013, 423).
In an October 6 policy speech, Clinton implored that if the United States did not
lead, the job would not be done (Austin 1995, 10-14). Earlier, the president argued that
saving the U.N. peacekeeping forces would only require a “temporary” use of U.S.
ground forces, done only after “consultation with Congress” and when requested by
NATO, yet his “aides insisted the United States would not be dragged into the war”
(Austin 1995, 10-10). The President’s reasoning was summarized in a July 1 letter to
Senator Majority Leaders Bob Dole (R-KS):
Failure to provide that support would result in a split of the NATO alliance,
heighten risk that the conflict would spread to neighboring regions, greater
suffering by the Bosnian people, and an increased danger that we would need to
insert a large number of U.S. forces as part of a potentially dangerous NATO
withdraw operation. (Austin 1995, 10-11).
Ultimately, the president “acting what he considered sufficient authority under Article 2
of the Constitution and under NATO…ordered the deployment of American ground
troops to Bosnia without obtaining authority or support from Congress” (Fisher 2012,
198-199).
Bosnia: Unity
Starting on August 30, 1995, NATO warplanes began a relentless bombing
campaign of Serb targets which convinced Serb leaders to cease the violence and work
with Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke to negotiate a peace agreement
(Powers 2013, 439-440). An agreement was reached in Dayton on November 21, 1995
(Rosegrant 1996, 44) and included a commitment by Clinton that a substantial U.S.
ground force would adjoin the NATO-led force to keep the peace (Austin 1995, 10-15).
In recognizing that the political consternation leading up to the accord could risk its
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success, as well as risk the stature of the United States and that of the NATO alliance,
and in attempt to convince the public the peace was worth the risk of American lives,
Republican Senators Bob Dole and John McCain came out in strong support for the
deployment of U.S. troops to enforce the peace deal (Power 2013, 440-441). This was
especially notable on Dole’s behalf, as he was President Clinton’s primary challenger in
the upcoming 1996 presidential campaign (Powers 2013, 441).
The peace announcement also resulted in a flurry of mixed messages from
members of Congress on both sides of the aisle, all of which ultimately shied away from
cutting off funds for the impending deployments (Austin 1995, 10-15). At least five
resolutions debated in the House and Senate leading up to the December 14 signing of the
Balkan peace accord in Paris were rejected, all seen as primarily politically motivated and
a threat to the peace (Austin 1995, 10-15). “In the end Dole helped convert twenty-eight
Republicans to Clinton’s cause” by convincing his colleagues that allowing atrocities to
continue in Bosnia were inconsistent with American values, especially if the U.S. had the
ability to intervene and, as he said, “because we happen to be the leader of the world”
(Power 2013, 441). The Senate adopted Dole’s S.J. Res. 44 by a vote of 69-30 and the
House approved bipartisan H. Res. 302 by Steve Buyer (R-IN) and Ike Skelton (D-MO)
on December 13; both resolutions demonstrated a realistic acceptance of the situation and
support for the troops for the greater good of the nation (Austin 1995, 10-15).
The two-thirds majority enjoyed by both resolutions in their respective chambers
was coupled with strong bipartisan supported funding provided in the 1996 defense
appropriations bill (which included $7 billion more than the president requested for the
Bosnia deployment) (Austin 1995, 10-15). The combined rhetoric and material support
was strong evidence defense policy could transcend the most tumultuous debates despite
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looming election dynamics, unprecedented foreign policy measures, and divided
government. As such, pressures from the international political arena led policymakers to
consider implications of placing U.S. troops in harm’s way, the president’s leadership
messaging, and the security interests of the U.S. and its allies, among other factors,
thereby helping to qualify conclusions of experienced public policy experts as to reasons
for the especially collegial discourse found in defense policy formulation.
Case 3: The 2007 Iraq Surge
Despite a devastatingly unpopular war in Iraq characterized by mounting
casualties and little public faith for prospects of success at the beginning of 2007,
President George W. Bush garnered enough support and funding from the newly-elected
Democratic majorities in Congress to deploy a surge strategy that turned the tide of the
war. This was a stunning political feat considering the new Democratic majorities in
both chambers were elected largely on the promise to end the war in Iraq (Austin 2007,
6-10). While Democrats had the majority caucus in the Senate, they fell short of the 60
votes required to counter filibuster attempts and nonetheless set out early to link funding
for the war with time limits and benchmarks for withdrawal (Austin 2007, 6-10). Instead,
the new Congress ultimately authorized and funded an escalation of the war during its
first year in office—the “Iraq Surge.” This was despite isolation of both the NDAA (PL
110-181) and the defense appropriations bill provisions (PL 110-116) from the war,
amendments to those bills and stand-alone supplemental spending legislation targeted
instead to realize a withdrawal agenda (Austin 2007, 6-10). The president’s successful
political maneuver in the face of such odds can be attributed, in part, to the themes
identified in interviews with members of the policy community as to why defense policy
formulation, in the context of pressures from the international political environment, is so
231

frequently able to transcend even the most vitriolic partisan situations to arrive in a
settled bipartisan agreement. In the case of the Iraq Surge of 2007, presidential
leadership, concerns over security, the information gap, and troops in harm’s way were
all factors that contributed to that bipartisan outcome.
The Surge: Presidential leadership, security, and the information gap
The situation in Iraq between 2004 and mid-2007 was dismally violent—the U.S.
military averaged almost 100 dead and 700 wounded per month by late fall of 2006 and
civilian deaths topped 1,500 per month by August of that year (Biddle, Friedman and
Shapiro 2012, 2). “[M]uch of Congress, most of the media, and a growing majority of
Americans had lost patience with the war in Iraq” (Gates 2014, 49). On January 10,
2007, in an attempt to turn around the devastating freefall in public support for the war,
President Bush in an address to the nation, announced a 30,000-soldier fortification of the
U.S. presence in Iraq in addition to a new commander, General David Petraeus, and a
new strategy for the employment of U.S. forces there (Biddle, Friedman and Shapiro
2012, 2). According to his Secretary of State at the time, Condoleezza Rice (2011, 590),
President Bush was worried that he may not be able to hold a domestic consensus
together long enough for the surge to work.
The president addressed the “information gap” with the American people and the
media in an attempt to build trust in the new strategy. To do so, he acknowledged the
current path was failing them and Iraq, and he took responsibility for it while also
invoking the efforts of troops in harm’s way: “The situation in Iraq is unacceptable to the
American people -- and it is unacceptable to me. Our troops in Iraq have fought bravely.
They have done everything we have asked them to do. Where mistakes have been made,
the responsibility rests with me” (White House 2007).
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To solicit deeper public confidence and acknowledge the resonance of the recent
election which placed Democrats in charge of Congress, Bush emphasized his deferral to
the help of others in constructing the new strategy: “We benefitted from the thoughtful
recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, a bipartisan panel led by former Secretary of
State James Baker and former Congressman Lee Hamilton….[W]e all agreed that there is
no magic formula for success in Iraq. And one message came through loud and clear:
Failure in Iraq would be a disaster for the United States” (White House 2007). The
president’s confidence in the counsel he received from the Iraq Study Group was
bolstered by him naming one of its members, Robert Gates, to be the next Secretary of
Defense, replacing Donald Rumsfeld who had personified the war for the White House
since its earliest days (Rumsfeld 2011, 707). Gates (2014, 48) recalled the moment as
one of only three over forty-five years serving eight presidents in which, “a president
risked reputation, public esteem, credibility, political ruin, and the judgement of history
on a single decision he believed was the right thing for our country.”
The president also gave a nod to the Congress specifically, again to emphasize
shared ownership of the challenge and to establish confidence in the new path forward:
This new approach comes after consultations with Congress about the different
courses we could take in Iraq…Acting on the good advice of Senator Joe Lieberman
and other key members of Congress, we will form a new, bipartisan working group
that will help us come together across party lines to win the war on terror. This
group will meet regularly with me and my administration; it will help strengthen
our relationship with Congress. (White House 2007).
His message to Congress foreshadowed a softer path than the road that was actually taken
over the next year: a caustic one, full of vetoes and veto threats, partisan vitriol, and
repudiation from Democrats and members of his own party, alike.
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Finally, Bush outlined the underlying reason why success of the surge was
necessary—to preserve U.S. national security:
The consequences of failure are clear: Radical Islamic extremists would grow in
strength and gain new recruits. They would be in a better position to topple
moderate governments, create chaos in the region, and use oil revenues to fund their
ambitions….Our enemies would have a safe haven from which to plan and launch
attacks on the American people. On September the 11th, 2001, we saw what a
refuge for extremists on the other side of the world could bring to the streets of our
own cities. For the safety of our people, America must succeed in Iraq. (White
House 2007).
The rhetoric regarding security was familiar, however. They were the same which had
been used since the days immediately following 9/11 to justify the military response in
Afghanistan, and perhaps the only holdover in the new strategy announced that evening.

“And then all hell broke loose.”
--Secretary Gates (2014, 48), referring to the surge proposal’s
reception by Congress.

The Surge: Congress and the new Democratic majority
Almost immediately, from the start of the 110th Congress, Democrats sought
means to legislate an end to the war in Iraq. However, shy of the 60 votes they needed in
the Senate to avoid a filibuster, and given most Republicans were not yet willing to
forsake the President’s wishes on Iraq, the new majority won only a series of symbolic
victories. A bipartisan coalition repulsed attempts to stop the surge, let alone the war
(Austin 2007, 6-10).
Summarily, it was “a combination of Republican unity and Democratic disunity
that prevented Congress from limiting the president’s ability to implement and fund the
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surge” (McHugh 2015, 9). The effort began in February when Senate Majority Leader
Harry Reid (D-NV) tried to open debate on the bipartisan Warner-Levin resolution;
despite the Democrats being joined by seven Republicans, it was “blocked by several
Republican filibusters over a period of two and half weeks” (McHugh 2015, 9). When
Reid tried again later, Minority Leader Mitch McConnell demanded “further debate on
the Warner-Levin resolution be accompanied by a debate on two pro-surge resolutions”
(McHugh 2015, 9). In March, 48 Senators, including one Republican, voted for a
resolution that failed by two votes, called for the redeployment of troops from Iraq, and
garnered criticism from the White House as an attempt to undercut commanders in the
field (McHugh 2015, 9). Not restricted by filibusters, the Democratically-controlled
House passed a non-binding resolution on February 16, sponsored by Ike Skelton (DMO), which opposed the surge and collected support from 17 Republicans and lost only
two Democrats in the 246-182 roll call vote (McHugh 2015, 9).
In the meantime, Secretary Gates put into place a three-prong strategy to engage
with Congress and convince members that the turn in tide was worth supporting (Gates
2014, 50). The first aspect of his strategy submitted that a troop drawdown could begin
at the end of 2007 should the surge strategy demonstrate success; the second called for a
high-level review and report by General Petraeus no later than September as to the
progress of the surge to that point; and the third “focused on media and the Congress
itself,” aimed to acknowledge and legitimize the concerns of the many critics with respect
(Gates 2014, 50). “The strategy largely worked, for a number of reasons,” which
included: the conditions on the ground started to change as early as July; the president
stayed firm in using or threatening to use his veto power; Senate Republicans largely
stuck together; and finally, “in matters of national security, Congress absolutely hates to
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challenge the president directly,” especially if it meant they might share blame should
things go terribly wrong (Gates 2014, 51). So, presidential leadership (veto power),
security, the information gap, and the fact that there were troops in harm’s way—all
elements identified by the policy experts interviewed for this study—Gates employed to
ensure unity in Congress and hold the line for the surge.
The House continued its effort to derail the surge via supplemental appropriations
bills: one in March (H.R. 1591) which required withdrawal by August 2007 and passed
218-212, and one later in November (Austin 2007, 6-10). The Senate passed the first
version of H.R. 1591 51-4, which directed goals be set for withdrawal instead of
mandating it (as the House version did), and while that provision was accepted by the
House in conference, the bill was still vetoed by President Bush on May1 (Austin 2007,
6-10). The veto override vote failed to garner the two-thirds required and in its place the
House sent another bill (H.R. 2206) that had no timetable for withdrawal (Austin 2007, 610). The new bill, however, directed fund be withheld until the president sent to
Congress a progress report on benchmarks the Iraqi government was to meet, which inturn triggered another vote to actually release the funds; the House passed that bill on
May 10, 221-205 (Austin 2007, 6-10). The House later passed an amended version 280142 with 18 specific benchmarks, the Senate passed it 80-14 on May 24, and President
Bush finally signed it into law the next day—over 100 days after it was requested (Austin
2007, 6-10).
Several other bills attempting to limit the war effort in Iraq were considered in the
interim between May and the November. However, the slim majority Democrats had in
the Senate was not wide enough to accommodate the passage of any of the Senate
proposals, nor any of the several bills the House passed (Austin 2007, 6-11).
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Furthermore, it was noted Republicans had been effective at changing the narrative
associated with the war, equating not supporting the war to not supporting the troops, a
label the vast majority of members from either side of the aisle did not want to stomach.
Republicans had succeed[ed] in redefining the terms of the debate, making
opposition to the surge synonymous with harming the troops. For example, thenSenator Barack Obama, a vocal opponent of the war, was hesitant to support future
funding restrictions, noting that no one in the Party “wants to play chicken with our
troops.” (McHugh 2015, 9)
“Another outspoken critic of the war, Democrat Carl Levin, chairman of the Senate
Armed Services Committee, supported funding of the surge; as he explained, ‘I don’t
want to send a message that we are not going to provide funding for the troops.’”
(McHugh 2015, 9).
With November came a requirement to appropriate supplemental defense funds to
ensure seamless funding for the Pentagon between the end of 2007 and the start of the
new year, also viewed as another opportunity to legislate a forced a withdrawal from Iraq.
The first emergency spending bill, H.R. 4156, passed the House 218-203, and included a
30-day withdrawal timeline to be completed by December 15, 2008 (in addition to
several other limitations on the training and equipping of deploying personnel) (Austin
2007, 6-10). The bill died in the Senate, unable to garner the 60 votes needed to invoke
cloture (Austin 2007, 6-10).
During this process, as with the one earlier in the year, President Bush was
consistent in his leadership tactics, demanding his request for emergency defense funding
be fulfilled before the end of the congressional session or he would veto the end-of-year
omnibus appropriations package (which funded the rest of the government) (Austin 2007,
6-10). In essence, he threatened to shut down the government unless the Congress sent
him a bill he felt he could sign—without Iraq restrictions. Calling his bluff, in mid237

December the House passed another version of the defense appropriations bill (H.R.
2764) by five votes, but it limited the $31 billion it appropriated to only being used in
Afghanistan (Austin 2007, 6-11). The Senate reworked the bill, upped it to $70 billion
(able to be used in Iraq or Afghanistan) and left withdrawal language out (attempts were
made to add withdrawal provisions but they did not meet the 60-vote threshold required)
(Austin 2007, 6-11). They sent it back to the House with a strong bipartisan vote of 7617 (Austin 2007, 6-11). The House passed the amended bill on December 19, the last
day of the session, 272-142, with the support of all but one House Republican and 78
Democrats, the rest of which voted against the measure (Austin 2007, 2-59).
The turnaround was an astounding feat for Bush and congressional Republicans.
They were in the minority in both chambers of Congress and faced a Democratic majority
with a fresh mandate to end an unpopular war led by an unpopular president. However,
the war, to include a surge of troops, was fully financed by two appropriations bills with
minimal limitations, no withdrawal mandate, and with support from members of both
caucuses. Additionally, the omnibus bill that funded the rest of the government passed
on White House terms at the end of the year, avoiding a government shutdown. Despite
all the partisan churn over the war, the president demonstrated strong leadership in his
resolve with Congress on the surge. He defined the surge as a vital security matter which
helped fill in the “information gap” with a favorable narrative and emphasized its role of
ensuring the safety of servicemembers in harm’s way. Collectively, these attributes again
reinforced conclusions of those interviewed from the policy community. More
specifically, when it came to responding to pressures from the international political
environment, presidential leadership, assurances of security, and working within the
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information gap to build trust and support, were all factors elemental in reaching
consensus on defense policy despite the terribly trying domestic political times.
Summary Analysis of Case Studies
This chapter delivered the final piece of the study’s effort to build a
comprehensive picture of institutional, domestic, and international political factors that
collectively explain the perceived collegial nature of defense policy formulation in
Congress. To do so, it illustrated how pressures from the international political
environment, as identified in interviews with members of the policy community in the
previous chapter, were reflected in events from U.S. legislative and political history and
led to notable collegial cooperation on defense policy matters among members of
Congress. Specific pressures illustrated in the case studies included how concerns about
security, America’s role in the world, presidential leadership, and the “information gap,”
among others, motivated policymakers to transcend their partisan bonds in Congress to
work together on substantive policy.
Three cases were examined, Vietnam, Bosnia, and the Iraq Surge, each
representing a situation wherein international political pressures weighed on the United
States and drove partisan rancor among members of Congress as to the policy matter in
question. In all three cases, partisan obstacles were overcome, and elected leaders came
together to see through a policy solution jointly that served the national interest. In the
first case, members of Congress of all political stripe joined in approving $700 million in
supplemental appropriations to escalate U.S. military operations in Vietnam in1965, per
President Johnson’s request. The next case examined the path that led to the deployment
of U.S. military personnel to Bosnia to enforce the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995, a
tumultuous policy road which eventually led to a hard-won bipartisan support in
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Congress. The third and final case examined how the U.S. troop surge to support the war
in Iraq in 2007 eventually gathered bipartisan support in Congress. That support came
together despite dismal public confidence in the conflict and that President George W.
Bush faced a newly-elected Democratically-controlled Congress with a mandate to end
the war. All three cases presented demonstrable evidence that pressures from the
international political environment weighed on the decisions of policymakers in Congress
enough to motivate a collegial tenor – one able to overcome partisanship and drive
cooperation on policy that moved the country forward.
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Chapter 9 - Conclusion
This study sought to answer whether or not defense policy formulation in
Congress is more collegial than that of other policy areas. The question was inspired by
an abundance of anecdotes, rhetoric, historic accounts, and scholarship that alluded to the
notion that policymakers get along better when it comes to collaborating on defense
related policy—a notion not substantively qualified until now. That is, the existing
literature was woefully short of rigorous examinations as to why a bill like the National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) has successfully passed into law every year for the
past fifty-plus years without fail. What makes it a remarkable question, worthy of
examination, is that the NDAA passed each year despite being faced with a variety of
institutional, domestic, and international political influences and environments over time,
to include the challenging contemporary era in which every instance of overcoming
partisanship in Congress is viewed as a significant feat. Given the remarkably stable and
consistent path of the NDAA, its history provided a unique study vehicle to help
understand why defense policy seems to be approach in a more collegial nature than other
policy areas.
The Farm Bill and the Highway Bill processes were chosen as comparative
examples to test the collegial nature of the NDAA process against, since both bills, like
the NDAA, also have a relatively consistent history as major authorizing legislation
passing with relative consistency over time. However, despite their routine passage, the
Farm Bill and Highway Bill have also both been entangled at times by partisan fights
while the NDAA soldiered on. This circumstance inspired the hypothesis that elements
within the institution of Congress, as well as factors from the domestic and international
political environment, provide unique incentives for policymakers to approach the annual
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NDAA with more collegial deference than that of the Farm Bill or the Highway Bill. To
answer that question and fill gaps in the existing literature, members of the policy
community were interviewed to provide insight, their insight coupled with analyses of
legislative case histories over time to build a comprehensive picture that could help
provide explanation.
Several verifiable reasons were demonstrated to plausibly explain why defense
policy deliberations, specifically those focused on the NDAA process, have been
routinely characterized over time as more collegial than other policy areas. Collectively,
those reasons are best summarized by the conclusion that, for all intents and purposes, the
NDAA is a de facto annual omnibus authorization bill with virtually unparalleled
political and institutional momentum and member investment that actively serves
individual policymaker interests as well as the overall public interest.
Finally, despite unveiling a wealth of evidence qualifying the notion that defense
policy formulation in the House is more collegial, there are still questions to be answered
as a result of the limited scope of this study. As such, while this study provides
elucidation regarding the question at hand, it also just scratches the surface on myriad
more as to the political nature of defense policy in Congress.
Hypotheses assessment
There was clear evidence supporting the underlying hypothesis throughout this
study. Credible interview accounts from members of the policy community and case
studies from history provided validation as to the collegial nature of defense policy and
reasons for it. However, the evidence was not wholly definitive in qualifying the main
hypothesis: The formulation of defense policy in the U.S. House of Representatives is
approached with more collegiality than other policy issue areas, mainly due to
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domestic, institutional, and international political pressures on members that transcend
competing partisan motivations.
Settling on how to operationalize collegiality as the dependent variable (DV) in a
manner that satisfactorily captured the concept in the political environment was one of
the more challenging aspects of the study design, especially if it was to be reliably tested
and provide acceptable methodological rigor. That said, collegiality is relatively easy to
recognize for those familiar with the policy process, especially if it appears in an
otherwise vitriolic partisan atmosphere. Even though it may be easy to recognize,
collegiality does not necessarily have a binary nature, making it difficult to effectively
quantify. You cannot turn it on or off, it is not black or white. Though, while it is
reputational, it is also measurable and roll call vote tallies were only one effective means
used throughout the study to help measure it.
Along those lines, a single vote is an inadequate measure of collegiality. A
policymaker does not pass a distinct threshold of collegiality at a point of collaboration
during the policy process. He may actually cooperate for days or years on an issue and
decide to vote against it the day of the vote. His decision might come for a variety of
reasons that have nothing to do with the matters he collaborated on relentlessly with
colleagues from across the aisle or with ideological opposites of the same party.
However, if a vote in Congress – a single, purely binary measure was employed to
capture his behavior for analysis, that individual could be inaccurately measured as anticollegial. Conversely, richer qualitative evidence and contextual knowledge, counts him
as fostering collegiality on the issue at hand. For example, the instance of the hate crimes
provisions discussed earlier, added on as a last-minute Senate amendment, or repeal of
the “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” policy, could be moral or ideological poison pills for a
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member regarding a bill, or conversely, the reason for him to change his mind and vote
for the final conference report.
Ultimately, I defined collegiality in a way that allowed both qualitative and
quantitative investigation: The exceptional and consistent cooperative interaction
among colleagues over time that rendered legislation which garnered support of at
least a bipartisan supermajority (two-thirds) of the House of Representatives upon its
final passage. I chose a spectrum of qualitative and quantitative tests to cast the widest
net possible in seeking explanations for the decision behavior of policymakers—
specifically, what factors incentivized them to work together when otherwise powerful
political motives were at play.
First, I examined the processes of policy formation that might explain the
perceived collegial nature of defense policy. From the interviews with experienced
professionals from the policy community along with historical evidence, it quickly
because apparent that the people and processes involved in assuring the NDAA passed
each year for over a half century were a vitally important part of its success and thereby
distinguishable from other policy types and similar authorizing legislation.
The people and process were culturally and institutionally different, mainly in the
manner by which the HASC constructed and considered the NDAA each year when
compared with how the Highway Bill and Farm Bill were framed and deliberated over in
their respective committees. The “building block” approach to the bill-building process,
whereby provisions were adding to the draft bill by consensus between the majority and
minority, was especially helpful in isolating the NDAA from controversy. Overall,
consistency, predictable routines, bipartisan loyalty to regular order protocols by HASC
leadership and rank-and-file members, a conjoined and disciplined focus on policy
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substance, a committee culture that reinforces respect for collegial behavior and tradition
in the NDAA process were all elements attributable to the people and processes of the
HASC that set them apart from the other two committees. While the Ag Committee and
the Transportation Committee were each shown to garner some of those tributes, the
HASC had pointed examples of them all and therefore cumulatively offered an
environment in which collegiality could flourish to get the NDAA passed year after year.
It was further demonstrated that HASC members and associated staff (personal and
committee staff) proliferated a pervasive, enduring culture which provided the NDAA
momentum via active participation from minority and majority members alike—their
attention and loyalty to the bill’s momentum fueled by their collective investment in its
provisions supporting the military, political pressure to pass the bill, and to committee
culture.
A common thread of the HASC culture referred to over time as reason for
collegiality among its ranks was in the wide reverence paid to constitutional designated
responsibilities. The oath to uphold the Constitution taken by all members and staff was
repeatedly referenced—Article 1, Section 8 specifically—as levying unique institutional
obligations that unified people around the defense policy process in Congress and
strengthened the transcendence of national interest over parochial concerns. Historic
records and personal accounts demonstrated consistency in that notion, especially
pervasive among those associated with defense or security related committees. However,
it was difficult to reconcile rhetoric with material intent, especially among politicians
motivated by a variety of unobvious agendas. Therefore, this issue presents opportunity
for further validation and study, moving forward.
The organization and operation of the professional HASC staff, especially in how
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they interact with each other and with members and personal staff—regardless of party
affiliation—appeared to make committee machinations more conducive to bipartisan
collaboration than other House committees. Opportunities to share time during
factfinding trip, open office spaces which were not separated between minority and
majority staffs, and shared open access to electronic drafts of the bill were notably
helpful along those lines, as was the cumulative product of institutional factors that
essentially comprised a shared “culture” among defense policy staffers. Accordingly,
that culture helped explain some of the unique collegiality pervasive in defense policy
formulation, especially in the annual NDAA process. While other committee staffs
shared some of the cultural attributes evident with the HASC, they did not seem to be
collectively present, nor as consistent. Information about the Agriculture and
Transportation Committees indicated staff operations were largely a reflection of
committee leadership desires in the moment, rather than being guided by an underlying
culture carried over time. Finally, the leadership of other committees did not seem to
foster the same robust and overt support for the policy pursuits of all its members,
regardless of party affiliation, as with the HASC. That is, professional staff on the HASC
have been continuously directed (and do) over time to help all members of the Committee
with policy related business regardless if the staffer and or member is of the opposite
party.
The perception that collegiality is more prolific on the Armed Service Committee
could not necessarily be explained by ideological alignment of committee leadership with
their rank-and-file members. The analysis provided evidence for relatively close
ideological member alignment within and among HASC, Agriculture, and Transportation
Committee membership. Parallels in the ideological nature of the three committees
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allotted adequate justification for broader comparison throughout study as relative
ideological peers—a baseline that placed the three committees on relatively equal footing
for more balanced comparative evaluations. Additionally, analysis inferred that when
members of a committee were more ideological aligned, it was mirrored in how a
committee’s subject jurisdiction, the matter of the policy the committee oversees
routinely, was perceived to be approached politically. For example, part of the
perception that defense policy is more collaborative than tax policy is bolstered by the
fact that the Ways and Means Committee is traditionally assigned a much greater ratio of
majority to minority members. That is, the tax policy (for example) is perceived to be so
partisan, in part because the majority “stacks the deck” by adding a buffer of members on
the committee to firm assure control during committee votes. Finally, HASC chairmen
and ranking members were expected to be more ideologically aligned with their fellow
committee members, as compared with other House committees. However, the data as
analyzed did not support that notion. Therefore, the perception that collegiality is more
prolific on the Armed Service Committee could not necessarily be explained by
ideological alignment of committee leadership with their rank-and-file members.
Contemporary domestic political issues and environments, with specific reference
to the different case study periods, were shown to weigh on the nature of political
discourse of the NDAA, the Farm Bill and the Highway Bill. It is valuable to also note
that the practical personal experiences of those interviewed from the policy community
mainly came from service during the latter two case study periods (1993 to 1998 and
2007 to 2012). The earliest case period (1961 to 1966) was underrepresented in the
interviews, mainly due to the time elapsed thence the availability of people with related
insight still active in the policy community.
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Distributive politics drove collegiality on all the Farm Bill and Highway Bill
cases, but only drove consensus on one of the three NDAA cases. Even if the matter of
central debate on a bill had a significant ideological or substantive bent, it was regularly
trumped by the greater influence of distributive politics with the exception of two out of
the three cases of the NDAA reviewed. In other words, while distributive politics seemed
to rule how members approached the majority of the three bills over time (motivated by
pork first to secure political capital, then by substantive policy issues), the cases of the
1962 and 2011 NDAA were arguably different. Summarily, the central debates of those
two NDAAs encompassed “certain domestic political pressures”—defined as legislation
with a substance-based central debate topic (as opposed to ideologically-based or one
dependent on distributive politics) and which garnered at least two-thirds of the final
House vote—distinguished from the other bills. While it is difficult to qualify a trend
given the scope of the subjects tested, the finding indicates that collegiality in defense
legislation is not solely driven by distributive politics.
The case findings indicate that with consideration for international political
pressures, national security first and foremost was identified as why defense policy
formulation is more collegial that other policy issue areas. The response to international
pressures show that policymakers band together when lives, values, or other vital national
interests are threatened and they can do something about it. The consequences of not
providing adequately to counter such threats were viewed as much riskier than “getting it
wrong” in other policy areas—the attacks of 9/11 provide a glaring example.
The cases also indicate that policymakers tend to see eye-to-eye on America’s
role in the world, though they may not fully agree on what to do about it. These shared
views are sufficient to provide a strong basis for collegial discourse on policy and
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legislation to address matters of international political concern.
The cases show that presidential leadership also plays a significant role in
aligning policymakers on how to address pressures from overseas. Clear direction from
the Commander-in-Chief was especially effective at driving unity in Congress when the
nation was faced with a national crisis or an immediate threat from abroad, even more so
the case when members of the military were deployed in harm’s way or if the lives of
other Americans were threatened in the like.
Conversely, collaborative support for the Highway Bill was determined to be
essentially a product of distributive politics or by collection of its “one eaches,” as was
the Farm Bill. The exception is that some aspects of the Farm Bill, notably concerning
international trade, are subject to international pressures that can motivate policymakers
to cooperate, especially if they are demonstrably linked to a broad swath of American
jobs or the economy. But this exception tends to prove the rule: defense policy is more
collegial because such pressures are pervasive in defense policy and only intermittent in
the likes of agricultural and transportation policy.
Incentives for collaboration in defense policy are strengthened by an “information
gap.” That is, the average American citizen does not have access to the same information
policymakers charged with national security do, nor do they have the means (or interest)
to verify their perceptions of how secure the nation really is. Policymakers can therefore
manipulate that “gap” in information accessibility to build coalitions that address
international pressures and threats as they see fit. Conversely, the public is more attuned
to the distributive implications of agricultural and transportation policies, especially when
it comes to district level implications of government program decisions in those areas.
Therefore, that constituent knowledge, the lack of an “information gap” in those policy
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areas, makes it much more difficulty to build legislative collegiality for decision-making
in those areas, lending to another reason why defense policy formulation is seemingly
more collegial.
Final Thoughts
The purpose of this study was to help elucidate the nature of defense policy
formulation in Congress, to learn from it in a manner wherein any lessons gleaned could
then be applied by scholars and practitioners, alike. It was meant to reveal and validate
reasons why deliberation over defense policy has been long observed as an opportunity
by policymakers to bypass the restraint and consequence of normal partisan biases and
strive for agreement on policy, even amidst the toughest fought debates and regardless of
who occupies the White House or holds the majority in Congress. The optimistic aim in
doing so—the practical value of this study, then—comes from the deeper understanding
it provides about how the American policy process works, especially when it does work,
and produces robust and substantive debate resulting in effective policy outcomes
positive for the public good and the nation writ large.
The hope was this study could provide understanding useful to overcoming some
of the most challenging obstacles to successful policymaking in the American system
today. Practically, successful attributes of defense policymaking in Congress revealed in
this study could conceivably be leveraged to realize more fruitful policy outcomes in
other policy areas. The question then, was whether or not the underlying research
question was answered adequately enough to do so. To recall, the original research
question was: Is defense policy more collegial than other policy issue areas addressed by
Congress? If so, how and why?
Historic records and personal accounts demonstrated consistency in that notion,
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especially pervasive among those associated with defense or security related committees.
However, it was sometimes difficult to reconcile rhetoric with material intent, especially
among politicians motivated by a variety of unobvious agendas. Therefore, this issue
presents opportunity for further validation and study, moving forward. For example, how
does the collegial nature of defense policy match up against other seemingly politicalfriendly issue areas that Congress deliberates on? How do the processes, culture, and
institutional norms of the Senate specifically weigh on how defense policy is dealt with in
the House? How does a president’s threat to veto the NDAA come into play with regard
to how rank-and-file members (or leaders) of the House view the bill process from a
political standpoint? The scope could also be broadened to include foreign policy
assessments in addition to defense policy.
Additionally, given the notable literature and credible personal accounts that
support ideology as factor in how policymakers approach defense policy formulation,
further ideological comparisons between and within committees and how they impact
policy outcomes, especially with regard to defense policy, presents much opportunity
moving forward.
In conclusion, there are many verifiable reasons to explain why defense policy
deliberations, namely those regarding the NDAA, have been routinely characterized over
time as more collegial than other policy areas. Those reasons can best be explained
collectively by the concept that, for all intents and purposes, the NDAA is a de facto
annual omnibus authorization bill with unparalleled political and institutional momentum
that serves individual policymaker interests as well as the public interest.
The NDAA helps address the distributive and parochial political pressures on the
agendas of individual members, but unlike most decisions in policy areas with
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comparable levels of collegiality, it serves fundamental national interests that constituents
generally understand.
The massive size and reach of the NDAA’s cumulative provisions and budget
authority are virtually unmatched in political and policy influence, and economic impact.
There are many more reasons for members of Congress to support the NDAA, almost
regardless of political stripe or ideology, than to oppose it. And there is virtually no
political incentive to be the first one to derail its staunchly consistent record of legislative
success which has endured without fail for over fifty years.
Finally, the NDAA’s annual legislative journey is unmatched in how its
provisions are built to the exclusion of controversial issues, a process tightly protected by
staff and members share an enduring culture that demands unusual loyalty to
transcendent importance of the process and its importance to the nation.
The NDAA is summarily an institution unto itself. And virtually all those
involved in the American policy process for the past fifty-plus years have been subject to
its far-reaching pull—the risks of its failure terrible, even existential; its rewards,
arguably universal. As such, the NDAA process has consistently demanded members
approach it in a uniquely collegial manner, more so than any other.
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